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Abstract
THE ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK: TRANSITION FROM URBAN POWERHOUSE TO
SUBURBAN INSTITUTION, 1950-2000
by
Henry Sheinkopf
Adviser: Professor John Mollenkopf

From 1850-1950, the New York Archdiocese welcomed newly arriving Irish and Italian
Catholics and forged a political block that influenced local, state and national politics with
political leverage sufficient to influence the city’s commercial sectors. This mobilization
transformed the once penniless and discriminated-against Irish, and later Italians, by enabling the
Archdiocese of New York, through the power of the vote, to promote its religious interests as its
adherents rose to positions of political and economic power. The Archdiocese of New York
became the owner of vast real estate, a provider of social and educational services, and an arbiter
of morality and power. In essence, the Archdiocese functioned not only as a religious entity but
as a political institution, relying on a large population of parishioners as the foundation for its
ability to affect local democratic governments.
As the latter half of the twentieth century approached, however, the descendants of those
whom the Archdiocese had helped left the city for the suburbs. The deindustrialization of the
New York economy coincided with growing preferences for the suburban lifestyle, which
included single family homes with ample parking, consumer amenities, and good schools. Low
cost VA / FHA mortgages, as well as the interstate highway system, encouraged this exodus.
Although it is well-documented that, in the decades after World War II, large numbers of white,
Catholic, blue-collar workers moved to the suburbs of New York City, research has typically
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focused on why they left and what impact this newly mobile population had on suburban
demographics and culture. Missing from these accounts has been how the political vacuum left
by diminished Catholic populations in New York City undermined the political influence of the
Archdiocese.
In fact, New York City in 1950 was about to enter a period of great political flux. Aside
from the flight of Irish and other white Catholics, the Archdiocese would have to contend with a
number of radical alterations in the fabric of New York City that would challenge its power.
These included: the mass immigration of Puerto Ricans; the end of the waterfront as both a job
creator and ethnic enclave; the decline of manufacturing in New York City; the rise of the reform
Democratic movement and the decline of Tammany Hall; the rise of public sector labor; and the
new politics mobilizing women, minorities, and gays. These unforeseen social and political
movements were highly significant agents of change in the American urban landscape and its
institutions, including New York’s Catholic Church.
Faced with all these factors, the Archdiocese of New York could have adopted a number
of strategies to either replenish its numbers or find new instruments of political influence in city
politics. Indeed, there were many nascent political institutions—public sector labor unions,
groupings of new immigrant populations, and civic organizations—that evolved during this
period. Evidence suggests that the Archdiocese was aware of the transformative environment
around it. But its fall from political grace over the next 50 years is apparent, demonstrated in
particular by the Archdiocese’s inability to stop the passage of laws that eroded its moral
authority, including measures that liberalized divorce and legalized abortion.
Given the Archdiocese of New York’s prominence and influence for over a century, its
failure to rebuild its power base when confronted with change, followed by its subsequent
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transition from an urban to a suburban powerhouse, raises questions this dissertation will seek to
address. Why did the Archdiocese of New York not use its political power to save jobs, protect
industries, and keep its flock from leaving? Were the failures caused by Irish domination and the
inability of the Archdiocese’s hierarchy to adjust to new ethnic realities? Were the factors
confronting the Archdiocese simply too much for it to adjust to at that time? Why did this
organization, perceived in the city to be powerful and perceived by its flock to be infallible,
appear to falter? What in this organization led to its changed role as an urban political power
player? In short, did the Archdiocese of New York foster the loss of its own political influence?
This dissertation will show the extent to which the Archdiocese was organizationally rigid and
impervious to signals in the environment, and how this rigidity was linked to domination by the
Irish, who were disinclined to allow other ethnic groups to have leadership or decision-making
roles.
This dissertation will describe the socioeconomic and political landscape of New York
City in the mid-twentieth century, the problems facing the New York Archdiocese, and its
reaction to the above issues. Further, this dissertation frames the Archdiocese’s shifts in power as
it transitioned from a classic urban powerhouse to a more suburban institution. The research
illustrates these shifts over the last half century based on an understanding of the changing
Catholic population; of a different definition of the “American Catholic”; of the still potent but
more nuanced Catholic power in the financial, labor and political arenas; and finally, of a new
understanding of the charismatic Catholic.
It is hypothesized that the Archdiocese functioned well in a static environment but was
incapable of adjusting in times of flux because of its lack of flexibility in maneuvering to
accommodate changing realities and its adherence to rigid policies. Citing the reservoirs of
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information noted above and focusing in particular on urban power research, this dissertation
will show that the Archdiocese of New York's rigidity resulted in a decline in its political
influence and power within the city. This decline precipitated the Archdiocese's changing focus
from the city to the suburbs so that it could survive and begin to exercise power and political
influence within its new suburban constituencies.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Located just east of St Patrick’s Cathedral at 452 Madison Avenue is the “Powerhouse,”
the residence of the Archbishop and head of the New York Archdiocese. So called because its
resident once had as much pull as almost anyone in New York politics, the Powerhouse still
attracts dignitaries, but they are less likely to come as supplicants. Mayors used to come to the
Powerhouse for advice on appointing city commissioners and ties between local parishes and
Tammany Hall were strong. An urban powerhouse and a cradle-to-grave social safety net, it
fostered loyalty among millions of immigrant Catholics and their descendants who settled in
New York (Dolan 1973).
With arrival of Catholic immigrants from Europe—first Germans followed by the Irish
and then Italians—the Church not only offered spiritual succor but created a system of social and
material solidarity anchored in individual parishes and supported by Archdiocesan-wide
institutions. It offered protection from anti-Catholic protesters, provided parochial school
education, jobs and access to political power through its relationship with Tammany Hall (Dolan
1973). The relationship was symbiotic: the Archdiocese of New York provided people and
Tammany received workers, consequently increasing the power of both. In the first half of the
20th century, the Archdiocese became a significant political force. Few elections were won or
appointments made to bureaucratic positions without input from the Cardinal (Cunningham
2009). Parish priests were even charged with getting out the Catholic vote before Election Day
(McManus 2009). When New York City mayors faced important political decisions, they often
made pilgrimages to the Powerhouse. Further evidence of the Archdiocese’s importance was the
ubiquity of Catholic institutions, which dotted the landscape to such an extent that by 1950 the
Archdiocese had become one of the city’s largest landowners.
1

At the same time, New York City sat on the precipice of volcanic and unexpected change.
On the one hand, Cardinal Francis Spellman’s role in the 1950s and 1960s as a Catholic leader
was at its zenith. He held sway over one of the nation’s largest archdioceses and exerted power
that went beyond his titular role in the Church. His influence extended to “New York State, and
even nationally and internationally — from influencing Rome’s selection of other American
bishops to helping City Hall choose commissioners and high ranking officials” (Quinn 2007,
168). Yet, with the erosion of the City’s manufacturing base and its decline as America’s
preeminent port, the Catholic working class found opportunities within Manhattan and the Bronx
considerably constricted. The trickle of blue-collar workers following jobs and dreams of a better
life in the suburbs that began in the post-World War II era soon became a veritable flood.
Demographic change meant that the half of all New Yorkers who were first and second
generation white ethnics in 1952 had fallen to nearly one-third by 1970 (Zeitz 2007, 13). In the
1940s less than half a million white New Yorkers left the City, during the 1950s, 1.2 million left,
and during the 1960s, another half million. It was “an outmigration on a scale associated in world
history with forced departures or natural disaster” (Freeman 2000, 172).

Statement of the Question
How did the Archdiocese of New York lose its ability to influence political decisionmakers, social and labor movements, and its own parishioners during the last part of the
twentieth century? This dissertation seeks to explain the transition of the Archdiocese of New
York from the urban powerhouse it had been before 1950 to its present status as a less urban,
more fractured, and less influential religious institution. It locates the Archdiocese’s declining
influence in internal and external forces. Internally, the Archdiocese increasingly relied on an
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inward-looking leadership wedded to an overly narrow social base of Irish Americans. It’s
socially narrow and inwardly oriented leadership proved incapable of adapting to demographic
changes, the decline of machine politics, deindustrialization, and the secularization of its
parishioners.
The Archdiocese of New York lost considerable political influence, which it had amassed
as its congregations had swollen in the first half of the century, after World War II when millions
of Catholics left the city for the suburbs. It appeared either reluctant to share power with later
immigrant groups or unable to assist in their ascension. In addition, the Irish viewed themselves
as Catholic leaders who would fight “to hold onto political power while simultaneously
reinforcing religious influence in the affairs of the home and the family” (McDonnell 2011, 1).
This attitude put the Archdiocese and its allies in Tammany Hall in direct conflict with newer
immigrants, who sought help not from the Church, but from political reform movements working
to register Puerto Ricans and other Latinos to vote (Badillo 2009).

Definitions of Power
From where does the Archdiocese gain its power? One model describes it as
organizationally immobile and inert, deriving its power and organizational design from the
Vatican. “It exists in a highly controlled environment, not subject to innovation; and the ability of
local administrators—even at the level of cardinal—to act is constrained by the decisions of
political superiors” (Wilson 1989, 13).Yet this stylized model where decision making of
consequence is controlled and directed by the Vatican still allows for autonomy in daily decisionmaking. The Archdiocese and its various entities can exercise discretion so long as they do not
violate doctrine. This protection of doctrine is maintained through “coercive persuasion”
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(Stewart et al. 2012).
“Coercive persuasion” might include expulsion. Threatening the norms of the Roman
Catholic Church and certainly those of the Archdiocese of New York could result in sanctions.
The Church maintains the threat of expulsion and the denial of secular rights, which include
access to local parish priests, schools, hospitals, orphanages, nursing homes, social service
agencies, and other church instrumentalities (Stewart et al. 2012, 380).
An incentive to conform—both for the Archdiocese of New York to Vatican norms and
for parishioners, who depend upon the Archdiocese of New York for religious and social service
provision—is based upon an understanding that rules must be followed. Breaking rules means
suffering consequences. In the case of the Archdiocese of New York, there can be no deviation
from the rules set down by the Pope and the Vatican. In the case of local parishes, there can be no
deviation from the rules set by the Cardinal and the Archdiocese of New York. To deviate might
result in expulsion. The “coercive persuasion” described by Stewart and his colleagues is even
more powerful than the threat of death.
The Archdiocese is a hierarchy controlled by the Pope, who delegates power to the
Cardinal, whom the Pope may remove or reassign at any time. The coerciveness of power
promotes conformity, which in turn reduces the possibility of adjustment to dynamic change,
such as the changes that occurred in New York City during second half of the 20th century.
The leadership tradition of the New York Archdiocese, like that of many bureaucracies,
did not promote adjustment to change but rather the opposite. “The sentiment of tradition, in
cooperation with an instinctive need for stability,” writes Michels, “has as its result that the
leadership represents always the past rather than the present. Leadership is indefinitely
retained…simply because it is already constituted” (Michels 1966, 121). Because of the
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inviolability of the Archdiocese’s mission and its bureaucracy, it was easier to ignore changes in
the environment.
Could the Archdiocese of New York, which in this dissertation is defined as Manhattan
and the Bronx,1 have directed its adherents to remain in New York rather than exiting to the
suburbs by refusing to empower construction of suburban churches? Interestingly, the exodus
from the city to the suburbs occurred with greatest intensity at the time of the Archdiocese’s
greatest political power. Could the Archdiocese have used that power to direct its adherents to
stay in the city by refusing to empower construction of suburban churches? Could the
Archdiocese have used that power to force the city and state governments to provide tax
assistance to protect businesses from closing and leaving the city? Could it have pressed the state
legislature to provide tax incentives to stop the outflow of waterfront based industries? Could it
have executed various measures to impede what was a crisis for the city? Or was it impervious to
signals and changes within its urban environment?
The changes in New York were a test of Tammany, which, though imperfectly
democratic, incorporated the immigrant working class. “Facing competition in the electoral
marketplace, big-city bosses found it in their interest to serve as ethnic middlemen, quickly
naturalizing and registering successive waves of immigrants. “In this way, machines ostensibly
assimilated the newcomers, fashioning multiethnic ‘rainbow’ coalitions” (Erie 1990, 237).
Alongside the political and social roles that political machines played for urban workers, the
Church had its extra-spiritual role. For Catholics in New York, Boston, and other cities, the
parish offered stability. It “was a fortress for old line residents. They strongly maintained familiar
1

The Archdiocese of New York is in fact 10 counties: Staten Island (Richmond), Manhattan (New York), the Bronx
(Bronx) and seven counties in the lower Hudson Valley, north of New York City. This dissertation focuses only on
Manhattan and the Bronx for several reasons, but for the purposes of this discussion most important is that
Tammany Hall, the regular Democratic Party organization and ally of the Archdiocese, was headquartered in
Manhattan and equally influential in the Bronx.

5

rituals, social events . . . and the neighborhood’s disappearing ethnic character, re-enforcing for
white Catholics the permanence of the parish's commitment to the neighborhood in a time of
change” (Gamm 1999, 239). Hence, the concept of power attained via the ballot box and based
on constituent voting was implemented by new ethnic "powerhouses." Yet, as Catholic voters
transitioned from New York City to the suburbs, their votes followed them, and no longer reliant
on the political favors of Tammany Hall or social safety net of the Archdiocese their affiliations
began to broaden beyond the Democratic Party and their parishes.
This dissertation will examine power and influence won and lost, power no longer tied to
a concentrated, urban parish. It will examine shifts in power that occur among other influential
entities to understand why the Archdiocese of New York could do so little to stanch the
diminution of its base and its power. Despite the Archdiocese’s clear, coherent values and
faithful adherents, organizational imperatives prevented it from adopting institutional responses
to changes in the urban metropolis that occurred from 1950 to 2000. It was a challenge the
institution could not confront (O’Reilly 1989).
Wilson’s notion that political power gained by bureaucratic entities—which can be
generalized from his description of political bureaucracy—occurs “by the growth of an
administrative apparatus so large as to be immune from popular control, by placing power over
a …bureaucracy of any size in private rather than public hands" (Wilson 1975, 2). The
Archdiocese of New York is a bureaucracy whose authority is believed to be derived from the
Pope, whose authority is derived from the heavens. It is thus a bureaucratic entity whose power
on earth and in the domain in which it governs is unchallengeable. And as we learn from
numerous interviewees Wilson’s point that “from the point of view of their members,
bureaucracies are sometimes uncaring, ponderous, or unfair" (Wilson 1975, 2) is an accurate
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reflection of parishioners’ experience.

Summary of the Argument
As the Second World War ended, the Archdiocese of New York was a central institution
in the political structure of New York City. It maintained a close advisory relationship with City
Hall and involved itself in key legislative battles at the state level. The institution spent more
than a century amassing such influence, attaining a power that is hard to quantify. Yet in a period
no longer than two decades after the war’s end, the prominence of the Archdiocese of New York
as a power actor had diminished considerably.
Traditional explanations for the City’s post-war urban decline focus on the exit of white
ethnics, primarily Irish and Italians, from Manhattan and the Bronx to the suburbs because of
post-war incentives for relocation. These included government guaranteed mortgages, newly
constructed highways that supported greater mobility, and the promise of a better life. These
arguments, however, do not deal specifically with conditions in the post-World War II New York
City setting and do not address all of the issues the powerful Archdiocese of New York had to
confront during this period of urban change. Suburban exodus was an important element but not
the only one; the Archdiocese was confronting a host of other issues that would contribute to its
political decline. They included external factors such as the shift of power centers from the
waterfront and manufacturing industry to other power centers; the replacement of traditionally
white ethnic, blue collar jobs with public sector jobs and the expanded role of public sector
unions in the City’s political structure. Factors internal to the Church included the inability of the
Archdiocese of New York to integrate newly arrived immigrants from Puerto Rico; Vatican II’s
liberalization of Roman Catholic doctrine in a period of major societal changes; and the
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Archdiocese’s decision to follow the Vatican’s position against birth control. It was during the
post-Francis Cardinal Spellman era, continuing through the reign of John Cardinal O’Connor era
that the Archdiocese's greatest loss of power occurred. Lindblom’s 1959 treatise The Science of
Muddling Through explains well the Church’s strategic response.
A highly significant challenge the New York Archdiocese had to face was the arrival of
an estimated 750,000 Puerto Ricans who were poor, uneducated, unemployed, Spanish-speaking,
and who, although Catholic, neither brought with them clergy nor shared the forms of liturgical
practice that the hierarchy had instilled in New York parishes. The inability of the Archdiocese
to absorb these new migrants contributed significantly to a reduction in its ability to maintain
dominance in the political life of the city. Competing arguments do not explain why, if the
Archdiocese was indeed powerful, it would not try to block such an exodus, or at minimum not
seek to slow the exodus down and maintain its own power base. In addition, the protection of its
physical plant alone had inestimable value: churches, schools, youth facilities, orphanages,
hospitals, colleges, nursing homes, convents and other real estate. The Archdiocese of New York
needed adherents to remain and likely government assistance to persevere. Yet during this period
of greatest change, the Archdiocese of New York continued to function in the same manner it had
for nearly a century, eventually to find its influence dramatically reduced and its real estate
unoccupied.
The internal decision-making process of the Archdiocese of New York vested all power in
the cardinals. New York State statutes governing charities aided the centralization of power in
the Archdiocese by uniquely granting institutional control not to a board but to the Archbishop.
No other religious entity has such legally binding authority. The process served to protect the
status quo but failed in promoting change, such as adopting new immigrant parishioners or to
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addressing increasingly salient social issues of civil and women’s rights and a growing antiVietnam War movement. The power amassed remained with the powerful and encouraged
organizational stagnation (Michels 1966). The Powerhouse proved unable to reverse its decline
through persuasive authority or moral suasion.
To substantiate my arguments and to gain a sense of what occurred and why, I include
interviews with Catholic clergy and administrators, members of the news media who covered the
politics of the era, labor leaders, community activists (including Puerto Rican activists who
witnessed the destruction of their neighborhoods), political leaders, historians, and other firsthand participants. While the interviews are anecdotal, they detail the transition of power within
the Archdiocese of New York from city to suburb, and contradict the simple, purely numerical
analysis that population out-migration was the primary agent responsible for the decline of the
Archdiocese's political power.
What is unique about this research is how it refutes the argument that the Archdiocese
lost power because its parishioners moved. Instead, it is a narrative of how political, religious,
and economic factors no longer protected the Archdiocese from outside attack. Catholic outmigration was largely balanced by in-migration. As established Catholics tended to move away
from the inner boroughs to the suburbs, newer immigrants moved in to take their place. The
Archdiocese power diminished in New York City not because of fewer Catholics but because the
Archdiocese became unable or unwilling to press its influence with the more recent migrants to
the city.

Alternative Explanations
A counter-interpretation of the New York Archdiocese's loss of urban power and its
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ultimate transition to a second base in the suburbs is one of effective adaptation. One could say
that the Archdiocese adapted well to changing post-World War II conditions, moving along with
its parishioners from the central city to the suburbs, and shifting from being allied solely with the
Democratic Party to building links with Republicans. Consequently, then, the Archdiocese didn't
unwittingly lose power in New York City, it just "went with the flow, and it went with the
dough." One also could say that the election of Governors George Pataki, Mario Cuomo, and
Andrew Cuomo represented the maintenance of Catholic influence. Perhaps the New York
Archdiocese did not give up on the city, but rather sensibly shifted its resources to where its
population was located. And in truth it had little economic choice.
A third counter-interpretation draws from Jelen's treatise “The American Church: Of
Being Catholic and American,” which states that “democracy and toleration also change[d]
American Catholicism...[T]o serve as a genuinely prophetic voice in political and social life; the
American church must maintain some vestige of its moral teaching authority” (quoted in Manuel,
Reardon, and Wilcox 2006, 83). By dint of its historical commitment to representing New York
immigrants and position of power in an era of dramatic and significant change, the Archdiocese
of New York had to meet the challenges posed by the new immigrants or see its moral authority
and political power in a secularizing environment put at risk.

Scope of the Study
The Archdiocese of New York includes New York County (Manhattan), Bronx County,
and Richmond County (Staten Island). This study examines only New York City and the Bronx
because the factors which are of interest for examination in this study of urban change were
greatest in Manhattan and the Bronx: 1) New migrants came primarily to Manhattan and the
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Bronx and later exited for other boroughs before ultimately moving out of the city; 2) The
Archdiocese had more access to money and power because of its physical location in Manhattan;
3) Manhattan until recently remained the “capital” of the city; 4) Tammany, the old line
Democrat organization, was Manhattan-based with deep alliances within the Bronx; and 5) The
waterfront was a huge base of employment for the entire city, primarily in Manhattan.

Evidence of Change and Transition
Deindustrialization
Deindustrialization weakened the Archdiocese’s hold on key Catholic niches in the New
York City's labor force. Between 1950 and 1966 industrial jobs in New York began to leave the
city's boundaries as its work force moved to the suburbs. “Industrial relocation entailed two
related events, decentralization of industry within the New York region and movement away
from it . . . [T]he change took place gradually. In 1953 New York City has fifty-six per cent of
the region's manufacturing jobs; in 1960, fifty-four percent. By 1966 the majority of jobs lay
outside the City” (Freeman 2000, 143). Factory jobs lost to the suburbs meant a shift of blue
collar workers from out of the City's center.
The port collapse was especially costly to the parish memberships. As Zeitz notes, “Once
the mainstay of New York's urban economy, the city's waterfront and its sub-culture changed
almost overnight. Its decline was one chapter in the story of postwar New York's economic
shakeup. In 1946, forty one percent of Gotham's labor force worked blue collar jobs. By 1970
that figure had declined to 29 percent, nearly matched by the 27 percent of New Yorkers who
held secretarial and clinical jobs” (Zeitz 2007, 148). The Archdiocese of New York proved
powerless to stop the outflow of jobs and blue collar workers from leaving the city, although

11

Gamm argues that white Catholics, particularly Irish Catholics, stuck it out in deteriorating
neighborhoods far longer than did Jews because of parish attachments (Gamm, 1999; Skelly
2011). As neighbors left or died, or children moved away, it became more difficult to stay. The
parish remained open, but the community was no longer accessible.

Politics and Patronage
Some writers identify the loss of patronage jobs as a catalyst for the Archdiocese’s loss of
power. Ware argues that the Tammany of old was not the Tammany of the 1960s and 1970s
because traditional patronage ceased to exist (1985, 126). The patronage jobs and the livelihood
of Tammany-affiliated operatives, loyal Catholics, were lost due to civil service and the fiscal
crisis. Moreover, patronage was controlled by the Irish, who dominated Tammany and “who
conceived of the Party as a defensive weapon to protect hard won advantages that cannot easily
be replaced” (Litt 1970, 46).
Increasing numbers of Irish and Italians embraced a conservative world-view often as a
response to newcomers and the changes they brought with their arrival (Rieder 1985, 1). Despite
discomfort with the culture of post-World War II liberalism, ethnic whites in municipal
employment found themselves relying on left-leaning unions. The Transport Workers, District
Council 37, American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees, and others may
have had politics different than their Irish and Italian members, but the power the unions brought
to the bargaining table would improve members’ lives significantly.
The primary loss the Archdiocese sustained, however, was private sector and waterfront
jobs too costly to maintain, not public sector jobs. Freeman writes: “With 36,000 of the 62,000
jobs added by the New York City government between 1953-1971 filled by African-Americans

12

or Puerto Ricans, municipal unionism became a movement of and for non-whites” (2001, 225).
Then the question of defining a “Catholic job” presented significant difficulty. Interviewees in
this study noted “manufacturing” or “police and security” as defining the jobs of the late 1950s
and 1960s (Dunne 2011). Construction would also seem to remain an area defining Catholic
employment. As Freeman noted the industry was overwhelmingly white (2001, 46).
Manufacturing in the city, however, was declining in the postwar years as firms moved to the
suburbs to cut costs. Their work force of white ethnic men followed.

Population Shift
The movement of Catholics out of the city and into the suburbs is well noted in New York
Archdiocesan history. “[T]hough the three [NYC] counties in the Archdiocese lost 166,956
people between 1940 and 1970, the situation was different in the suburbs. “The seven counties
there gained 744,669, of whom almost 323,129 were in Westchester” (Cohalan 1983, 296).
Westchester Catholics remained part of the New York City Archdiocese. Those moving to Long
Island created the base for a wholly new archdiocese. The population shift was so intense that in
“1957, the Archdiocese of New York announced the creation of a new diocese, the Diocese of
Rockville Center, to serve the nearly 500,000 Catholics now living in the Long Island counties of
Nassau and Suffolk—a service that would include driving lessons for people accustomed to the
New York City transit system” (Barry 2008, 192). This new diocese was taken from the
Brooklyn Diocese. Hence “as more and more upwardly mobile college educated Catholics
followed the new highways to the suburbs, the century-old tight-knit world of urban Catholicism,
with the parish church and school as its center, unraveled” (Quinn 2007, 169).
The loss of parishioners was particularly hard felt because while they were mobile the
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Church’s infrastructure was not. Church closings and school shuttering did not become common
until the 21st century. A parish priest noted in an interview that if the Church were a business it
would have failed some time back. It created buildings for large growing groups, most built
during the 19th century. Getting smaller was how to survive (Sakano 2011). But the Archdiocese
centrally owned all the property. Hence it remained a central decision-making system, slow
moving and highly resistant to making changes in governance. Yet the pressure to change could
not be entirely ignored. Much of that pressure fell on the parish priests who remained in the city
and provided services to the changing population of new immigrants. Despite their sometimes
heroic efforts, as the shortage of priests and nuns grew, there was less free labor available to staff
hospitals, nursing homes, and schools. The Archdiocese could no longer afford to be in those
businesses. The outcome was the loss of hospitals and nursing homes from its control and the
closing of schools.

Women's Movement
Further, the rising numbers of women in the municipal civilian labor force was to become
a bane to the New York Archdiocese. Although Vatican II provided promised reform, the
Church's decision to maintain opposition to birth control was contrary to the goals of the
women's movement, which had become powerful and politically significant. In New York, public
sector labor unions, especially, and a majority of the general population stood in support of
women and the right to abortion. The pro-choice movement was followed by the gay rights
movement to which the Roman Catholic Church was adamantly opposed.
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New Arrivals
Puerto Ricans arrived in New York during the 1940s and 1950s and changed
neighborhoods almost overnight. Although they were predominately Catholic their devotion to
the Archdiocese of New York depended on their reception. The Irish-dominated Archdiocese
looked upon their practice with suspicion, and its refusal to permit the creation of national
parishes for Puerto Ricans—a system that worked well for Italians, Slavs, Hungarians and others
within the Archdiocese—made the failure to minister to them in Spanish almost inevitable.
Portes and Rumbaut describe a rigid structure of ethnic hierarchies and an inherent
resistance to newcomers, which indeed was the case when Puerto Ricans met with the ruling
Catholic establishment on the mainland (2006). The Archdiocese had seemingly little room for
Catholics of color, especially ones who did not speak English. Although the new migrants’ needs
rivaled those of earlier waves of Irish immigrants, the Irish were responsible for building the
Archdiocese of New York and held onto their power within it. The result was that Pentecostal
churches found a receptive audience among the Catholic Puerto Rican community, and the
Archdiocese lost an opportunity to organize a voting bloc that might have extended the centuryold system created by John Hughes, New York City’s first Archbishop, and nurtured by Cardinal
Spellman.
Parishioners migrated not just out of the City. Within the City, Puerto Rican migrants
settled largely in East Harlem, but a shortage of housing created a new migration to the Bronx,
much as had occurred with previous groups. With each re-location there was conflict at the local
level between typically older white-ethnic populations and recently arrived Puerto Ricans. As
Jonnes writes, “Those who stayed and filled the old working class enclaves of the Bronx found
neighborhoods simmering with racial and class tensions. When Father Banome, a Catholic priest
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at St. Joseph's Church in Tremont arrived in the Bronx from East Harlem...no doubt the
appearance of a Spanish speaking priest must have carried an unsettling message to the Irish: ‘I
was just amazed at the struggle between them, the absolute hatred and disregard. . . . All the Irish
here disliked me intensely. If this neighborhood could not be like they wanted it they moved’ ”
(Jonnes 1986, 114). Such attitudes were certainly not the policy of the Archdiocese, but they
existed.

New York’s Archdiocese in a Changing Urban Environment
What position did Terrance Cardinal Cooke have regarding the urban chaos happening
mere miles from the Powerhouse? Did the post-Spellman Archdiocese have sufficient residual
power to fight for the new flock? Immigrants residing in this urban landscape, filled with new
Federal anti-poverty programs, new Democrats, and new interest groups were not as dependent
on the Archdiocese of New York as were former immigrants. Ultimately, this landscape proved
to be a difficult one for the Archdiocese of New York to navigate despite its customary influence
and power.
The waterfront on the Manhattan side was Irish dominated, as were transit and semiskilled manufacturing jobs (Fisher 2009, Freeman 1989 and 2000). But since workers in
traditional Catholic occupations within the public sector such as police and fire services were
permitted to live outside the city, those occupations did not suffer a decline in white ethnics. But
there was little the cardinals could do to stop the outflow of jobs in the era before government
created public-private partnerships and joint nonprofit-government activities. Job creation was
not in the parish priest's job description.
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Research Design
The Research Questions
In examining the decline in the Archdiocese’s relative power and position, this study will
address several subsidiary questions: Were Puerto Ricans and the other new immigrants
marginalized the way the Irish-dominated Archdiocese had marginalized Italians? What affected
the Archdiocese of New York’s ability to absorb new immigrants? Why did the Archdiocese not
organize Puerto Ricans into national parishes as it had done for other ethnic groups before them?
Might the “white ethnic,” i.e., the Irish and Italian, exodus from the city be explained using
Hirschman’s (1970) model of exit, voice, and loyalty? What might the Archdiocese have done to
stem the outflow of the flock to the suburbs and beyond?
This dissertation will describe the social, economic, and political landscape of New York
City in the mid-twentieth century to examine how the Archdiocese reacted to the issues it faced
at the pinnacle of its power. Adopting urban power research and an in-depth examination of the
Archdiocese of New York and its actions, I will show that it was the very nature of the
Archdiocese of New York itself that did not allow it to remain the urban political powerhouse it
had been.

Models of Power
I will first examine the nature of power and influence observed in the Archdiocese of
New York as World War II ended by focusing on how people perceived this power and how it
was related to the size of the white ethnic population within the New York City boroughs of
Manhattan and the Bronx. I will examine the Archdiocese’s power through the lens of three
models described by Dahl (1957), Bachrach (1967), and Gaventa (1982). The strength of the
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Archdiocese‘s power will be assessed via an historical analysis of the Archdiocese’s population
and practices that affected particular populations from 1900 to 1950; Catholic electoral
achievements defined in light of favorable legislative outcomes; and information derived from
in-depth interviews. My interviews focus on the power wielded by the Archdiocese. Specifically,
I explore how the Archdiocese of New York scouted political aspirants that it might be able to
support (Badillo 2009), exercised influence over Democratic Party political club activity
(McManus 2009), and was involved in legislative issues before the City Council (Vallone 2009).
Interviews will provide a descriptive profile of the Archdiocese’s political activity that sought to
protect its adherents and their institutions.

The Structure of the Relationships Between
the Archdiocese and Its Constituents
In addition, this study will examine the nature of the relationship of the Archdiocese of
New York with its blue-collar constituents. The post-World War II collapse of the port as an
economic engine, corruption, and crime were significant factors in the disposition of power in
New York City. These influences and the limitations of a Manhattan-based port led the shipping
industry to relocate to the New Jersey side of the harbor, which diminished the power of the
Archdiocese of New York. As manufacturing, port facilities, and related industry jobs left the
city, so did those who once worked them. The increasing power of the less Catholic public sector
unions served to reduce the political power of the Archdiocese. Labor leader Edward Ott (2009)
notes that the private sector labor movement was so successful in protecting workers and raising
standards of living in the post-war era that workers rarely depended on the Archdiocese of New
York. Thus, the "cradle-to-grave" service delivery of the New York Archdiocese—a creation of
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John Cardinal Hughes and sustained through the Francis Cardinal Spellman years—was no
longer as important. I will also show how increasingly secular, more mobile, and wealthier
populations grew distant from the Archdiocese when it could no longer provide tangible benefits
such as political power. With the emergence of "Cafeteria Catholics" among white ethnics and
other groups of workers the task of corralling the faithful became a much more difficult if not
impossible task (McLaughlin 2009).

Fractured Political Alliances
Evolving political alliances and the breakdown of traditional parties and coalitions will be
the next area of study. Shifts in the Catholic electorate included a growing number of politically
conservative, anti-communist Irish Catholics who defected from the Democratic Party, as well as
the fall of Tammany Hall, which had served as a buttress against reformist efforts and Irish
defections to the Republicans (Glazer and Moynihan 1963). Such shifts reflected a loosening of
the Church’s grip on its New York flock, further reducing the Archdiocese’s perceived political
power. Tammany’s demise, the rise of reform, and changing social conditions left the
Archdiocese politically weakened, with reduced local and statewide power to protect its interests
and express its political will.

The Archdiocese’s Response
The Archdiocese of New York employed little of its political power to respond to events
occurring in its community, in essence contributing to its own decline. This research will look at
the previously noted events and document through both historical and anecdotal accounts the
Archdiocese of New York’s lack of action. James McManus, Paul Crotty, and Monsignor Bergin,

19

in their interviews, contended that the Archdiocese under Terrence Cardinal Cooke could take no
action to stop the flock from leaving Manhattan and the Bronx (McManus 2009; Crotty 2011;
Bergin 2011). Bergin noted two important factors. First, the Archdiocese followed the Catholics
as they left the city; Second, Cardinal Cooke created a system for richer parishes to send
subsidies to poorer parishes as a way to help the newly arriving immigrants and those left behind
by the exodus. Hence, mass closures of schools and parishes were put off until the early 21st
century. In addition, the Archdiocese took a hands-off approach to the repeal of the Lyons law,
which mandated that municipal workers reside in the city. Its repeal ensured that the bulk of the
municipal labor force need not live within the Archdiocese of New York.
Other options that might have stemmed the flow of parishioners to the suburbs remained
largely untried. For example, the Archdiocese of New York might have registered newcomer
Catholic voters to demonstrate its political force. Instead the newcomers' allegiance was
increasingly to the newly-formed public sector unions and not to local parishes. The Archdiocese
of New York could have required its adherents who served in public office to vote to protect its
interests in Albany and at the city council, but it did not. Such strategies were implemented in
Boston and Chicago), although they actually only delayed the decline of Catholic power.
In addition to the Lyons Law, the Archdiocese of New York opposed several pieces of
legislation that challenged the heart of its moral vision. These include: divorce liberalization in
1966; 1970 state legislation liberalizing strictures on abortion; the City Council’s 1986
liberalization of civil rights statutes to include specific protections from discrimination against
gays; and the 2011 Marriage Equality Act, which permitted same sex marriage. An examination
of attempts to thwart these legislative acts will show the limits of Archdiocese’s power to
influence city and state legislative bodies.
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The Lyons Law, passed in 1937, but repealed in 1962, required public sector workers to
live inside the city’s boundaries for three years prior to their being hired. “Residency
requirements for city workers originated in the nineteenth century when local ward bosses hired
public employees, including policemen and firefighters,” writes Roth. "Their residency ensured
ward bosses that they would be continually elected. Policemen were also used to collect bribes
and protection dollars for the ward bosses” (2010, 314). The Archdiocese of New York's failure
to block 1966 divorce liberalization in the New York State legislature provides clear proof that its
moral vision held little sway over the secularization of family law.
The Archdiocese's position on abortion pitted it against the legislature again in 1970
when New York legalized a woman’s right to abortion. Again, this tested the Archdiocese's
ability to ensure that its doctrine was reflected in state law. In 1986, the City Council of New
York passed an anti-discrimination ordinance, also opposed by the Archdiocese of New York,
outlawing discrimination against homosexuals, and in 2011, the state legislature passed the
Marriage Equality Act, permitting same sex couples to enjoy the same civil benefits as those
enjoyed by married couples. The measure passed both houses of the legislature and was then
signed into law by Governor Andrew Cuomo despite public opposition by the Archdiocese.

Data Collection Process
Recorded interviews were a major basis for analyzing the areas under study, and for
drawing conclusions about those who played policy roles in Archdiocese affairs. Interviewees,
many of whom have had a long personal history with the Archdiocese of New York and
extensive experience in city and state politics, were selected for their specific knowledge and
expertise in this area. Their participation was essential to establishing an historical perspective.
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Other interviewees have information important to the study due to their professional positions as
journalists, educators, or policy-makers. Also among interviewees were media figures that
covered the Archdiocese of New York, individuals who had relationships with Archdiocesan
officials, public non-elected officials who served in decision- making policy positions, and
elected officials past and present. Their first-hand accounts proved essential to describing the
issues that dominated the period under study. The interview questionnaire is appended to this
dissertation, as is the list of interviewees identified by their vocation or position.
It should be noted that no officials presently in positions of power within the Archdiocese
of New York were interviewed. In fact, none were asked because the author chose to draw data
and ultimate analysis from the outside looking in.

Outline of Chapters
The research and primary data of this dissertation have been organized into three areas.
Chapter Two provides the historical context for the “rise and fall and rise again” of the
Archdiocese of New York’s power.
Chapters Three, Four, and Five provide a successive outline of sets of challenges that the
Archdiocese of New York faced over the last fifty years. Chapter Three specifically outlines
issues of shifting Catholic power, including the rise of secularism, lack of loyalty among
parishioners, and hierarchical issues. Chapter Four discusses Catholic leadership and the cult of
“Catholic personality,” delving into leadership development and the importance of the individual
men who were in power at St. Patrick’s Cathedral. Chapter Five focuses on the challenges of
changes within the New York City body politic, within labor, and the mores that had set the tone
within Catholic schools.
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Chapter Six offers a discussion of the shifting demographic narrative that becomes the
underpinning for the ultimate reorganization of the Archdiocese of New York in 2006. Finally,
Chapter 7 offers conclusions about the nature and extent of power wielded by the Archdiocese of
New York from 1950 to 2000.
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CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: A RISE TO POWER
This chapter outlines the history of ethnic groups within the Archdiocese of New York,
their evolution, and their competition for power. In particular the study examines the Irish who
constituted a white ethnic majority in the early 1900s, followed by Puerto Rican migrants and
other Hispanic groups that followed and constituted a significant influx of Catholics into New
York parishes in the second half of the century.
New York City has always been in near constant change. During the second half of the
nineteenth century, a massive influx of Catholics would again redefine its landscape. Most of the
first Catholics were Irish and faced difficult conditions on their arrival. They soon bonded,
however, via their poverty and their religion, finding in the Archdiocese of New York a unifying
and benevolent institution.
Unity and desperation made them attractive fodder for the local political machine, which
co-opted them by promising economic safety and physical protection in return for their votes.
“[N]ineteenth century immigrants arrived to find important political groups eager to satisfy their
material needs” (Schier 2002, 16). Janelle Wong stipulates in Democracy’s Promise: Immigrants
and Civic Institutions that the importance of immigrant groups was a function of need. Political
organizations needed those votes, and the voters needed the services, both tangible and political,
that the political organizations were able to provide (Wong 2006).
In time the Irish came to dominate the very machine that introduced them to politics.
They wielded their influence—over everything from jobs to local housing—through the
infamous Tammy Hall, a remarkably effective political machine,—from the era of John Cardinal
Hughes (1842-1864) through Francis Cardinal Spellman (1939-1967). Thus, the Archdiocese of
New York was brought into power by its adherents, the Irish, and began realizing the perks of
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political control derived from Irish control of Tammany Hall.
The Italians followed. Unlike their predecessors, however they were not universally
embraced by the Archdiocese and its political and economic engine. The changing economic life
of the city left little room for those who could not speak English, had no formal education, and
were unskilled. But the cradle-to-grave safety net provided to previous Catholics by the
Archdiocese and the regular Democratic organization, Tammany Hall, had wider gaps for this
wave of Catholic immigrants. The unbalanced relationship between the Irish and the Italians in
their mutual quests for power would linger for generations.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the city’s Catholic population was significant,
and the Archdiocese of New York itself had amassed considerable power. It would wield this
power without reservation, and Tammany would control the government via the services and
contracts it doled out. This state of play would continue for decades, until the very world around
the Archdiocese of New York began to change.

The Archdiocese’s History in New York City
New York City’s roots were hardly Catholic. Dutch and later English Protestant dissenters
founded the city, and for many years there was a strong streak of anti-Catholic fervor among the
general population. Papists were viewed with suspicion, suffered local legal discrimination, and
were subject to restrictions in commerce. Of 70,000 New Yorkers in 1806, a sizeable portion,
about10, 000, were Catholic. Starting in the 1840s, however, immigration swelled the population
so rapidly that by the end of the Civil War nearly half of all New Yorkers were Catholic.
German Catholics arrived first but were soon followed by the Irish. As Glazer and
Moynihan wrote: “In the 1840s Irish and Germans, who had of course been present in the city in
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some numbers before this time, began to enter in much larger numbers, and soon became
dominant. . . . By 1855, the Irish-born made up 28 per cent of the city, the German-born 16 per
cent of the city" (1963, 7-8). From 1820 until 1920 “some four million Irish immigrated to the
United States. Most of them were young Catholics fleeing from poverty and discrimination in
their homeland. New York was a favorite point of entry” (Shelly 2006, 52).

Arrival of the Irish
The first Irish immigration wave arrived in 1845 and brought more than three million
people to American shores. The immigrants “landed in America like tired migratory birds.
Prisoners of their own poverty, they were confined to the cities in which they landed” (Brown
1956, 328). These points of confinement were generally the large east coast port cities,
specifically New York and Boston. This migration created the “first great ethnic majority in
America’s cities” (Sowell 2007, 17). Poor and illiterate, Irish immigrants crammed into the
poorest parts of the cities, which quickly “became frightful slums as property owners converted
existing buildings into tenements to house as many families as possible” (Foner and
Frederickson 2004, 242). Forty-two percent of the nation’s 1.8 million Irish-born lived in the
twenty-five cities with populations greater than fifty thousand. In contrast, only ten percent of the
country’s twenty-nine million native born whites lived in these big cities (Erie 1990).
Irish immigrants were forced to live in squalor. Despite their crushing poverty, they chose
to stay in the cities; in fact, “in 1890 when the number of Irish-born in the United States was the
highest, less than 15 per cent were engaged in agriculture; the remainder was bunched in the
great cities with 190,418 in New York” (Brown and McKeown 1997, 329). The ghettoization of
the Irish, and the refusal of American society to accept the new immigrants with their odd
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accents and Catholic religious practices, was bolstered by the Irish’s own “voluntary segregation
reinforced by economic necessity” (Brown and McKeown 1997, 17). The Irish became “the first
ethnic group in American history to be concentrated in urban neighborhoods where problems of
poverty, crime and alcoholism were acute” (Cochran and Carroll 2003, 590). Today we find Irish
Americans comfortably distributed throughout the nation’s power elites in its cities, suburbs, and
countryside. But both before and after they left the ghetto, the Irish were to alter in multiple
ways the fabric of American society, particularly its political structure (Portes 2006, 121).
Scholars have noted that being able to speak English provided the Irish with their primary
source of upward mobility (Barron 1949). They were “exploited and proscribed poor; used but
not accepted by the Protestant majority” (Brown 1956, 329), and their movement into
mainstream American society was not to be easy. They greatly benefited, though, from the
Archdiocese’s cradle-to-grave care.
The Irish were greeted by the virulent xenophobia that had welcomed earlier immigrant
groups, which fueled and still fuels America’s long and ongoing debate over immigration. The
goal for the new immigrants was to survive, move up, and move out. As Nathan Glazer writes,
“[t]his was certainly a far distance from the idyllic world thought to be the future by Emerson
when he wrote: ‘In this continent—asylum of all nations—the energy of the Irish, Germans,
Swedes, Poles and Cossacks and all the European tribes—of the Africans and the Polynesians—
will construct a new race, a new religion, a new state, a new literature, which will be as vigorous
as the new Europe, which came out of the smelting pot of the dark ages’ ” (Glazer 1964, 128).
In the case of New York County (Manhattan)—headquarters of the Archdiocese of New
York—the greater the dislike of the Irish and Catholicism, the stronger the Archdiocese became.
The anti-Catholic vitriol of intransigent nativists served only to produce results opposite to their
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intended purpose. In rallying to defend their Church, the Irish created institutions such as
schools, hospitals, orphanages, and old age care facilities that paralleled those of the society that
sought to reject them. In so doing, these Irish Catholics became foundations of the political order
and hated by their enemies, particularly those who sought to reform politics.
It was ironic that “one of the principal functions of nativist campaigns has been to
strengthen the legal and collective clout of immigrant minorities, giving them greater voice in the
political process through mobilization of defense of their rights” (Portes and Rumbaut 2006,
347). The Irish viewed threats to the Archdiocese as threats to themselves. In response to these
threats, they bound together, seeking power through politics to support their community, to
preserve their identity, and to further their commercial interests (Elkin 1987). While their religion
protected the spirit of the Irish, the Irish constructed the “brick and mortar Archdiocese of New
York,” thus providing the physical sites for organization and action; politics would provide the
power (Sakano 2011). Over a 50 year period, “the Archdiocese of New York constructed
thousands of cathedrals, rectories and convents, parochial schools, colleges” (Miller 1985, 527).
This power would protect their institutions, guard them against physical attack, and ensure that
the political spoils came to them and not to later arrivals from other immigrant groups.

The Archdiocese of New York and the ‘"Cradle-to-Grave" System
James McManus is district leader of the Midtown Democrats and a member of the
McManus family, who have been Democratic Party/Tammany stalwarts since 1892. Referring to
the political club now led by James McManus, the New York Times wrote that “the McManus
club has controlled politics in Hell’s Kitchen and beyond for more than a century. It was created
by Mr. Manus’s great grand-uncle, Thomas J. McManus, who in 1892 defeated the legendary
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George Washington Plunkitt for district leadership.” “Mr. McManus, who at age 26 took over in
1963 from his father, Eugene McManus, still holds office hours” (Kilgannon 2012).
They were from Manhattan’s Hell’s Kitchen, once dominated by the Irish and later
upscaled with the name of Clinton. McManus pointed to the Archdiocese of New York as the
single most important institution to shape both materially and symbolically Irish urban existence
(McManus 2009). His analysis focuses on his neighborhood experience, but it also describes the
general ethnic experience of pluralistic societies, where “ethnic-based forms of social
organization and collective action . . . embedded in inter-personal networks” are critical because
“these forms of organization and action generate and distribute resources” (Sanders 2002, 330).
The Archdiocese provided support in the poverty stricken ghetto and granted salvation
from its difficult conditions. This became a religious and political process: first, neighborhood
residents were mobilized in defense of their besieged religious institution; second, sometimes
they brought other immigrant groups along as allies, inducting them into the political clubs. Irish
collective action fed the resident poor and the Catholic religious and political institutions that
grew to fill immigrant needs. Eventually the Irish dominated the social and political realms into
which they had entered.
As Gaventa notes, “[p]owerlessness within the organization still represented power
relative to what might have been the case without it” (1982, 194). In other words, the new
immigrants had nothing, and their lives were controlled by local politicians. Their powerlessness
gave way to a sense of group belonging, even as they were not in a position to question the
power of Tammany or the Archdiocese. Thus “leadership was not to be questioned and exit was
not a choice, then loyalty was the only response possible for the powerless” (Ibid).
That an immigrant group came to dominate New York’s political system is likely no
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surprise (Wong 2006). Previous immigrant waves reached to the heart of US politics while
subsequent newcomers “arrived to find important political groups eager to satisfy their material
needs. Political party organizations, especially the many urban political machines, did their best
to get them” (Bedolla 2005, 73). Erie writes that “the Irish capture of the urban Democratic party
depended on a large Irish voting bloc . . . the Irish mobilized politically much more quickly than
other ethnic groups. Irish naturalization and voter registration were the highest of the immigrant
groups. The Irish talent for electoral politics extended to high turn-out rates and bloc voting for
machine candidates” (1990, 28).
The Archdiocese of New York became a corridor to political power as well. It served as a
locus for organizing and for collective action McManus explained that in every neighborhood the
Church created ethnically homogeneous parishes, including national parishes created to serve
immigrant groups in their own languages and in many cases with their own liturgies. The
parishes catered to the spiritual and material needs of parishioners:
On 40th Street between 10th and 11th, we had a Polish Catholic Church with a grammar
school. On 41st Street, we had an Italian Roman Catholic Church with a grammar school.
On 42nd Street, we had an Irish Church. On 47th Street, we had a Belgian Catholic
Church. On 46th Street, we had a Lutheran Protestant Church and on 49th Street, we had
a German Catholic Church with a grammar school. On 50th Street we had a Slavic
Catholic Church, and on 51st Street we had another church where the Irish went
(McManus, July 2009).
It may be, as Erie suggests that the Irish were just better than others at organizing and
mobilizing. Of equal importance was McManus’s observation that “[t]he Irish were just the
dominant group—there were more . . . Irish here than any other group in population and power”
(McManus 2009).
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The Irish Become Democrats
The affinity that the Irish had with the Democratic Party was a product of their outsider
status and the Democrat’s antagonism to Republicans. Erie offers the following explanation,
“[w]ith the nativist reaction of the Know-Nothing party and by the subsequent shift of many
Protestant groups into the Republican Party, Irish Catholic identification with the Democratic
Party was further solidified” (Erie 1990, 33). A major purpose of Democratic organizations was
to provide material assistance and basic sustenance to the immigrant masses, which reinforced
the organizations’ ranks and was the source of their strength. “Spending, borrowing, and
patronage soared in the early 20th century. “Lavished on a single ethnic group, patronage tamed
the restless Irish working class” (Erie 1990, 53).
The improvements in the quality of life offered by the Irish-dominated political machines
were not limited to the provision of bread. Erie notes:
Irish machines did more than mobilize immigrant voters. They also increased the size of
the public sector in order to reward new voters . . . . Boss Tweed [the infamous New York
City Tammany Hall leader imprisoned for corruption] for example embarked on a
program of massive debt financing . . . in part to enlarge the city’s payroll (Erie 1990,
53).
The machines created a patronage system that would ultimately result in economic hardship for
the city, but those who once opposed the Irish and discriminated against them found they could
tolerate it (Shefter 1994).
Structural alliances and established voting patterns enabled the Irish political clans to
serve and control their community by manipulating the political system through collective
action. The Irish success story can be contrasted with contemporary immigrant groups who seem
unable to mobilize within the political arena to realize their communal self- interest (Teixeira and
Rogers 2001). Thus, Irish collective action fed the machine’s need for growth, and the ultimate
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result was Irish—and Catholic Archdiocesan—domination of the politics of the age.

The Power of the Irish and Tammany
Urban political machines were hungry for immigrant support and workers, but hungry
mostly for their votes (Bedolla 2005). The Irish had mobilized in defense of the Archdiocese,
sometimes accepting other immigrant groups as allies along the way. In turn the urban
Democratic political machine mobilized them. And the greater was the attack, the greater the
allegiance, strengthening Tammany and the Archdiocese. The Irish and the Catholic Church
rallied against nativism, which had a long history in the United States and New York. With the
immigration of German and Irish Catholics in the 1840s anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant
hostility found expression in the Know Nothing movement. The “American Party” emerged as a
potent, if short-lived, expression of political anti-Catholicism. Popularly known as the KnowNothings (because members of a related nativist organization customarily replied ‘I know
nothing’ when asked about their activities), the American Party exploited anxieties over
immigrants and Catholics” (Fisher 2000, 55). Political nativism in New York had an even earlier
genesis. In 1842, the American Republican Party was founded in New York City, and within the
year it had won nearly a quarter of votes in local elections. In 1844, the Party elected its
candidate James Harper to City Hall. He proceeded to enact a nativist program that sought to
limit the number of immigrants on the city’s payroll and push the poor and dependent classes
further to the margins of New York society. Nativist sentiments boiled over in the spring of 1844
with a street battle in Brooklyn and serious rioting in Philadelphia. When local xenophobes
decided to greet a delegation of Philadelphia nativists, the head of the Archdiocese, Bishop John
Hughes mobilized 1,000 parishioners to stand guard at local churches. When Mayor Harper
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queried Hughes if he feared his churches would be attacked, the bishop replied, “No sir, but I am
afraid that some of yours will be burned” (Burrows & Wallace, 1999: 632-33).
While the Archdiocese would mobilize parishioners when it had to, it preferred a strong
relationship with City Hall, and Tammany’s ability to deliver Irish Catholic voters for their
candidates ensured that the Archdiocese’s political needs would be met.
From its inception as the Society of St. Tammany in 1789 its members sought advantage
in the city’s political structure, whose “authority was exercised through a wide array of boards
and commissions as well as through city councils and mayors . . . [A]ppointments to schools,
police forces, and the various administrative agencies were made on the basis of patronage or
acquaintance with the appointing agent” (Elkin 1987, 24; see also Myers, 1917).
For the Democratic Party political machine patronage and the other spoils of the electoral
system provided a way of life and echoed Weber’s warning about professional politicians who
“live off politics” (Shefter 1985, 15). Golway writes:
Tammany Hall’s leaders delivered social services at a time when City Hall and Albany
did not. They managed justice at a time when the poor did not have access to public
defenders. In addition, they found jobs for the unemployed when the alternative was
hunger and illness . . . for generations of immigrants and their children in Manhattan, the
face of government was the face of the local Tammany ward heeler. And it was a friendly
face (2008, A23).
Besides winning votes through public services and jobs, political goods that were by their
nature limited, the Democratic machine turn out the vote to secure their power against
challengers. In a sense they were providing a public good of which New York’s immigrants
could take advantage:
Tammany, also appealed for the support of immigrants by defending them against
assaults upon their political rights and civil liberties. The machine fought against the
efforts of Republicans and upper class New Yorkers to reduce the political influence of
immigrants by altering election laws and restructuring the institutions of municipal
government; it opposed the efforts of Protestants to proselytize the children of Catholics
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in public schools; and it defended its constituency against the efforts of prohibitionists
and sabbatarians to enact legislation regulating the sale of liquor. The machine also
nominated members of the city’s largest ethnic groups for public office (Shefter 1985,
16).
Dahl, in contrast, emphasizes the source of ethnic politics as arising from an almost
inevitable self-organization to:
[E]nlarge the opportunities for ethnics to rise without undue discrimination in a system
that contained built-in inequalities in the distribution of resources. Political leaders and
their ethnic followings combined to use the political system in order to eliminate the
handicaps associated with ethnic identity rather than to reduce disadvantages stemming
from the distribution of resources by the existing socioeconomic order itself (Dahl 2005,
33).
Distribution, however, was their objective, and it often flowed into the hands of the few. But the
passage of civil service testing and non-political appointments reduced the machine’s ability to
provide such items as turkeys at Thanksgiving and other amenities. Responsibility for providing
the social services once provided by Tammany most often fell to the Archdiocese. In sum the
Irish were the best known of the political entrepreneurs, and they remained so until late in the life
of the political machine. Hence they played a major role in the development of the Manhattan
and the Bronx:
Edward Levine similarly argues that the Irish working class consciously rejected the
middle-class Protestant value of economic achievement. Alienated from Protestant values
and institutions, the Irish constructed the Democratic Party and the Catholic Archdiocese
of New York as mutually reinforcing institutions rooted in working-class Irish Catholic
values. For the Irish, power and security, not money or status, represented the highest
values. Reinforcing their separateness from the Protestant mainstream, politics enveloped
the Irish, becoming the approved secular career (Erie 1990, 243-244).

The Italians Arrive
In the early 20th century an estimated 1.5 million Italians resided in the United States,
with about 400,000 in New York (Baily 1999). For both the Irish and Italians, America—
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specifically New York—was a place where their labor was needed and their lack of skills no
detriment:
Italian mass migration to the Americas can best be understood within the context of
capitalist development. As capitalism expanded during the second half of the nineteenth
century, it brought new exchanges of technology, capital and labor within the Atlantic
economies….Italy became part of the periphery supplying labor to the industrial core
areas of northern Europe, to the commercialized agricultural areas of South America, and
to the industrial core of the United States” (Baily 1999, 23).
Not all Italians chose to go to America. Some went to other European nations and to
South American countries, with a substantial migration to Argentina. Like the Irish, however,
“[b]eyond the putative pastoral ‘stability’ of the village could be found a struggle offering little
hope of amelioration for the peasant and farm laborer faced with eroded land, exploitative
absentee owners and a government at best indifferent to their plight and at worse abusive” (Baily
1999, 24). Parenti (1975, 26) adds: “Overwork, malnutrition and, in some regions, malaria were
common conditions. . . . [H]opeless poverty, draft evasion, and desire for change and
opportunity, these were the main reasons why many embarked upon the long journey.” Of those
Italian immigrants, at least 95 percent were of Catholic background (Parenti 1975, 24)
The rapidly industrializing American economy, in which New York City and its port
played critical roles, needed a large, mobile, unskilled labor supply (Iorizzio 1970). Workers
were in demand, and in fact “[b]y 1900 it was virtually impossible to find an English-speaking
laborer doing common railroad work. The demand for such labor was met by immigrants from
southern and eastern Europe” (The Floating Immigrant Labor Supply 1907-1910, 331, 339; U.S.
Bureau of Labor Bulletin). New York’s economic possibilities acted as a magnet for immigrants,
particularly so for those from southern Italy:
New York was, over the period of 1890 to 1931, the biggest American city with the
greatest number of Italian immigrant residents. Between 1901 and 1913, a little less than
a quarter of Sicily’s population departed for America, most living in New York for a time
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if not setting up permanent residence there (Critchley 2009, 4).
The Archdiocese of New York and the Italians
Italians came as the Irish had come before them, to escape economic deprivation. But
unlike the Irish, they did not experience the religious discrimination in their homeland that had
colored the Irish experience. The problems between Irish and Italians in New York began with
conflicts over differing liturgical practices. This was compounded by the desire of the Irish to
control the flow of “cradle-to-grave” goods and services emanating from the Archdiocese. They
worked diligently to retain these benefits for themselves alone.
While the Irish utilized the Archdiocese and their command of English to begin their
climb to power, Italians struggled to learn English:
The Italians in New York confronted significantly greater cultural differences than their
counterparts . . . . The English language was difficult to learn, Protestantism was the
major religion [in New York], and even the growing Catholic Archdiocese of New York
was dominated by Irish hostile to the way the Italians practiced the religion. As a result,
the Italians had problems with the language, were subjected to religious prejudice, and
had greater difficulty understanding the values of the host society. Clearly, the cultural
encounter of the Italian immigrants was most traumatic in New York (Baily 1999, 75).
To add to their difficulties, unlike the Irish, Italians arriving in a rapidly growing and multilingual New York City had strong regional and language dialect variations. Former New York
City Schools Chancellor Frank Macchiorola noted liturgical differences and regional variations
among Italians, recalling from his youth that “Loretta was a small parish. It was a Sicilian parish.
Our Lady of Nativity was a Neapolitan parish. So, if you were an Italian Sicilian, you went to
one parish. If you were an Italian Neapolitan you went to another parish. You didn’t have to fight
for territory” (Macchiorola 2009).
Nativist anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic sentiments were not directed solely at the Irish.
Increasingly, most Americans stereotyped Italians as:
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[I]gnorant, volatile, “priest ridden,” dishonest, dirty—as criminals and strikebreakers who
clustered in urban ghettos and refused to assimilate. Sicilians were specifically singled
out for scorn as swarthy Mafiosi, as transients who came and went at the beck and call of
agents and padroni. The anti-Italian sentiment was also manifested in local
discriminatory legislation designed to exclude Italians from certain jobs. Although in
1894 and 1895, New York State had temporarily excluded all aliens from jobs on state
and local public works projects, it was some years later before a body of exclusionary
legislation was enacted into law. In 1909, New York made citizenship a requirement for
becoming a lawyer or a detective (Baily 1999, 87).
Irish Discrimination Against the Italians
Italians, who first had to deal with English, were then forced to face their coreligionists—Irish Catholics—who held official positions in the Archdiocese of New York
hierarchy. The Irish seemed to believe that Catholicism as practiced by the southern European
Italians was of a different religious tradition altogether.
For Italians the Archdiocese appeared incapable of fully integrating them into its religious
and communal structure. This may have also been the result, however, of geographic distinctions
created by Pope Gregory XVI when he created two separate dioceses, in 1850: the New York
Archdiocese (consisting of Manhattan, the Bronx, Westchester, Orange, Putnam, Sullivan, Ulster,
and Dutchess counties) and the Archdiocese of Brooklyn (Kings and Queens counties). The
prestige, power and financial resources rested with the New York Archdiocese, parts of which—
Manhattan and the Bronx—are examined in this study. The New York Archdiocese demanded
that each parish balance its own budget with income drawn from its own territory. The creation
of diocesan distinctions made the locus of centralized control more diffuse and created a “prayer
system based on geography” (Brown 2008, 113).
Irish resistance to Italian immigrant liturgy proved an obstacle to their integration, but as
important, the requirement that parishes become self-supporting, undermined the integration of
Italians who lacked Irish access to resources and were more likely to harbor more resistance to
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the Church hierarchy. Italians remained loyal to Catholicism but not necessarily to its Irishinvented and maintained boundaries. If “religions try to soothe emotional trauma by offering
alternative authority for one’s self-identity and social presence” (Carnes & Karpathakis 2003,
18), then Italians clung to their previous systems of authority to soothe the trauma inflicted upon
them by the Irish and the Irish-dominated Archdiocese. The liturgical and cultural chasm
between the earlier arriving Irish Catholics and their later arriving Italian co-religionists were
skirmishes in the battle for control of vital political resources, access to networks of power, and
ultimately economic power—all of which were controlled by the Irish and their political organ
Tammany. The Irish won the cultural and political battles but not without signaling that they
were limiting Italian access to the Church. They would repeat the same power play with Puerto
Rican parishioners, but in that case push these new arrivals to Protestant Evangelicalism and
away from the Archdiocese’s alliance with traditional Democratic Party politics.
As Diaz- Stevens writes, “[t]he traditional Catholic upper class, or politicians, are
oriented to the power structure of secular society and look to outside groups for support,
protection and legitimization” (1993, 36). The Archdiocese of New York similarly sought its
protection from political and even physical attack from within their political world, which was
controlled by the Irish and the Manhattan and Bronx Tammany political machines. Little room
existed for anyone but the Irish who were the “upper class” of Catholic New York. The Italians,
their Catholic devotion aside, were outsiders.
The cleavage spanned beyond differences in language, social structure, or religious
nuance. The fight was also over jobs and economic survival. The struggle viciously played out
with grave consequences for the Archdiocese and the long- term economic health of the region.
For example, the power struggle over public housing construction siting resulted in the
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demolition of Italian neighborhoods and left Italians as losers. Sharman (2006) details how the
Italians of Manhattan’s northern First Avenue were displaced to make room for public housing.
McManus noted how not one such housing development was built in the Tammany-controlled
Irish West Side of Manhattan (2009). His description of the power structure mirrors Bachrach
and Baratz’s model—forcing non-decision as power (1962). The West Side/Tammany
Hall/Catholic dominant McManus clan made non-decisions about locating public housing on the
West Side.
Of course, the power struggle between the established Irish and more-recently-arrived
Italians did not confine itself solely to the Archdiocese of New York. Rather, it began with a
basic inequity in access to low-level manual jobs, a primary source of newly available
employment and a bastion of Irish control. The Irish erected a hierarchical structure dominated
by Irish business interests, which were aligned financially and spiritually with the Archdiocese’s
elites, largely Irish: the Port of New York and the businesses attached to it. Fisher writes: “Italian
American dockworkers outnumbered the Irish everywhere in the port save Manhattan’s West
Side. Even though an Italian neighborhood initially created just east of Sixth Avenue in
Greenwich Village was twice as populous” (2000, 32).
Italians disproportionately occupied lower levels of the socioeconomic sphere. Only three
percent of those identified as first generation Italians had work that could be categorized as
professional or technical. For the second generation it was not much better at only six percent.
The percentage of craftsmen dropped to 22 percent from 24 percent between first and second
generations. Managers, officials, and proprietors of businesses fared not much better. Thirteen
percent could be so identified in the first generation and then only ten percent in the next
generation (Zeitz 2007).
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Italian Americans never achieved full access to employment. For many years Italian
dockworkers were regularly hired by only one among the many steamship companies housed at
the Chelsea Piers. In addition, they were largely restricted to coal handling, a job unacceptable
to Irish longshoreman. Further, as the Catholicism of the Italians was questioned by the dominant
Irish, so too were their politics. Communism, an anathema to the Archdiocese, was condemned
by the Irish and Archdiocese officials. Moreover they suspected that the Italians “were
vulnerable to capture by the communists . . . [T]he formation of waterfront Italians as Christians
and citizens was not yet complete, an attitude very widely shared by the overwhelmingly Irishdominated catholic clergy of New York City and the Irish waterfront’s rank and file” (Fisher
2000, 136).
Thus while both groups came from nations with high levels of Catholicism and poverty,
the earlier-arriving Irish maintained their role as gatekeepers and blocked the Italians from full
Diocesan participation and from the employment market. The Italians found themselves cut off
from opportunities for status and protection in the Irish-dominated labor unions, as well as from
gaining access to the higher reaches of the Diocesan structure. With few English language skills,
their access to the middle-class was also blocked. Their loyalty was questioned and their worship
styles were found lacking. The Italian “on the docks of New York might be called a dago or told
that it takes three of him to make one ‘white man’” (Tomasi and Engle 1970, 150).
Discrimination also extended to communal and social networks. For example, the Archdiocese
and the Democratic political machine might have provided them with the basic entry card to
New York and the nation’s middle class, but Italians arrived when the Irish already held positions
of power. The pews of the Archdiocese served as a status symbol but only for the Irish, who
likewise had sole access to Tammany’s jobs and patronage.
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Hindered from achieving equality through religious and political means, many Italians
sought a new direction:
The Italians in the big cities, not sharing in American entertainments and deprived of the
peasant communal life of old, sought conviviality in a host of informal associations that
began in grocery stores, barbershops, coffeehouses, and later crystallized into, or were
supplemented by, formally organized clubs founded either on provincial consanguinity or
city block and neighborhood (Parenti 1975, 31).
Having created an alternative to Irish dominated locales, Italians returned home to their social
clubs and other familiar groups. These associations, based often upon the geography that
corresponded to parishes in city neighborhoods, were alternative structures to the political clubs
that constituted the feeding system of the Archdiocese of New York. But the Irish-dominated
Tammany municipal jobs and union hiring halls remained closed to them. Indeed, the Irish had
found Tammany as the way to rise to the head of the “ethnic queue” (Lieberson 1980).
As an alternative, Italians frequently placed their trust in the padrone system. Adapted
from Italy, it was a means for middlemen to connect those at the bottom of the social ladder with
those further along. The padrone system was a response to “the absolute infrequency of literacy
among peasants [, and it] promoted the influence of intermediate power brokers who for a fee,
or a favor, would read a letter, explain a contract or witness a document. . . . [T]he gap between
peasant literacy and the need to write . . . gave great impetus to the padrone system” (Bell 1979,
161). Parenti writes, almost apologetically, that “since the days of the padrone system, they [the
Italians] had become accustomed to look for some individual for help and advice. No questions
of political philosophy impaired this relationship” (1975, 31).
The padrones helped the new immigrants by recreating Italian social roles in New York.
The padrone system offers an explanation of the beginnings of organized crime within the Italian
community, although without a similar system Irish gangs predated Italian-based organized
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crime in this country. The importance of the padrone system should not be overestimated,
though. Its ability to smooth the rough edges of assimilation could not compensate for Italians’
lack of access to resources and power. The obverse side of the padrone-client relationship was
restricted social networks and the stereotyped exaggeration of connections to organized crime
(Parenti 1975).
This failure of the Archdiocese of New York to meet the needs of the later-arriving
Italians, plus the discrimination against them, helped decimate their neighborhoods and
facilitated their exodus from the city to its suburbs. The failure to help the Italians integrate into
the city hardened into a pattern the Archdiocese would follow with later immigrants, which
would prove nearly fatal for the city and for the Archdiocese as well.

The Archdiocese of New York and Models of Power
Access to power meant more than social mobility or even the ability to vote. It meant
access to social, work, and political organizing locales, and often to the Archdiocese of New
York itself, as McManus pointed out (See also Portes and Rimbaut 2006). Access to work
mattered greatly and recommendations from Archdiocese-friendly employers and employment
activists carried weight. Such recommendations might also mean accessing even the smallest
portion of the Tammany-protected and -controlled patronage trough, which included lucrative
long-term business contracts and the jobs that went along with them and those provided via
organized crime’s growing influence on Tammany (Allen 1993). Irish domination of Tammany
Hall was to end with the ascension of its last powerful leader, Carmine DeSapio, who later was
toppled by a then little-known activist named Edward Koch.
But before that, the Irish came to control a good deal of the governing structure of the city
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through Tammany Hall. The political power of the Archdiocese extended beyond Tammany’s
political operations directly into daily city government activities. That Manhattan’s Irish West
Side was exempted from construction of the housing developments of the New York City
Housing Authority (NYCHA) is evidence of this power and influence (McManus 2009).
Compounding the Archdiocese neglect that weakened their neighborhoods, Robert
Moses sited public housing on upper First Avenue and forced Italians to relocate from their
neighborhoods. On the other hand, when Fordham University wanted access to land around
Lincoln Center the Archdiocese garnered support for the project. Badillo writes that:
[W]hen Jesuit-led Fordham University wanted to open a campus in midtown Manhattan
[they] brought Moses into the picture. He used his sweeping powers as slum clearance
committee chair and city construction coordinator to oust hundreds of tenants from six
prime acres of real estate adjacent to his Lincoln Center Title I development. Many of the
displaced residents at the location where the Fordham campus was planned were
themselves Catholic (2006, 183-184).
Badillo underscores that in New York City governance, and in the politics that made that
governance possible, the Archdiocese and associated institutions such as Fordham played a
significant role. Gaventa's "total power paradigm" is more descriptive in this case than
Bachrach’s "non-decision model" or Robert Dahl's writing on the "participatory model" of urban
decision-making. What the Archdiocese of New York wanted, it was likely to achieve; what it
did not want was less likely to become reality. If democracy is about “including those who are
potentially affected by collective decisions in making those decisions,” then democracy mattered
little to an institution powered by the Divine (Warren 2011, 683).
In mid- twentieth century New York the Archdiocese resembled an independent nation
“effectively consolidating power by controlling territory, developing administrative capacities,
and regularizing sovereignty through constitutional means” (Warren 2011, 685). It organized in
territorial fashion through its parishes and developed the administrative prowess to manage and
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control its many interests, including schools, nursing homes, hospitals, universities, and
orphanages. The Archdiocese shored up its considerable powers by seeking the protections of
civil law and influencing which laws were passed in the state legislature, including those
exempting it from public oversight and laws that went beyond those granted to other non-profit
entities.
Under New York State law, all non-profits, including churches, are required to respond to
pressures from members as expressed individually or through controlling boards or trustees. But
such is not the case for the Catholic Archdiocese of New York (New York State Religious
Corporations Law, Article One, Section 2b). All power rests with the “consent of the archbishop
or bishop of the diocese to which such Archdiocese of New York belongs or in case of their
absence or inability to act, with the consent of the vicar general or administrator of such
diocese,” but not with the civil government (New York State Religious Corporations Law,
subsection (e)).
David Samuels, a legal expert on non-profit organizations in New York State, notes that
“congregants in most religious organizations are memberships with the rights of members. The
Catholic Archdiocese of New York is a hierarchy. The members do not control what happens at
their Archdiocese of New York.” According to Samuels, the Archdiocese of New York is not
required to keep membership lists, unlike other non-profit organizations. “In the not-for-profit
corporation law [there are provisions that] . . . relate to keeping a list for what they call a record
date for the annual meeting of members. And we don’t have that with the Catholic Archdiocese
of New York.” The Archdiocese of New York is able to function as it does with the full support
of the state and its structure remains protected by statutes in place since 1909 (Samuels 2011).
The issue of the Archdiocese’s lack of permeability is compounded by its sustaining
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notion of infallibility, specifically “papal infallibility and papal primacy” (Reese 1989, 36). This
was fully confirmed as doctrine at the Vatican I Council (1869-1870). It was not until Vatican II
(1962 - 1965) that power was returned to some extent to local bishops as “responsible [agents]
for their dioceses . . . [with] a role in the governance of the universal Archdiocese of New York”
(Reese 1989, 24). All power ultimately belongs with the Pope, but flows to the bishops as his
agents. In New York State, their power cannot be challenged by the normative legal means used
by members of other non-profit or religious entities who might find themselves in disagreement
with their organizations.
To this day power within the Church remains with the Archdiocese, unchallenged. Brown
called it a “tiered system of tolerance” in which the hierarchy managed parish autonomy (1956,
53-65). In Manhattan, which was the richer, more politically potent and prestigious locale,
diocesan power determined where parishes could and could not be located, as well as which
populations were permitted linguistic variations in the service. Thus the hierarchy maintained
total control. Irish adherents, who were in New York the longest and thus the most entrenched,
were the most fearful of losing power. They exercised their ability to impede the access of other
ethnic groups to decision-making power.

Summary
To contextualize the eventual shift in power of the Archdiocese of New York, this chapter
focused on the rise of the city's white ethnic Catholic population, specifically on the arrival and
ultimate supremacy of the Irish and the later influx of working-class Italian Catholics, who
served as a harbinger of the ”third wave” immigration of Puerto Rican and Hispanic populations.
Each holds a key to the eventual change in power that occurred in the latter part of the last

45

century. For the Archdiocese of New York, the past is, indeed, a prologue.
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CHAPTER III. CHALLENGES EMERGE: SHIFTING CATHOLIC POWER
This chapter is the first of three that incorporates thirty-five separate interviews
conducted over a six-year period from 2009 through 2014. These interviews spanned more than
an estimated sixty hours of in-person communication.
My interview subjects represent a broad spectrum of thought leaders who could speak to
the present, past, and future power and position of the New York Archdiocese. From politicians
to policy experts to educational experts, from members of the Catholic clergy to lay leadership
within the Archdiocese of New York—and members of the news media who had covered the
Archdiocese and its leadership—all were generous with their time and responses. Each interview
was a series of questions outlined in a questionnaire (see Appendix B) and answers were
carefully coded during more than two months of organizational work.
After coding, I categorized responses into twelve groupings. During the interviews,
respondents raised similar themes: the rise of secularism; shifting loyalties; changes in the 1960s;
the Archdiocese of New York’s adaptation to the changes in its environment; hierarchical
reorganization; and ways of thinking and responding to single issues.
Interviewees cited the role of secularism in changing the Archdiocese's political
environment and noted a perceived decline in religious practice and a lack of commitment to
Catholic tenets, Indicative of changes outside the Church were government sanctioned policies
such as condom distribution in city schools. Politically, congregants displayed decreases in
loyalty to the Democratic Party and a greater affinity for Republicans. In practical terms, the
Archdiocese failed to rally New York City Catholics to block abortion rights and liberalized
divorce laws, and other pertinent social issues.
The Archdiocese of New York’s faced two difficulties: adapting to changes in the
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political and social environments, and maintaining the status quo within the Church as new
conditions, demographic and political, seemed to shift almost daily. This chapter concerns itself
with demographic changes that occurred during the 1960s. Changing social norms affected
parishioners’ views on the Archdiocese. And those views were also the result of an expanding
secular knowledge and orientation that often accompany increased wealth and suburbanization.
New York City Catholics, including the Archdiocese’s Irish working-class base were unsettled by
Vietnam antiwar protests, the 1968 New York City teachers’ strike, and the increased importance
of money in politics.
In this chapter interview respondents also weigh in on the failure of the Archdiocese of
New York to integrate Puerto Ricans and its failure to maintain its influence with its longstanding parishioners. They consider the role of reform politics, which challenged and defeated
the Tammany system, and the influence of Vatican II on the ability of the Church to adapt.

Challenges Emerge
The relationship between the Archdiocese of New York and Tammany Hall was one of
convenience and symbiosis. The power of each institution fed off the power of the other,
although their essences were quite different. After all, Tammany Hall was not a religious
institution in any way, but it expressed to a significant degree the wishes of the Irish Catholic
hierarchy of the Archdiocese. Similarly, the Archdiocese was not in the “business” of
government but surely exerted significant power over appointments—especially during the
Spellman era (1939-1967)—and power over government operations and private sector labor.
The accepted rationale for the decline of the Archdiocese’s political influence is the
decline of its membership. As the twentieth century progressed, white Catholics in New York
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City exited the city due to a variety of factors, including economic advancement, which was
facilitated significantly by new highways and transportation accessible to the city or between
suburbs. With the loss of population came a loss of political influence, but this was just one of
several issues that contributed to the Archdiocese’s decline in power.
While many Catholics were leaving, many more were arriving. Puerto Ricans began
moving to New York City in large numbers starting in the late 1940s. In most cases, they faced
many of the same issues as previous new immigrants: lack of jobs, poor housing, and being cast
as outsiders. The Archdiocese would have to determine how to absorb this new demographic and
incorporate them into the fold in order to replace the existing whites, but Puerto Ricans were
different culturally and religiously.
At this same point in time, New York City’s important source of economic power, the
Manhattan ports, began to decline. For the Archdiocese of New York, this had implications. Port
business leaders contributed significant sums to the Archdiocese of New York, and the waterfront
workforce was Catholic (Fisher 2009). The exodus of both business owners and workers
significantly reduced the clout of Tammany and the Archdiocese. The port succumbed to the
pressures of increased competition and internal corruption, resulting in a drastic decline in union
activity and importance, and the Archdiocese lost an economic cudgel it had used to wield power
in the political sphere.
The weakening of dock and other private sector unions coincided with the rise of public
sector unions. This labor movement was vastly different than the one to which the Archdiocese
had been accustomed. Its roots lay outside of the traditional blue-collar working class.
All the above factors contributed to the decline of Tammany Hall, the Archdiocese’s
longtime foundation of political power. The old ways of politics were dying, and new methods of
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organizing and exerting influence in politics were rising. Moises Naim writing in The End of
Power states quite unequivocally that “[e]verywhere party bosses are back on their heels, as they
contend with candidates and leaders emerging from realms outside the proverbial smoke-filled
back rooms” (Naim 2013, 6). Moreover, New York City’s culture and politics were generally
growing increasingly liberal, in stark contrast to the politics of the Archdiocese and Tammany
Hall.
With the Archdiocese facing an overwhelming shift in its environment, its decision
making process came under increasing pressure. While theologically and as a matter of papal
authority, roles within the Church were fairly clearly sketched out, the everyday life of the
Archdiocese proved more complicated. The Church could rule bureaucratically, but its traditional
constituency, loyal, church-going Irish immigrants and their descendants, had their own interests.
The Church hierarchy tended toward oligarchy, but as Michels (1966) suggests, the alternative to
oligarchy is to increase the size of the group making decisions within the bureaucracy. The
possibilities for such an enlarged group within the Archdiocese were unlikely, though. The model
was that authority derived directly from the Pope or the Almighty, and historically the archbishop
had been able to run the Church’s affairs through personal charisma and organizational authority.

Rise in Secularism
Yet, the Church faced social challenges to its authority, and the charismatic authority of
individual archbishops proved incapable of stemming those social forces. Monsignor Thomas
Bergin, Pastor of St. Charles, pointed to the rise in secularism. He believed that it accounted for
the decline of the power of the Church and that it had caused Catholics to leave the religion.
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Further, he felt that the failure of Catholic politicians to stand for the principles of their faith had
been a significant factor in the Archdiocese’s transition to reduced power.
“I believe that secularism has taken its toll on any power that we may have had,” parish
priest and former Vicar for Education in the Archdioceses Monsignor Bergin said, “We’ve lost so
many people, and we’re all aware of so-called Catholic politicians . . . . [W]hoever is supporting
their campaign . . . that’s where they seem to follow . . . . I’m upset by that sort of thing” (Bergin
2011). Former New York City Schools Chancellor Frank Macchiarola, a prominent Catholic
layman, agreed. “What we are threatened with is secular—the opposite of a Catholic is not a Jew,
is not a Muslim. The opposite is a non-believer.” He responded further that the way to protect
Catholicism and its institutions was to more closely adhere to Catholic doctrine. “[T]he only way
you convince a non-believer . . . is by living your own faith and having him witness that. And
that’s the way it has to be done" (Macchiarola 2009).
Like Monsignor Bergin, Macchiarola also blamed politicians for the decline of
institutions. Macchiarola said, “[T]his is not understood by those people who run the political
institutions, who think Catholic is a label. . . . [W]here the strength of the Church lies is not in its
political structure. The strength of the Church lies in its ability to convert. . . . To run hospitals,
to run social agencies, to do ministry” (Macchiarola 2009).
Long-time newspaper reporter Sam Roberts said that the perceived power of the
Archdiocese declined slowly over time. He noted that, “…you had all of these little things that
were tests of the Church’s power, and it just became whittled away” (Roberts 2009). Roberts
alludes to secularization, citing government policies that the Archdiocese might have once been
able to prevent. “[B]y the time you reach the ‘70s, [and] ‘80s, certainly the ‘80s, you have
condoms being distributed in the schools, totally against the wishes of the Catholic Church.
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They try to effect a compromise which gives an opt out . . . . Even that fails,” he said (Roberts
2009). Evidence of the diminished influence of the Archdiocese wan an ineffective attempt by
Mayor David N. Dinkins (1990-1994) to use the Archdiocese to pressure City Council Speaker
Peter Vallone to pass legislation. “You have the Peter Vallone story about Dinkins calling the
Cardinal to pressure Vallone on the Anti-Crime Bill . . . and Vallone, the ardent Catholic, gets
really totally pissed off at the fact that the Mayor is using a major figure in his church to
influence him on a secular issue. And it didn’t work” (Roberts 2009).
Whether its power had diminished or not, people of prominence still believe that the
Archdiocese has power. In Roberts’ opinion, “all of these things add up. So the power just
evaporates after a while. It [the Archdiocese] is powerful as a social service institution; it’s
powerful to some extent as a political force. You don’t want them against you” (Roberts 2009).
The perception is it can still use power to sanction individuals who oppose whatever political
agenda it might have.
Joseph Strasburg, counsel to City Council Speaker Peter Vallone explained how the
Archdiocese achieves its desired political ends: “[t]hey just do it.” He added, though, that
secularization and societal changes had a negative impact. “I think [secularization] also added to
the diminution of influence by the churches . . . and it translated itself to a point where . . . in the
‘90s when I was around, early ‘90s, nobody thought about the impact of religion” (Strasburg
2011). He also noted the pedophile scandals affected the Church locally and nationally by
undermining its integrity. “Of course then you had the problems with the church and the priests
and . . . which at that point, if they had any credibility . . . that was out the window. Nobody was
going to line up with them, with religion, against the social policy” (Strasburg 2011).
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Shifting Loyalties
The concept of Catholic loyalty came under scrutiny during interviews. There was a
sense among respondents that Catholics no longer voted as a block. Former New York City
Board of Education President Stephen Aiello remarked: “I think if you look at Democrats for
Reagan . . . and look at the ethnicity and the religious affiliation you’re going to see a lot of
Catholics going there and you’re going to see white working-class Italians, Polish, Eastern
Europeans, and Irish” (Aiello 2009). Aiello also saw 1973 as a transitional year. “You can use
this [1973] as a seminal year, and I think it makes a lot of sense if you look at that [and] . . . if
you look at the power of . . . the county leaders.” It was the last year New York City’s five
Democratic Party county leaders were united and were effective. He also saw a breaking up of
the traditional Democratic Party base specifically because white ethnic Catholics no longer voted
as “a block,” a euphemism for leaving the fold and voting Republican. Aiello stated:
I think what was happening was the Democratic Party, for whatever reasons, was moving
away from the Roosevelt coalition . . . people like my cousin Dominic and others who
bought into the whole American Dream were now seeing that there were two sets of
standards. The rhetoric was the Land of Opportunity, and it still is . . . if you work hard
and you want a better life for your children. But other people who they didn’t see as
working as hard, who felt they were entitled to this, were taking their place (Aiello 2009).
The traditional base of the Democratic Party, according to Aiello, was shifting. That base
of white ethnic Catholics, loyal to the Democrats in most instances since 1932 and the election of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to the presidency, was moving away from its roots. As secularization
increased loyalty decreased. One of the outcomes was a changing Democratic Party no longer
welcoming or hospitable to people such as Aiello’s cousin Dominic. “The Republican Party,”
Aiello said, “to their credit were reaching out to those folks. So I think . . . it starts with the
decline and fall of the WASP [White Anglo Saxon Protestants] . . . and the [appearance of the]
unmeltable ethnics” (Aiello 2009).
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Former New York City Council Speaker Peter Vallone agreed. Catholics no longer voted
as Catholics, nor did they take their political advice from the Archdiocese. Vallone opined, “I
think that you can’t consider . . . an Italian and an Irish-Catholic vote anymore. I think you can
consider possibly an ethnic vote, possibly an Italian vote, Irish. But Catholics, unlike other
denominations, do not vote in a block” (Vallone 2009). Lobbyist and former Daily News
columnist Martin McLaughlin flatly dismissed the idea that the Archdiocese was a serious
political entity. “I think the power is tremendously diminished. And I think part of the reason it
diminished, [is that] you have a very divided Catholic Church right now. You have what I am
accused of being, which is a ‘cafeteria Catholic’” (McLaughlin 2009). Again, he alludes to the
factor cited by many of those interviewed. Cafeteria Catholic implies increased secular
behaviors, and non-block voting implies lack of loyalty.
The “lack of loyalty” concept mattered even to political expert and long-time Hell’s
Kitchen Democratic Party district leader James McManus:
Well, number one, the Catholic Church isn’t as organized as they used to be. You know
the parishes were really parishes where all the Catholics went to the church, the priests
knew them all and they knew the political organizations and they [the parish priests on
Manhattan’s once heavily Irish West Side] go along with the political organizations in
many cases. In some cases they wouldn’t be able to, but they still wouldn’t hurt the
organization, and between the Church and the organization, they got the vote out
(McManus 2009).
McManus' responses define a closer relationship between Archdiocese of New York parishes. He
noted that fewer Catholics attend church, and thus organizational effectiveness had declined.
The wide net of social organizations that the Church had cast mattered as well. Peter
Quinn, author and former chief speechwriter for Governors Hugh L. Carey and Mario M. Cuomo
spoke about the Catholic parochial school system and its significance. “Well, you know,” Quinn
said, “the Catholics, we had our own school system. I can say growing up . . . in an Irish Catholic
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family, the public schools were not anything that concerned us. We didn’t go to them. We didn’t
use them. They could teach anything they wanted, it really didn’t interest us” (Quinn 2011).
Quinn went on to speak about the political transition that was ensuing in the Church and
the nation:
A confluence of things [took place]. The Catholic Church of New York, it had a large
Italian population, but it was an Irish Church. It was run, staffed and operated along Irish
lines. Religion for Italians is part of their culture. Religion for the Irish wasn’t a culture.
I think one thing [that] happened is when Kennedy gets elected, is the kind of symbolic
end [to group politics] because what holds ethnic groups together is not self-love. It’s all
infighting. What holds people together is a common enemy. And with Kennedy’s
election the enemy went away (Quinn 2011).
With the 1960 election of John F. Kennedy, the Irish once vilified and discriminated against were
no longer the object of derision. The election of one of their own meant that they had arrived as
equal players in the American political scene and within American society itself.
In Quinn’s view the Kennedy election and Catholics’ new status made movement from
the city to the suburbs more likely. Kennedy’s electoral success “kind of exacerbated the
suburban move out to the suburbs. They [the Archdiocese] lost their power base. And they lost
that sense of the Catholic Church as a citadel” (Quinn 2011). Irish Catholics experienced a new
sense of freedom that allowed them to take advantage of the changing American secular culture
of the 1960s and 1970s:
They [Irish Catholics] went into this defense crouch when they came to the United States.
And it essentially lasted from about 1845 to 1960. Very defensive. My parents were . . .
very suspicious of leaving New York, going out to the rest of the country. They were
suspicious of the Republican Party. Prohibition. Nativism. . . . [Y]ou stayed together,
and you were safe in your neighborhoods. I don’t think after 1960 they felt they had to
stay together anymore. There was no need. The enemy went away (Quinn 2011).
Fox News contributor and Catholic Church lay leader Andrew Napolitano saw that
“family life changed. As the church’s grip on people changed, the politicians had less claim
on … the Italians and the Irish” (Napolitano 2014). In his opinion, the movement out of the city
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to the suburbs significantly altered the voting patterns of white ethnic Catholic voters, who had
generally been reliable Democratic Party supporters. Political leaders, Napolitano said, thought
that the Irish and Italian were “always going to vote for Democrats—suddenly some Republicans
popped up in that group, something that would have been inconceivable, unheard of in the ‘50s”
(Napolitano 2014). Echoing the sentiments of other interviewees, Napolitano spoke of lack of
loyalty and secularism but uniquely he identified those factors as helping Catholics loosen their
ties to Democratic loyalty.
Aureo Cardona, life-long resident of the South Bronx and former Democratic Party
district leader, added geographic specificity to his view of the Church’s political decline: “by the
mid-1960s, late ‘60s it was over for the Catholic Church,” in at least the South Bronx.
I think it ended when [Bronx County Democratic Chairman Patrick] Cunningham left.
Because in Cunningham they [the Archdiocese] had an ally, a political ally, and I thought
that he was the last political power-player who kind of engaged the Catholic Church in
some kind of . . . viable position of strength. Once he left, nobody gave a shit. Then . . .
when [Bronx County Democratic Party Chairman Stanley] Friedman took [over], the last
thing Stanley Friedman gave a shit about was the Catholic Church. He wanted to get the
Puerto Ricans out so he could continue his powerbase with the Jewish community, which
he did for a while (Cardona 2011).
For Cardona, the Archdiocese of New York could only provide spiritual relief. This allowed the
Irish to dominate political and religious affairs in alliance with the political machine. The
Democratic Party leaders were only concerned about the needs of the particular ethnic or
religious groups to which they personally belonged. In fact, he conjectured that by doing
nothing, the Archdiocese had effectively assisted in the deterioration. “But I think it [the
Archdiocese] never adapted to the diversity of New York. It never adapted. I mean you can’t say
with the great Hispanic population … in New York City that the Church is a Hispanic church”
(Cardona 2011). Even with the rise in the Puerto Rican population the Irish continued to
dominate.
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When exactly did the Archdiocese lose its aura as an institution of power? United States
District Court Judge Paul Crotty tied the changes to attitudes among the city’s—not the
Archdiocese’s—leaders:
I think the mayors changed. [Mayor Abraham] Beame certainly never consulted with the
Catholic Church during the fiscal crisis. [Governor Hugh L.] Carey—you read the books
about Carey, who was, I think, a great governor and an unsung hero for many years—he
never consulted with the Church. But power? The Church lost its power. The Democratic
Party was losing its power at the time, too. So the structures that used to talk and
intermediate with one another were gone. It is a perfect storm if you think about New
York. [When Terrence Cardinal] Cooke becomes his Excellency [Cardinal] the political
structure is falling apart, the waterfront is falling apart, the manufacturing sector is falling
apart, the Catholic, blue–collar middle class is leaving. What does he walk into? [It’s a]
formula for failure politically, and he’s lost his clout. That’s what happened (Crotty
2011).
For Crotty, the demographic shifts, changing political leadership, suburbanization of white blue
collar Catholic ethnics, shifting power centers, and the changing Democratic Party—a result of
Catholic voting pattern changes all occurring in the same time period—worked together to create
conditions under which the powerful and less powerful alike were less likely to listen to the
Archdiocese.
Seeking an answer to the question of why the Archdiocese of New York’s leadership
decided not to create national parishes as a means to retain Puerto Ricans, filling church pews
left empty by exiting Irish and Italians, Monsignor Peter Finn, former associate superintendent of
schools in the Archdioceses and past rector of Saint Joseph’s Seminary, said: “I think the reason
they didn’t create national parishes for anyone is because the experience with national parishes
was totally alien to what we then called the melting pot and unity, and it caused some very big
problems” (Finn 2011). What had worked for other ethnic groups was not to be utilized with
Puerto Ricans. They were expected to integrate. Instead of integrating, according to former
Bronx borough president Herman Badillo, Puerto Ricans became Protestants
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The Archdiocese’s Adaption
Sociologist Douglas Massey writes that “[a]s an ethnic group’s socioeconomic status
increases, its spatial segregation from the majority should decrease” (Massey 2001, 642). The
exact opposite occurred within the Archdiocese structure. Although Irish Catholics have
increased their social and economic status, they remained spatially segregated from the majority.
With laws protecting it the Archdiocese isolated itself. Despite the success of the Irish the
Archdiocese of New York perceived itself as an institution under attack. In fact, anti-Catholic
sentiment became more pronounced during the rise of social movements in the 1960s: prochoice, women’s rights, gay rights and anti-Vietnam war.
If the Catholic Church and by extension the Archdiocese felt itself an institutional victim
of oppression and persecution, then to adjust to the new urban realities, it needed to find ways to
define “a set of principles and organizational design that might help it redefine its view of itself”
(Denhardt 2004, 56), Historically, the American Roman Catholic Church, according to Reese
(1989, 272), “prospered under religious freedom and the separation of church and state.” Yet this
freedom from state control isolated the Church from changes within American society. Moreover,
the Archdiocese’s exemption from civil laws that held other nonprofits accountable and Diocesan
law that kept the leadership unaccountable to parishioners prevented it from easily adapting.
Ian Buruma writes in Taming the Gods: Religion and Democracy on Three Continents, de
Tocqueville saw that “the difference between France and Britain, or indeed [France and] . . . the
United States, is the role of the Catholic Church.” As de Tocqueville pointed out, European
unbelievers attacked the church for political more than religious reasons because the Catholic
Church was an extremely powerful political institution, “with vast wealth in land and treasure.
The Vatican was a source of absolute truth and the authority of priests was almost total” (Buruma
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2010, 35).

Hierarchical Organization Maintains the Status Quo
Democratic practices were not the standard modus operandi historically within the
Catholic Church—even though in America the “Catholic Church was now to be allowed to
function openly and equally among the other national religious institutions, but its long history of
oppression had left it in a highly demoralized state” writes A. Daniel Frankforter in A History of
the Christian Movement, The Development of Christian Institutions. The positioning of the
Catholic Archdiocese of New York and elsewhere created anxiety among other Protestant leaders
who were:
[S]uspicious of attempts to plant the Catholic Church in the midst of their democracy, for
the Protestant values of the American way of life were at odds with traditional Catholic
belief and practice. . . . None was more troubling than the patently undemocratic structure
of the Church itself. Catholics believed that God himself delegated absolute authority to
the pope, who in turn mediated it to the bishops and the lower clergy. The people stood at
the bottom of the divine hierarchy, and had no control over their Church (Frankforter
1978, 256).
The complexity and apparent contradictions within the national social policy undertakings of the
Church can be seen within the 1891 encyclical of Pope Leo XIII entitled “Condition of the
Working Classes” in which the Pope clearly defines the supremacy and protection of private
property. Yet in the same encyclical, Leo called on business owners to recognize the rights of
labor to organize. As virtually all subsequent Church leaders and scholars came to believe this
was a cause for celebration for those who believed in protecting private property but who also
subscribed to a reasonable redistribution of wealth through a fair and balanced tax system, such
as public sector labor unions. Although he attempts to dilute the meaning of the Pope’s
encyclical, professor of economics and Jesuit Father Bernard W. Dempsey writes: “[t]he state in
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its legislation must be careful not to abolish private property by any enactment that would in
effect be socialistic” (1958, 185). Dempsey goes on to argue—unconvincingly—that this
protection of private property is in no way reflective of the desire of the Church to protect its
extensive property holdings from seizure. It is as if the Pope ignored the criticisms of the Church
and its empire because he reported only to the Divine. The same set of behaviors would be
culturally indefensible in New York and the rest of America.
As organizational theorists March and Simon have noted, “[w]hatever increases
[organizational] efficiency is good; whatever does not is bad . . . [But] this stance is only what
one would expect of a theory of administration that sees efficiency as its primary aim” (Denhardt
2004, 74). If the Church’s goals were to maintain a structure that allowed for democracy or
permeability, then Denhardt’s rationale would be reasonable. Increasing organizational
efficiency, however, was not the Church’s primary goal. Its goals also included material gain and
retention of property. As change swept through its most politically prominent precincts in New
York, the Archdiocese continued to operate as it always had, consistent with its internal goals and
established policies.
How successful was the Archdiocese’s organization leadership? If its goals were survival,
its leadership protected itself and followed its historical experience of adapting enough to
survive. However successful it may have been at surviving, if its goals were maintaining and
adopting new bases of power, the Archdiocese was certainly less successful.

Vatican II
Up to this point, I have stressed the demographic changes related to the movement of
Irish, Italian, and Puerto Rican parishioners into and out of Manhattan and the Bronx.
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Additionally, I have pointed to New York City’s changing economy and especially the loss of
jobs in manufacturing and the declining importance of the Port of New York. Secularization
affected parishioners’ loyalty to the Church and their practice of Catholicism, which in turn had
an influence on the political power of the Archdiocese. What I have up to this point neglected is
the importance in the Catholic Church’s changing interpretation of its theological mission.
The Second Vatican Council, popularly known as Vatican II, took place between October
1962 and December 1965. It was convened by Pope John XXIII and closed by Pope Paul VI.
What Vatican II is most known for is its revisions of the liturgy, especially the celebration of the
Mass in the vernacular. Besides services in English, the Council encouraged forward-facing
priests, increased use of scripture in the liturgy, and other changes that bolstered lay involvement
in the Church. It was not convened to settle a question of doctrine or resolve a power struggle. Its
purpose was to reinvigorate Catholicism and the faithful. The changes it ushered in were
profound.
Yet, opening up “the windows of the Church to let in some fresh air,” as supporters of the
Council were wont to say, exposed the Church to a different set of problems. It potentially
diminished the power of the hierarchy and threatened the authority and otherworldly nature of
the Catholic experience.
Andrew Napolitano noted that the diminution of Archdiocesan power occurred in the
context of waning Catholic traditionalism:
I think all of those things. But remember, this is preceded by something bigger than the
Church in New York and bigger than the Church in the United States. It’s preceded by
Vatican II. And it was the problem with Vatican II—it’s not Vatican II—it’s the reaction
to Vatican II. It’s the belief—nowhere articulated in the documents—that we can loosen
our belts; we can water down everything. We can make the liturgy frivolous. That’s in
writing, because Paul the VI really destroyed the Mass. And all of those things almost
sent a signal to Catholics, all those old rules—you’re gonna go to Hell if you eat a hotdog
on a Friday; you’re gonna go to Hell if you don’t fast for three hours before you receive
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communion on Sunday—all those old rules were gone. And [it had] mocked the old
discipline and just unleased . . . radical new ideas about the relationship of the Catholic
Church to society. And it happened intensively here, because there are so many Catholics
in New York City. . . . [B]ecause Spellman had had such an iron grip on the city
government when he was Cardinal. I think it’s all of those things. I think it’s part of the
watering down of Catholicism that was the reaction to Vatican II—the trivialization of the
liturgy, the weakening of Catholic identity, the lack of desire to be part of a Catholic
group (Napolitano 2014).
Paul Crotty added that the Archdiocese may have been unable to respond because the
change was overwhelming. This change was first spurred internally by the reforms of Vatican II:
I think older Catholics were alienated simply because it [Vatican II] represented change
in what they had been used to for so long, so you know the one true holy Catholic Church
is supposed to be stable . . . it wasn’t stable and for the people who were liberal, it didn’t
live up to its expectations because it became more conservative again but the
conservatism wasn’t enough for people who said you changed everything on me so why
should I believe you? (Crotty 2011).
***
Interest was growing in civic and religious reforms, but reforms outpaced the
Archdiocese’s ability to control its members, to protect its accumulated power, and maintain its
standing as the all-powerful arbiter between eternal life or “fire and damnation.” Henry Pratt
writes in Churches and Urban Government in Detroit and New York, 1895-1994: “[m]achine
dominance in a given city tends to shape the political environment in which interest groups of all
kinds, urban church federations included, must operate; ‘reform’ tends to produce an equally
distinct environmental impact” (2004, 3). That environmental impact was outside of the Church’s
control and included the growth of the welfare state and an increase in the power of unions,
which diminished the need for Diocesan-provided services such as medical care, homes for
unwed mothers, soup kitchens, and other cradle-to-grave services.
It is important to note that since the Great Depression, the Church and the Archdiocese’s
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cradle-to-grave services were partially supported by the federal government. Depression-era
urban unemployment was high, and most Catholics supported Church and government agency
cooperation to tackle social services as it became clear that neither religious nor secular charities
could properly supply much- needed community services. Yet in order to receive public funding,
religious charities needed to meet secular criteria (Pratt 2004). As a result, the Church lost
autonomy. In later years, parishioners could seek services from the government or Diocesan
institutions. Or those social services became the benefits of union membership.
The Archdiocese of New York, which defined ethnicity, politics, social standing, identity,
and cradle-to-grave stability, also required cradle-to-grave obedience and compliance. Loyalty,
support and votes were similarly required to its political partners. As Berger states, “[r]eligion
manifest[ed] itself as public rhetoric and private virtue” (1967, 134). In other words, the
Archdiocese tried to establish in America what the papacy had created in Europe. But it could
not be successful in a changing modern democracy. The Archdiocese continued, however, to
provide values and a definition of what a civil society should represent and provide. Where this
private virtue becomes a public theology is where it creates “a republic as an active political
community of participants [with] . . . a purpose and a set of values” (1975, 177). The
Archdiocese sought, in a religious context, to provide that set of values, that purpose and that
definition of what a society should represent. In view of its positions on contemporary issues, it
was not fully successful in being the model for the civil society of which it was part, as it could
not stray far from its theology.

The Archdiocese of New York: Hierarchy and Its Leadership
The complexity of the new multicultural, multireligious, and highly secular urban
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environment proved too difficult for the Archdiocese to navigate in a way that would allow it to
wield power as it had done earlier. The insular attitudes of its leaders were clearly diminishing its
political power. But why were there no dissenting voices or factions that could have turned the
tide? Robert Michels offers one answer. In Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the
Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, he explains that organizational leadership
inevitably becomes hierarchal and less democratic: never democratic in any event, the Church
seemed to have flourished because it did not function democratically. It was able to “focus,
simplify, and reduce the flow of information. . . . Hierarchy thus provides effectiveness by a
process of simplification. It simplifies the knowledge environment, limits processes of
communication, lowers costs, and systematizes tasks” (Michels 1966, 23).
As the civic and cultural environment became more complex, the hierarchical structure of
the Archdiocese became cumbersome. It could only do what it was designed to do: respond
meekly and report to the Church in Rome. It is not that the Archdiocese of New York failed;
rather, its hierarchy could not adapt functionally to the new environment. Instead it carried on as
it always had. The hierarchy maintained itself, but in a period of political and social change it did
so with fewer allies and significantly reduced political power. It became more of what it had
always primarily been: a religious organization with a defined mission—but whose protective
environment was gone.
It could have attempted to engage in the rapidly-changing realities that defined the midtwentieth century. Instead, its leaders withdrew into themselves. The organization that mattered
most to the Archdiocese’s hierarchy was the Archdiocese itself. The critical leadership of
Cardinals Spellman and Cooke contributed to the decline of its political power – in the case of
the former, because he was too rigid and in the case of the latter, because he had little interest in
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politics.

New York Politics
New York had institutionalized political equality as a mere pretense in the 1893
Constitutional Convention when it consigned whole cities to be controlled by upstate political
leaders:
The convention represented delegates from every legislative seat as well as two dozen atlarge. Republicans held every at-large seat as well as a majority of the delegates chosen
in legislative districts. New York City, a Democratic stronghold, was badly over-matched.
The convention defined new districts, giving the Republican city of Buffalo its fair share
of seats at the expense of New York City. In addition, the convention crafted district
boundaries within the City, ensuring at least four new Republican seats. One district
connected Wall Street to the upper west side, two highly Republican areas, and ran
through Hell’s Kitchen and other immigrant neighborhoods and contained many people
but few voters. . . . [T]he handful of Republican delegates from New York City went
along with their party’s plan, even though the new apportionment plan would reduce
substantially the City’s political voice and power (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2008, 59).
Power was what mattered, and the rational approach was to hold onto it in any way possible.
New arrivals were thus disempowered at every level, and it would have consequences
much later. There would be no Puerto Rican political boss of the Bronx—head of the Bronx
County Democratic Party—until 1985, despite the Bronx being the first New York City borough
to have a majority minority population. Manhattan’s first minority county Democratic Party
leader, Herman “Denny” Farrell, was elected in 1981. Still, the movement to ensure dominance
by non-minority politicians in both counties predated the election of both those men. Political
party mattered to those in power, and they wanted to remain in power.
The isolation of Puerto Ricans fit into national political trends. Clearly, significant
portions of the Catholic population were moving rightward, and the entire labor movement was
changing. The 1972 landslide victory of Republican Party presidential candidate Richard Nixon
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was among the biggest in American history. Nixon took the electoral votes of forty-nine states,
sixty-two percent of the popular vote and surprisingly 57 percent of the blue-collar vote (a 22
point increase for Nixon since 1968) and 54 percent of the union vote (a 25 point gain since
1968). He was even the first Republican presidential candidate to receive a majority of Catholic
votes (Cowie 2010, 121-122).
The movement rightward for Catholics was further helped by the staunch antiCommunism of Archdiocese leaders, notably Francis Cardinal Spellman. His ideology even
trumped what might reasonably have been predicted to have been his stronger interest in helping
to elect the first Catholic president, John F. Kennedy, in 1960. It appears that Cardinal Spellman
and the Archdiocese hierarchy were unenthusiastic Kennedy supporters (Nasaw 2012). After the
election, Cardinal Spellman openly attacked Kennedy’s education proposals, noting their lack of
assistance to parochial schools. The isolation of the Catholic hierarchy from its flock included
not only alienation from the new arrivals, the non-Irish, non-English speaking Puerto Ricans, but
even from those Catholics who chose not to toe the ideological line most comfortable to this
older regime.

Change in the 1960s
Pre-1960s
In attempting to describe what he identifies as the power of the Archdiocese of New York,
Herman Badillo relates a personal story that occurred during the early part of his political career:
When I got started in politics in the late 1950s, the Catholic Church had an enormous
constituency in New York City. Cardinal Spellman spoke Spanish fluently and was all
over the news at all times, and you had the Irish and Italian constituents living in New
York City and contributing money so that the Catholic Church had plenty of money.
There was no danger that parochial schools or parishes would have to be closed, and so it
was a time of glory for the Catholic Church and Cardinal Spellman, and then it all began
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to fall apart after that. To show you how powerful the Catholic Church was in the end of
1950s. I spoke once at LaGuardia House on 116th Street between 2nd and 3rd Avenue,
and then I got a call from a Monsignor saying that we would like to see me at the
Cardinal’s office. I was then only about twenty-seven or twenty-eight. I just had become
a lawyer a couple of years earlier so I went to the Cardinal’s office, and there I was met
by a very high ranking monsignor who said to me, “young man we heard you speak at
LaGuardia House last week, we were very much impressed with you and we think you’re
a young man who’s going to go very far in the city and we’re always looking for young
Catholics that we can push along,” and I said “thank you very much. But you know
unfortunately I cannot become a Catholic because I come from a Protestant background
in Puerto Rico. My family is said to have smuggled the first Protestant bible into Puerto
Rico, and for generations in the 1800s the Badillos were either ministers or lawyers. The
ministers would practice the Protestant religion, and the lawyers would get them out of
jail. So I’m kind of stuck with being a Protestant as well.” [The Monsignor replied,]
“inany event, we think you’re a terrific guy.” So can you imagine that the Catholic
Church was so powerful that they had scouts out looking for young Catholics to push
along. That’s the best example I can give you (Badillo 2009).
The “change in the 1960s” made an impression on my interviewees. Michael Long saw a
cultural change that took place in the City of New York. “Demographics started to change.
Asians started to come in. Even though we still have a pretty significant amount of Catholics
living here in the city of New York, I think the type of Catholic has changed” (Michael Long,
July 2009). Long also refers to Vatican II, which was in session from 1962 to 1965, and
considers the reforms it inaugurated significant. “I think in 1965, just from the Church’s point of
view, Vatican II sort of opened up the windows and let the fresh air in, but the problem is, the
storm, the tornado went right through the whole building” (Long 2009).

Way of Thinking
Monsignor Bergin gave his impression of the social turmoil the Church faced and the
decline in its power:
’69 was Woodstock. . . . [T]he Vatican Council was just before this in some way. There
was a revolution in the way people led their lives. They didn’t want to be told what to do.
Using the old sixties terminology, they’re going to do their own thing. And the only
group around that seemed to tell people, this is right, this wrong, is the Catholic Church.
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People didn’t want to hear that. They didn’t want to be told that this is wrong . . . you
shouldn’t be doing this. Nobody else does this. It’s the do your own thing, go out and do
what you think is good, you know, away from no longer listening to what the church tells
you what to do. This was the beginning of the decline in the church’s influence. This is in
the middle of this big revolution, the sixties revolution, the rock revolution and so on. I
mentioned ’69 was Woodstock and so on. And the Vatican II [Council], opening the
doors, opening the windows, letting in a lot of air. A lot of people overreacted or took
this: Oh the freedom, I can do what I want to do. I’m no longer going to be told by the
Church what I have to do. I’ll pick and choose. We’ve used the term cafeteria
Catholicism for the last number of years. You know, pick and choose what you want, and
I’m still a good Catholic, I’ll still come marching up to communion on Sunday, when I
go, when I choose to go and so on. There’s no idea, anymore, it seems to me, though of
serious influence and so on. This was all part of what we’re all about. Maybe there was
an overreaction to that, by going so far to the left, you know, they never really got back to
the middle. They left and kind of upped. We just lose people right and left. They’re no
longer here. They’re no longer coming to us (Bergin 2011).

“After World War II, this Church, the country, became the biggest and the strongest in the
world,” said former New York City Council Speaker Peter Vallone. For a while the Church
matched that success, but the Archdiocese could not sustain it in New York City.
“I believe the exodus [from the Church] started as I grew up,” said Vallone. “Most of my
friends—and that would be in the ‘50s and ‘60s—my father started the largest Boys’ Club, Boys’
and Girls’ Club in the country, private. And there was a raffle in 1950, that the winner would
have a new house in Long Island. And they raised a million dollars” (Vallone 2009). Those who
left their local communities, their parishes, to move to the suburbs in fact were supported by their
friends; and further, that moving made them wealthy or possibly the very idea of suburbanization
for those in the Vallone circle meant wealth versus the economic stagnation of those who
remained behind.in the city. Again, this appears to be an example of a change in the “way of
thinking” noted by other interviewees.
Daniel Chill (special counsel to the New York State Assembly), credits some of the
change in the “way of thinking” cited by others to the new politics of the 1960s:
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It happened in the late ‘60s . . . the other thing that changed it, is the rise of radical
politics . . . the Vietnam War triggered not just liberal thinking anymore. Liberal became
radical. I’ll give you the example of Ocean Hill-Brownsville. You would think that if the
Blacks came in and said anti-Semitic things and got two of the teachers fired, the ACLU
would be on the side of the Jewish teachers. It turns out the ACLU was never on the side
of Jewish teachers. They were on the side of anti-Semites, where they’ve been ever since.
So, in my neighborhood in the west side of Manhattan, [United States Senator Robert F.]
Kennedy was running against [Eugene] McCarthy. Kennedy, regarded now as a liberal
was murdered [in the primary election in New York] by Eugene McCarthy, Kennedy was
no liberal in the eyes of many. And you still have a cadre of what they call red diaper
babies . . . Jews primarily but very, very leftist, radical, SDS and the whole. Now the
Church was conservative. And still is conservative, so the society, at least in the New
York area became radicalized and he church was having none of it (Chill 2009).

Crotty suggested that the new politics of the sixties could prosper because of the failure
of the old politics:

It was a complete failure in the political structure because the parties . . . the Church was
not seen as the structure for communicating Catholic views. The Vietnam War, you had
riots in the streets down in Wall Street, you had the disintegration of financial networks.
The city was in a lot of trouble. We had the rent strikes in the city about those times. All
engines of authority were under simultaneous attack so . . . I think the political structure
was looking backward rather than forward . . . as we were trying to recall the glories of
old and they weren’t really in tune with what was going on (Crotty 2011).
“You know Catholics were the majority of people living in the city at one point,” said
Father Duffell, immigration reformer and parish priest at the Church of the Ascension on
Manhattan’s west side:
That’s why it [the Archdiocese of New York headquarters] was the Powerhouse. We
were the largest group. In the 1960s that began to change dramatically—shifts of
neighborhoods, movements of people into the suburbs after the war. It really kind of hit
the high water mark I think in the 1960s. The Church in the minds of some politicos
controlled a lot of votes in the City of the New York and in the State of New York,
Cardinal Spellman was . . . an interested guy, he knew his way around but in the
beginning he wasn’t even in New York a lot. He was doing a lot of the military stuff I
think (Duffell 2011).
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Monsignor Peter Finn sees New York as the epicenter of the societal changes that went
on in the 1960s, affecting many traditional institutions including the Archdiocese of New York,
but saw Cardinal Cooke—Spellman’s successor—as a moral force, as opposed to a political one:
Here in New York, even more than that it was a tsunami of cultural change within our
society one of which was the sexual revolution certainly, the Civil Rights Movement. The
day he [Cardinal Terrence Cooke] was installed, he went with [Mayor John] Lindsay and
walked in the Bronx when Martin Luther King Jr. was shot dead. He was also the man
who had no political power but he was the one that [President] Ronald Reagan called and
he spent two to four hours with him in the White House (Finn 2011).
Frank Macchiarola comments on what others imply about changes in “the way of
thinking.” “In many, many ways people of the last generation did things because of the
conventions,” he said:
I was taken every Sunday to my grandmothers and grandfathers house for Sunday dinner
because that’s what we were supposed to do. That’s where all my cousins were. They all
came to the house. We had a way of practicing our family and our religion and our
culture that’s lost today. It’s just doesn’t exist. When people are living next to each
other, I could tell you who was in each apartment in the neighborhood I lived in. I knew
all of those people and I could walk home from school and be watched by everybody; if I
did anything wrong or got in trouble, my mother would hear about it. It was a
community. There was a sense of identity and there were a sense of rules. Today’s kids
don’t understand the rules. The society doesn’t understand that. You know I have
psychiatrist, professor of psychiatry in NYU, child psychiatry, head of the department,
tells me his ten year old won’t go to church, “what do you think I should do”? This is a
professor of psychiatry he’s asking me what he should do. I said “you take the little
bastard and take him to church” (Macchiarola 2009).

Lack of Focus
Daniel Chill said: “[The Catholics] weren’t interested in political life after Spellman. . . .
Cooke was kind of spiritual, he didn’t focus on politics and so they lost elections, they lost”
(Daniel Chill, May 2009). The idea that the Archdiocese of New York had a generalized lack of
focus was also mentioned frequently. Daniel Chill spoke about politics. Others cited the Church’s
compromised moral position.
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Conservative Michael Long said:
Moral issue, I think the Church really lost ground with its constituency meaning its own
members, those of a conservative bent, when the abortion law was passed in New York
State. There are those who are conservative-minded like myself who felt that the bishops
and the Cardinal made an awesome mistake of not standing up, getting in the plane,
ascending on Albany all at the same time in red rose and saying hey guys, don’t pass this
bill. They blinked and it was that same time that the legislature started to change and the
attitude of doing business in New York started changing whereas whether it was member
items or finances for the Church, for the hospitals, for the schools. So there are many of
us that believe that one point in history the Church blinked, blinked on the issues, were
worried about losing their status, losing their tax status in the Churches, losing their
money for their hospitals, because we [Catholics] were running very successful hospitals
at the time (Long 2009).
Long believes the Archdiocese of New York may have traded off moral standing on religious
issues to protect its social service empire, and the funding received by the Archdiocese of New
York from the state legislature to support it.
“I don’t want to use the word corrupt,” continued Long:
The money made them blink in their philosophical beliefs and I believe the Church
leadership itself withdrew from putting their finger in the eyes of elected officials who
were doing, in their eyes, the wrong thing. The Church had gotten softer (Long 2009).
Other of my interviewees saw the Church’s narrow focus as a hindrance. “The Church’s
agenda has changed over the years, which is much more long-term. The Catholic Church focused
more on life before birth than it does unfortunately on life after birth,” said John Marino, an
advisor to Governors Mario and Andrew Cuomo, again mentioning abortion and the
Archdiocese’s controversial position among non-Catholics:
Having said that, they still do wonderful things whether it’s Catholic charities and all that.
But the focus has become very different. Remember, it was a very, in the ‘50s, a very
doctrinaire church. We still hadn’t had [Pope] John XXIII, we hadn’t had Vatican II, so
the Church itself was very doctrinaire. I think the Church did a good job. So I think at
some point the Church kind of lost its bearings when it came to wanting to control. I
think they had other issues that they were dealing with. And you know what? It may
have been in the ‘50s, it may have been in the ‘60s, it may have had something to do with
the larger changes that were taking church, in the Church, changes taking place in the
Church, the liberalization of the Church. It may have something— I think it has a lot to
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do with a lot of different things. Cardinal Cooke was never viewed as a strong cardinal
—nice guy, but not a strong Cardinal (Marino 2009).
Responsiveness
How did the Archdiocese of New York respond to the demographic, social, and political
changes that were occurring in the era under study? Was its response planned passivity? Did it
have any choice in how it could respond? “I don’t think it’s just the Church’s power that
disintegrated,” Michael Long said. “I think at that period of time it was the whole society in
New York that was deteriorating and losing” (Long 2009).
Peter Powers, Giuliani administration deputy mayor, said:
The church lost influence because it first lost influence with its members, then obviously
it lost influence with government. The only way it would have influence in government is
if it could move its members, and the reason it lost influence with its members is the
Church refused to democratize. In other words, it was still run by old men; bishops,
cardinals, and the people in the parishes really never had a say in running of it, so they
became more divorced from it, as society became more independent of religion generally.
I think organized religion, at least the Church, had less relevance . . . they just didn’t
listen in the same way. As the mores of the society changed the church didn’t (Powers
2009).
Herman Badillo returns to the problems Puerto Ricans experienced and the failure of the
Archdiocese of New York to more aggressively work to bring them into the mainstream of the
Archdiocese, especially in the post-Cardinal Spellman era:
They did not reach out, they didn’t meet with the people, and that began to happen in the
‘60s, and they also made a number of mistakes. For example, when I was running for
President of the Bronx in 1965, the Catholic Church closed Saint Francis Hospital . . . a
very important hospital in the South Bronx and I pledged when I was running that I
would build a new Lincoln hospital, get it approved within six months after I was elected
borough president. I did get a new Lincoln hospital built, and the Catholic Church lost
out because they lost the value of having a hospital. The Catholic Church in those days
ran not only parochial schools but also hospitals as well. The activities that got the
Catholics to continue going to church like parochial schools which they’re now closing,
and parishes which are now closing, have led them to lose their constituency even
more. . . . [T]he Archdiocese has been very passive in Manhattan and the Bronx. The
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Catholic Church in Brooklyn has been more active and the difference has always been
that the Catholic Church in Manhattan and the Bronx has been predominantly Irish, and
the one in Brooklyn and Long Island has been Italian, and the Italians have always
reached out more to the Puerto Rican and Hispanic community than the Irish (Badillo
2009).
Although believing that during the worst of the destruction of the South Bronx, the
Archdiocese of New York should have acted, forcefully, community activist Aureo Cardona
never specifies what the Archdiocese of New York might have done or realistically been able to
do. “I don’t think they looked the other way, I just think it was their dogma that they were
interested in, not the condition of the community . . . the only relief it [the Archdiocese of New
York] provided was a spiritual relief to people who would walk into the Church and believe that
when they die, they would get their reward.” Should it have done something else, something
beyond attempting to provide spiritual relief? Cardona responded:
Absolutely . . . it didn’t, it didn’t do anything. When the Irish were in the power and its
constituents were Irish, the Church was powerful. Oh yeah, it just dissipated . . . they
didn’t get modern, they didn’t get . . . homogenized they didn’t get . . . all kinds of
people, they didn’t do it, and they could have, and they had the resources to do that
(Cardona 2011).
Did the Archdiocese of New York respond by reinforcing and/or expanding its political
relationships or creating coalitions with those same political actors? “The only time the
Church came [to Albany] was on divorce and abortion,” said Daniel Chill (Chill 2009).
Judge Crotty added:
The Church can probably do more in creating a conversation about the values that you
need in the civic society to have a democracy. You know democracy can’t be when the
heaviest purse is the highest priest. You know you got to have some of the value structure
that we all agree on, and I don’t know if we will ever agree on but we can certainly
discuss values; what are the values that we really respect? You know they are in the
Declaration of Independence, they are in our Constitution, and we never talk about them
(Crotty 2011).
Former City Council member Walter McCaffrey notes the Archdiocese of New York’s
inability to manage the then growing Puerto Rican population as major factor in its lack of
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response to social and political changes:
[T]hey didn’t have priests who understood the importance of speaking Spanish. So if you
were a parishioner in my church and I’m an old Irish pastor, you can come to Mass, but
dammit, I’m not going to speak Spanish to you. You’re going to speak my language. That
was the type of schism that went on. It’s a problem for the Church because they want to
have some power, and they sort of bristle at the fact that they’re ignored, but they’re not
doing anything to help themselves in terms of that. And touting, you know, kill a commie
for Christ. And what happens now is the neighborhoods, and I saw this, you know, my
neighborhood lost the largest number of war dead in Vietnam of any community in the
United States… and when those kids were coming home, that turned people against the
war (McCaffrey 2011).
“The Catholic Church wasn’t equipped to handle people with different languages—especially the
Puerto Rican influx. They needed a tremendous amount of help, and the schools that the
Catholics . . . ran, didn’t have the people back then to teach in Spanish. So those kids had to go
to public schools,” said Fordham University Vice President for External Affairs Thomas Dunne
(Dunne 2011). From Dunne’s point of view the Archdiocese proved unable to respond to the
Puerto Rican population, unable even to bring them into the parochial school system, which
Cardinal Hughes created to insure the integration of new immigrants. Martin McLaughlin
added:
Obviously, they had a language problem. Also they lost all their religious
teachers. I had Dominican nuns for all of my teachers. Well, there are no more
Dominican nuns. Nuns are gone. There are hardly nuns anywhere. You . . . barely
have Sisters of Charity at St. Vincent’s anymore. So they had all that free labor. . . . I
went, took my daughter down to Georgetown, just as an aside. And this girl was
taking her around the campus and she said, one thing you must do if you come here,
before you graduate, have a Jesuit as a teacher. If you went to Georgetown when I
went there, you couldn’t have anything else but a Jesuit. . . . That’s a big factor. You
lost the clergy (McLaughlin 2009).
If the Church found responding to changing demographics and cultural attitudes difficult, what
could it do? Monsignor Bergin answered that the response was to build:
[N]ew parishes up in the sticks . . . People have the freedom to do what they will and we
kind of follow them. If people are leaving, we follow them and we build churches. My
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own parish, I grew up in the Bronx, Riverdale. Then came World War II, all building
stopped, and then there was the flight of the Jews . . . building the places upstate,
building the places out on Long Island, Levittown. I mentioned that and some of these
other communities where they moved out of the city out of the apartment houses in the
Bronx to get a patch of land. The GI Bill let guys go to college. There were loans that
enabled them to build homes and so on, and they did so (Bergin 2011).
It was not as though there was no response to the social changes that were occurring all
around. From his perspective, the Archdiocese's response to issues facing the city was to follow
the flock. To that were a set of incentives that failed to address the changes within the city.
We built schools . . . they made you a monsignor if you built a school alright? So the
move was on in the ‘50s to build schools, the big high school building was around ‘58 or
‘59 and around that time that was when they built a diocese in high schools. They built
Cardinal Stephen in White Plains in ‘48. We built a school in ‘63.That wasn’t the reason
for it—to meet the needs that the people were in the parish. This was one of the places
they were moving out to, to Staten Island. The church followed the people where the
people went.
Well, they built bigger churches or new churches where they [those exiting to suburbia]
were going. Rockland County, Duchess County, Nassau and Suffolk and so on, they left
the inner city parishes then. It may have been an endowment there may have been money
in the bank from the Irish and Italians but that went very quickly because the people who
came in … no, I think they used it for the people who came in who were poor (Bergin
2011).
How Single Issue Politics Diminished the Power of Catholics
Asserting Catholic political power required bringing to bear the Church’s moral vision
and its political resources. Corralling Irish and Italian votes in defense of an immigrant identity
and as a strategy to improve life chances had its challenges, but the Church proved an
institutional and cultural bulwark against nativism and deprivation. Catholic morality had the
advantage of emphasizing communal values and an “us vs them” ethos. The alliance of the
Archdiocese and Tammany Hall worked to both parties’ advantage. But with the ascendance of
secularism, liberalism, the rise of minority political power, and the decline of Irish social and
political power, and a host of other changes this research has noted the Archdiocese also saw its
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moral compass under strain. Speechwriter and author Peter Quinn observed that the Church
staked its moral position on a narrow set of concerns, concerns that many parishioners no longer
held:
You can’t survive in politics, and have the relationship with the Church the Church wants
you to have. You can’t get elected in New York and say you’re against abortion. It’s just
not going to happen. You’re not going to be the mayor of New York. Right? So they’re
not going to take it, once you stop taking orders on that. You got to separate . . . you got
to have a little sunlight between you and the Church now. The Church has nailed its
whole identity to sexual issues. Which most of the practicing Catholics I know are on the
other side of. They just don’t listen. So that whole message there, the power to
command obedience has been seriously diluted. They can spout all they want about gay, I
think they’re going to lose the gay marriage thing. I think most Catholics don’t give a
shit anymore about gay people getting married. So if they’re talking about, you sort of go
across the issues, you just generally tune them out (Quinn 2011).
In fact, a Catholic, Governor Andrew Cuomo, supported the passage of same sex marriage,
approved by both chambers of the New York State Legislature in 2011.
“Yeah,” Quinn continued:
[I] think you can’t outlaw abortion. We wouldn’t, my wife wouldn’t have one, but the
law shouldn’t be there. And even if you outlaw it, it’s just going to go back rooms. It’s
going to be prohibition. It’s going to do what alcohol, what prohibition . . . [did, it] made
it more widespread than less. You see, I think that’s one of the things the Church itself,
staring with John Paul, has identified [and] focused on these sexual gender issues. It used
to have a voice in social justice issues. You hardly ever hear that anymore (Quinn 2011).
“Now all you hear is, you know, if the Cardinal is in, or the Archbishop is in Albany, it’s about
gay marriage, or abortion funding,” Quinn concluded (Quinn 2011).
Speculating about issues that are theologically based, including abortion, Andrew
Napolitano opined that all these actions were diminishing the Archdiocese of New York and the
larger Church:
[I]t's a march of many decisions. I don't think any cardinal said I want to diminish my
power. But if Cardinal Timothy Dolan traded tempering his opposition to abortion and
same-sex marriage in favor of financial assistance to Catholic schools, that continued that
march of lessening the effect of and influence of the Catholic Church (Napolitano 2014).
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“Pope John Paul II was rigid when it came to issues of doctrine and issues like abortion, whether
priests would be celibate, whether they could be married. And most Catholics I think in America
and specifically in New York, they make independent judgments about this. They’re Catholics
but they pick and choose certain things” (Cunningham 2009).
He continued, saying that those he knew had a much more liberal attitude about such
matters:
[T]hey’ll say, well, we’re Catholics but we think maybe it’d be okay for priests to get
married. Everybody has free will. Maybe the one thing you learn in Catholic school that
you never forget is that we have free will. Then it’s okay for me to think differently than
the Bishop or the Archbishop or the Cardinal. And society is totally different on all of
these issues. It wouldn’t have been just a Catholic who would be opposed to abortion
fifty years ago. It would have been a whole range of society. It wouldn’t be the position
of just the Catholic Church about gay marriage. It would have been all of society
(Cunningham 2009).
“There was definitely a lessening, over the years, of the moral force of the Church. There
was a gay rights issue. There were . . . birth control, abortion. All these issues came to the fore,
and there was [less] hold on the loyalty of parishioners,” said veteran newsman Gabe Pressman
(Pressman 2011).

Abortion
On the issue of abortion, the pollster Douglas Schoen believes that when the Archdiocese
of New York was unable to stop the passage of legalized abortion in New York State, elected
office-holders and those seeking office no longer believed the Archdiocese a factor in their
success or failure. Schoen said:
I would tell you this, the number of people who focused on what the Church was up to—
and there was one other issue, one other thing, which was abortion—I think the law
changed in ’72 and basically the clear perception was, that if the Church couldn’t stop
that, and if Catholic politicians could get elected, being pro-choice, that you didn’t have
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to fear the Archdiocese (Schoen 2009).
Is there room within the Archdiocese of New York for those whose issue positions are
different than those of the Archdiocese and its clerical leaders? Frank Macchiarola effectively
said that attempting to pressure people to publicly take those positions—opposing abortion and
same sex marriage—hurts the Archdiocese:
I think the Church sees an inappropriate role for people who are involved in public life
when the values in the society . . . don’t resemble the values of Church believers. So that
you can’t ask, I don’t think it’s fair to ask people . . . to come out against . . . abortion. In
public life a Catholic candidate can’t say that abortion isn’t one of those rights that people
have. I don’t think public policy can parallel the view of Church believers in that. Now,
in saying that, I realize I’m not standing where a lot of Catholics stand. A lot of Catholics
put it all together. On the issue of gay rights and gay marriage, for example, my own
position on it is . . . and I think many priests would agree with me . . . that the concept of
what is now legal marriage should not be a bar to people of the same sex. It has with it
certain implications for rights that one has for the sharing of assets and for survivorship
rights, etc. And . . . so that’s important for lots of people. It shouldn’t be denied because
there’s such a thing called a religious marriage. My feeling on it is the Church never
should have been in the business of performing civil marriages. I think the confusion
comes when the Church assumes two roles in the same act—a civil union, a civil
marriage, and a religious marriage (Macchiarola 2009).
Martin McLaughlin summarized what he believes to be a more prevalent view among
Catholics he knows on the abortion issue:
I’m pro-choice. And I think abortion is a big mistake. Not because [the Church] opposes
it. I have no problem with that. Because I don’t support abortion, I support choice. And
there’s a big difference between choice and abortion . . . I just don’t want to say, create a
law that says you got to go get a wire hanger because you can’t go to a doctor and get a
goddamn abortion. Okay? And you don’t have the right to do that to a woman. It’s her
choice. And that’s what I believe . . . And I believe God gave them intelligence and a
soul so they can make these choices. And I would hope that she wouldn’t abort the
kid . . . I’d hope she’d have the kid and do something with it, whether put it in foster
care, find a foster parent. I had a friend of mine whose daughter got knocked up. She
went to Ireland. They found a beautiful family. She had the baby, gave it over to the
family because she was too young . . . And there was a loving family (McLaughlin
2009).
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The social movements in the 1960s and 1970s created challenges for society at large but
for the Archdiocese the drive for abortion rights and the gay rights challenged Catholic theology.
Daniel Chill observed:
[T]he growth of the women’s movement was very, very important . . . the church had an
unpopular stance, it was anti-choice. And that alienated many, many Catholic[s] because
they were having sexual relations, and they didn’t want to have babies. Pro- choice is
wildly popular with women, so they lost the Catholic women (Chill 2009).
Father Duffell also sees the abortion issue as impossible to navigate for the Archdiocese:
[S]ome people pick and choose what they want. I don’t think it’s that. I think people . . .
young people find it difficult when they hear bishops kind of crying out against certain
things like the whole abortion question. People can be opposed to abortion, but how you
affect policy change is important. And I think that’s where the Church has lost its sense of
faith and trust (Duffell 2011).
Karen Keogh, former State Director for then-United States Senator Hillary Clinton said:
We [her Catholic mother and herself] don’t discuss choice at all, at all. I know what her
position is. She’s firmly right to life, a thousand percent, and nothing is ever going to
move her off the position. We just don’t discuss it. . . . I think she probably knows I’m
pro-choice. I’ve worked for obviously many, many pro-choice candidates, but it doesn’t
come up (Keogh 2009).

Same Sex Marriage
Bruce Gyory, a former senior advisor to Governors Hugh Carey, Eliot Spitzer, and David
Paterson, said:
I think . . . [political attitudes toward gay people] started to change in the Lindsay
administration. Koch was solicitous of them because of the coalition he was trying to
keep. The Church was not allied with the labor movement or the machines, it couldn’t
produce the votes any more . . . and then as the gay issue developed you have now where
politicians actually debate should I march in the Saint Patrick’s Day parade, whereas it
used to be you know you had to march in the Saint Patrick’s Day parade, as recently as
twenty years ago (Gyory 2009).
John Marino elaborates:
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Abortion. Abortion is the issue that drives most. Homosexuality drives people crazy too.
They don’t think the Catholic Church should be getting involved in issues like that. They
think the Catholic Church—and I’m not only talking about Democrats here—I’m talking
about most people you talk to who think the Catholic Church should stay out of it. If it
wants to get involved in abortion, fine; it does not need to make it the big issue. They
don’t even think the Catholic Church should talk about the death penalty. But if you want
to talk about abortion you should talk about the death penalty . . . Gay rights, why are you
getting into the whole issue of homosexuality? But why is the Catholic Church involved
in that kind of issue? What right does it have in that kind of issue (Marino 2009)?
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CHAPTER IV. LEADERSHIP PAST AND PRESENT:
THE CULT OF CATHOLIC PERSONALITY
Leadership and Lack of Leadership Development
No Replacement Catholic Leaders
The Archdiocese of New York’s transition owed much to its leadership. Interview
respondents noted that the nature of the personalities within the Archdiocese significantly
affected how the Archdiocese was perceived by outsiders. They also cited the Archdiocese’s
inability to replace Catholic leadership and to develop new leaders that would create a dynamic
organizational structure attracting others.
Herman Badillo referred to the Archdiocese as a business that was being run improperly.
He blamed the lack of leadership on the Cardinal, a leader who could influence political
outcomes but failed to attend to internal dynamics:
If you’re running a business, and that’s what the Cardinal does, you’ve got to pay
attention to the business. You’ve got to pay attention to where your money is coming
from. You’ve got to pay attention to who your constituents are. You’ve got to pay
attention to the public officials because you’ve got to help elect some of those public
officials. So if you want legislation in Albany or in Washington or in the [City] Council
you’ll be getting the support. . . . In the old days it was a prerequisite if you wanted to be
elected to my office, to set up a meeting with the Cardinal. (Badillo 2009).
In discussing the same issue, Frank Macchiarola indicates that the locally-based
leadership, which at one point meant white ethnic Catholics, was quite different:
The political leadership, which was community-based, has been replaced. Who replaces
it? The government itself? We have a government that runs the government. What is
an Assemblyperson supposed to be? Assemblyperson is supposed to be a person from
the community who brings to the legislature a point of view. What are they now? They
are the direct force of the political power. And you know they’re politically powerful
because they’re always reelected (Macchiarola 2009).
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And what is the impact today of the Archdiocese of New York in politics, in community
leadership? “[The] Church has nothing—no one has anything to say with it. It’s all government
stuff” (Macchiarola 2009).

No Development of Future Catholic Leaders in Politics and Public Life
If the Archdiocese of New York had been able to develop either a lay leadership or
clerical leadership who could have participated more publicly in the city’s political affairs,
Herman Badillo skeptically opined, there would have been little difference in the perception of
the Archdiocese as a political force. Could the Archdiocese develop leadership to engage the
political community on behalf of its adherents?
They could, but they don’t because nobody cares anymore. In the old days, for example,
[we had] mayors who were Catholic like Wagner, and even Impelliteri, names like that,
and they all received this stamp of approval from the Catholics. And the [Democratic
Party] county leaders would make sure that there would be a Catholic who would be
running for office. And the last one who really tried to get the support of the Catholic
Church was Biaggi . . . After he went down the drain I don’t really remember any
Catholic aspiring for citywide office. . . . [T]he only thing that counts in New York City
is the Democratic Party . . . Unless you’re Rudy [Giuliani] . . . Rudy being Catholic but
being very much on the outside . . . he did not come in with the support of the Church, he
came in because people were furious at [David] Dinkins. (Badillo 2009).
Aureo Cardona reflected when, as a young man, he became involved in politics the opportunity
to develop as a Catholic leader had largely disappeared. Other forces had moved to the forefront
of New York City politics:
I was probably the youngest district leader in the South Bronx . . . I remember that
[Democratic County Committee Chair Patrick] Cunningham was a very powerful Irish
leader, and politics in the Bronx were primarily Irish. You had a strong Irish hand. When
I became district leader for a short term, the district leaders had no power. The people
before us, years before us, would be able to dole out jobs and…for some reason unions
got involved, and unions took over basically the power of the political leaders. . . . The
South Bronx was predominantly Catholic. There were Churches everywhere full of
people, mostly Latino (Cardona 2011).
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Judge Paul Crotty served in the mayoral administration of Edward I Koch (1978-1990)
and thought that the Archdiocese had but an informal influence on the Mayor:
I talk about my own political experience; I know that Ed Koch appointed me in 1984 and
I’m quite sure he was sensitive to the issue of Catholics in his administration and liked to
have Catholics in his administration, [although] he never consulted with the Archdiocese
or the Cardinal about who those choices ought to be. He had a particularly warm and
close relationship with Cardinal O’Connor where they talk about things (Crotty 2011).
What would a new leadership look like? Michael Long alluded to a new model, but it was
really a reflection of the past when there had been active and effective Catholic leaders:
Hugh Carey, Tom Manton, there were really big identified [with the Church and with the
Archdiocese of New York] guys . . . all of them didn’t always defend the principles of
their faith, but they were identified as Catholic. They had good relationships with the
Bishop I think . . . and the Church doesn’t seem to have that clout anymore, because they
don’t have the people they can go to anymore . . . Even Nelson Rockefeller, while he
was not Catholic, was smart enough to pay attention to the Catholic leadership down here
in the City of New York and most likely around the State of New York, but he was smart
enough to do that. So you had . . . people like Moynihan, you had people like . . . as I
said Tony Travia, you had Matt Troy . . . these are all somewhat icons that really worked
real well in the political system. They started to disappear (Long 2009).
In former City Council member and land use expert McCaffrey’s opinion, the clergy who
had the most potential to create new leadership were being lost to the parishes.
[They had] tended to be the individuals who would be the greatest activists in terms of
the neighborhood. And so you ended up [in the Manhattan and Bronx parishes] with older
clergy who were . . . used to doing the same thing. They’ll go to the Rosary Society
meeting but the idea about doing anything outside in the neighborhood, that was
something that you rarely saw (McCaffrey 2011).
What McCaffrey was alluding to is that changes in demographics, coupled with the rise
of secularism and other social change, seemed to curtail the development of new leadership
within the Archdiocese. More community-based leadership would typically be a formula for a
leadership more activist in its outlook and less tethered to conservative doctrinaire behavior. But
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the older neighborhood-oriented clergy were dying off and not being replaced.
What does the future look like, and how will the creation of a new leadership affect the
Archdiocese? Monsignor Sakano, who was a pastor on the Lower East Side and worked to
preserve housing in Manhattan and the Bronx, says about the future that:
[A] lot of it is going to depend on our leadership in the church and I’d like to think that
there’s a vacuum now, and I think there is. And there can be a period of calm before
somebody or some people step in and provide leadership. And then you might see some
codification and definition to what Catholicism is. But I don’t think it’s ever going to
return to the Cardinal Spellman period. That’s an interesting chapter. It’s just gone. It
went. Part of an evolutionary process. But I don’t know whether it’s going to happen or
not, I can only hope that it does. That there [will be] an effective leadership that comes in
and solidifies and strengthens the Catholic faith (Sakano 2011).
The "Powerhouse": The New York Cardinal
Frequently interviewees answered questions regarding the future of the Archdiocese of
New York in New York City politics by turning the discussion to the personalities of its leaders,
past and present.
In a city filled with power brokers, no other leadership group was able to combine the
temporal, political, and spiritual like the succession of New York cardinals in the second half of
the twentieth century. It is not surprising then that most of the interviewees noted a “cult” of
personalities among those in residence at Saint Patrick’s Cathedral.
Stephen Aiello saw two sides to the Church: its organizational presence that provided
“schools and everything else” and tried to “promote its agenda” but also its “personalities.”
“Who’s the face of the church, outside of the local parishes? I remember the local priests, the
nuns. [It was] the Cardinal [who] was out here, but I think the face and interfacing with the
powers that be, are the personalities, and [their] strengths (Aiello 2009).
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Andrew Napolitano, as he had when responding to other questions, had a view more
attuned to religious doctrine. He saw the fate of the Church depending on moral leadership,
which rested on individual cardinals and the direction of the Church’s religiosity.
You had the watering down of Catholicism structurally and liturgically and politically
that followed Vatican II. The exception to that is Cardinal O’Connor. But Cardinal
Cooke, a wonderful and saintly man, was not into politics. Cardinal O’Connor was into
politics. Cardinal Egan was not. By the time Cardinal Dolan got here, the influence of
the Church had been radically diminished because the Church’s grip on Catholic
politicians had been diminished. Could you imagine if Cardinal Spellman were still here
today—would he give communion to Rudy Giuliani who’s divorced and remarried many
times and is in favor of abortion? Probably not. But yet Dolan will. Same church, same
teachings, same rules; just different discipline (Napolitano 2014).
Dagger John
The spirit of John Joseph Hughes, who served as Archbishop of the New York
Archdiocese from 1842 through 1864, provoked comments from several of my interlocutors.
Hughes reacted aggressively to then-common attacks on Catholics and on churches. He fought
for the creation of a separate Catholic school system, founded Fordham University, and began
the construction of St. Patrick’s Cathedral. He was nicknamed Dagger John for the way in which
he signed his name, always followed by a cross which resembled a dagger. He was noted for his
savvy leadership, a leadership role that might again surface in the Archdiocese.
William Cunningham saw his leadership in the creation of unique institutions:
Look, it goes back probably to Archbishop Hughes, Dagger John. It goes back to the
immigration after the potato famine followed later on by the Italians coming in. These
waves of Catholics from Ireland, from Italy then Eastern Europe, the Church was a
parallel institution that was built up. It was a social as well as a religious institution. It
had a hierarchy. The Irish, particularly coming out of a British system, understood
politics. They understood control and command to use today’s phrase, organizations,
they understood how power flowed down (Cunningham 2009).
Paul Crotty offered an assessment that was more critical of Hughes legacy, though:
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I know that they've done a great job in rehabilitating St. Patrick's Cathedral. The expenses
are far exceeding the income, what are we doing? We are closing down schools? We are
closing down parishes, pretty much like the post office. I think the Church started out as a
pilgrim church. We didn’t have big buildings, and we didn’t have big hospitals and all
those. The Catholic schools in many ways are response to Cardinal Hughes [who thought
that] we are going to become Protestants as opposed to good Catholics. So we need a
separate structure, I don’t know if we need a separate structure. I don’t think we can
afford a separate structure (Crotty 2011).
Cardinal Spellman
Reverend Thomas J. Reese, writing more than two decades after the death of Francis
Cardinal Spellman, lists what he considers the qualities needed to be an effective Archbishop:
The ideal archbishop is a pastorally-sensitive administrative genius who can prophetically
preach the gospel in a non-threatening way and provide extensive social services and
educational programs at low cost with few bureaucrats. He must govern in a way that is
widely consultative, decisive, innovative, collegial, orthodox, and that keeps everyone
happy. He must be prophetic in his concern for the poor and raise money from the rich.
He must convince his priests that they are the most important people in the archdiocese
without alienating religious and laity by being excessively clerical (Reese 1989, 1).
But this was not Francis Cardinal Spellman, who served as Archbishop of the
Archdiocese of New York from 1939-1967. He presided over the Archdiocese during the exodus
of the Catholic white ethnics to the city’s northern and eastern suburbs, a wave of migration to
the city from Puerto Rico, the post-Vatican II liberalization of Church doctrine and practice, and
the decline of the port and related industrial sectors of the city. The Catholic population by 1965
would swell to over seven hundred and fifty thousand.

“Spellmanism”
“Spellmanism” was style of leadership, unwavering in its conservatism and anticommunism. It labeled those who disagreed with any element of that conservatism “antiCatholic.” It supported foreign wars and right-wing dictatorships as long as they protected
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Catholics and Catholic interests in the world. It was an exclusionary ideology in which no dissent
was brooked and the punishment of political pressure was a constant threat to those not of the
Faith or who publicly disagreed with the Cardinal’s positions. Catholics who violated the
hierarchical lines of command structure within the Archdiocese would find their careers derailed
or reassigned.
Jesuit theologian Avery Dulles outlines in Models of the Church what defines the Church
as an institution: sacrament, communion, herald, and servant. Clergy were expected to lead in
each of these aspects of Church practice. Canon law refers to bishops as “teachers of doctrine,
priests of sacred worship and ministers of governance” (Dulles 1974 quoted in Reese 1989, 7).
Spellman appeared most concerned about governance, which translated as an exercise of total
control of the political and social environment within which the Archdiocese of New York
operated.
Spellman was described as unafraid to exercise that control. According to Quinn, he
“played [a role] in matters of church and state, from influencing Rome’s selection of other
American bishops, to helping City Hall choose commissioners and high ranking officials,
especially in the heavily Catholic police and fire departments . . . A supporter of Senator Joseph
McCarthy, he was unbending in his anticommunism” (2007, 168).
There were examples where Spellman freely exercised his will over municipal affairs: for
instance, when Joseph Papp, the late theater producer, attempted to convince City Parks
Commissioner Robert Moses to allow Shakespearean plays to be staged in Central Park at no
charge, Mayor Wagner “was seriously handicapped by his fear of the political power of the
Catholic Archdiocese of New York; if there was one man in the city sure to be influenced by
Moses’ innuendos that Papp was a left winger it was Francis Cardinal Spellman” (Caro 1974,
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1035).
Moses, by most accounts the most powerful man in the history of New York, had
business to do with Cardinal Spellman and the Archdiocese. He came to ask Spellman to partner
in slum clearance on the Upper West Side of Manhattan to reserve space for the construction of
Fordham University’s downtown campus. The relationship between Moses and Cardinal
Spellman had paid previous dividends for the Archdiocese of New York. The West Side Irish
kept their neighborhood intact when other neighborhoods faced the wrecking balls of New York
City Housing Authority urban renewal (McManus 2009). It didn’t turn out as well for the
Italians, who lived on upper First Avenue and saw their homes destroyed by Moses to build high
rise public housing, all done with likely support from the Archdiocese and Cardinal Spellman.
Spellman’s decisions had grave consequences for the future of the Archdiocese. Badillo
notes many attempted to bring Puerto Ricans into the New York church after their arrival on the
mainland, but the Cardinal took few steps to make it happen (Badillo 2009). He recalls that many
priests, and even at times Cardinal Spellman, may have understood the future demographic needs
of the Archdiocese and the ability of Puerto Ricans to fill Archdiocese pews vacated by the white
ethnics. Yet, the Cardinal did little besides convening conferences to discuss the issue, and no
one could force him to do more. Despite growth in the poorest parishes in the Archdiocese, “the
Spellman administration opened fewer new parishes than any since that of Bishop Dubois (18261842). Of the forty-five new parishes, only thirteen were in the city. In spite of its declining
population, Manhattan got five, the Bronx five” (Cohalan 1983, 345). Instead, Cardinal
Spellman opted to follow his membership. More churches were built in suburban locations in
Westchester, Rockland, Orange, Dutchess, Putnam, Sullivan and Ulster counties, all within the
geographic territory of the Archdiocese and all increasingly accessible by the new interstate
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roadway system.

Censorship
Cardinal Spellman also tried to assert his moral authority, attempting in 1950 to prohibit
the film The Miracle from being shown. The Archdiocese described this foreign film as
sacrilegious and ensured that the New York City Commissioner of Licenses banned further
showings. The ban was upheld by the local courts and the New York State Court of Appeals.
Even the State Board of Regents weighed in on behalf of Cardinal Spellman. The priesthood was
silent on the matter. Priests, judges and Regents all likely owed their appointments to the
Cardinal, and disagreeing with him and the Archdiocese could have consequences for career
advancement. The United States Supreme Court ultimately overturned the ban, citing its
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Similarly, in 1956, the Catholic Legion of Decency condemned the film Baby Doll. The
United States Supreme Court held that movies were forms of entertainment and entitled to the
full protection of the First Amendment. “That in effect killed all local censorship” (Cohalan
1983, 344). It would thus be no surprise that when the Times Square area of Manhattan turned
from an area of legitimate entertainment into a center of pornography, the Archdiocese of New
York felt it had no avenue to influence a change.
Spellmanism was a metaphor for an unstoppable drive to censor materials that the
Cardinal deemed unfit. It meant using power when he chose to; and when he didn't, it meant
looking away while Moses destroyed the housing of the Italian Catholics and dislocated them. It
meant attempting to ban from public view ideologies that veered to the left. In the case of the
1949 gravediggers’ strike it meant breaking a union and denying workers the right to be
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represented by a union of their choice. The Cardinal thought the union dominated by
Communists.

Authority
Wilner quotes Weber’s observation: “It is the recognition on the part of those subject to
authority which is decisive for … charisma,” and that such judgments about charisma are found
when we “look at the responses of the followers, not the leader, in order to know whether a
charismatic relationship has been established” (quoted in Wilner 1984, 18-19). Using the concept
of “leader-image” he writes that it:
consists of beliefs that identify the leader with realms beyond the human . . . (1) beliefs
assimilating the leader to the divine or semi divine and (2) beliefs that the leader
possesses otherwise superhuman, supernatural, of exceptional powers or capacities. The
second category denotes unconditional acceptance of the personal authority of the leader.
It can also be divided into two subcategories, one in the domain of belief, and the other in
the domain of action. The first relates to the "idea-acceptance” dimension and consists of
convictions of truth of the leader’s statements. The second subcategory refers to the
“compliance” dimension and comprises unconditional obedience to the leader’s directives
(Wilner 1984, 19).
The argument continues that the leader then becomes indispensable to its adherents.
Adherence to ultimate authority is consistent pedagogically with the concept that power
throughout all portions of the Church flowed from Rome and the Pope. Even under the
liberalizing reform of the Second Vatican Council in 1962, Cardinal Spellman’s authority in his
Archdiocese was beyond challenge. Many believed his power also extended to the selection of
diocesan officials throughout the nation including Archbishops:
To many New Yorkers the clearest proof of his great influence in Rome came after the
death of Thomas E Malloy, Bishop of Brooklyn, when the Diocese of Rockville Center
was cut out of Brooklyn and it was announced on April 6, 1957, that both dioceses had
been filled by former members of Spellman’s staff (Cohalan 1983, 359).
In the Spellman era, the authority of the Archdiocese of New York was vast and its temporal
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authority unquestioned. “Eventually, it struck some priests at the Chancery that the archbishop’s
political power in New York knew few limits. But even they were baffled by the ways in which
Spellman managed to maneuver behind the scenes” (Cooney 1984, 106).
“As far as I was concerned,” says the Reverend Albert Nevins, who worked for twenty
years in New York and is quoted by Cooney, “he [Spellman] controlled Tammany Hall. . . . He
made judges and other appointments, but you could never prove it. There was never anything on
paper in New York politics. It was always done through the back door” (Cooney 1984, 106).
Cardinal Spellman’s decline in influence is mirrored by the growth of social movements
in the 1950s and 1960s, which included the women’s movement, the civil rights movement and
the movement for equality for gay men and lesbian women. The Archdiocese either did not
actively participate in these movements for change or actively opposed them. Vatican II’s
mission to reinvigorate Catholicism undermined the power of the Church hierarchy for many
traditional Catholics by suggesting that a group of men, not the heavens nor the solely Pope,
could affect the rules of prayer (Massa 2001). The Archdiocese was not meant to create reform
from the bottom up. Spellman allowed no compromise, and as a result the Archdiocese continued
as it always had, regardless of changes occurring in society and in the city.
Despite Irish domination of the Archdiocese's power structure and the politics of the city
that, as I have chronicled protected Spellman and the Church, other influences undermined
Spellmanism: the out-migration of Catholic white ethnics from New York City to its suburbs, the
decline of the New York port and manufacturing base, and the growth of public sector labor,
which owed nothing to the Archdiocese and replaced the Archdiocese’s cradle-to-grave network.
The inability of the Archdiocese of New York to cede sufficient authority to permit integration of
the newest migrants, Puerto Ricans, and the decline of the Archdiocese’s ally, Tammany Hall,
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were also significant factors (Diaz-Steven 1993). Under Cardinal Spellman “the old -style Irish
machines did not fashion multi-ethnic rainbow coalitions [or reward] each group with a fair share
of the prizes drawn from a sizable pot of municipal gold” (Erie 1980, 190).

Cardinal Cooke
Terrence Cardinal Cooke succeeded Spellman. Cooke’s leadership style, despite their
close relationship, proved unlike his predecessor’s. Cooke became a member, in 1957, of
Spellman’s inner circle and rose in rank steadily. A social worker, he served as secretary, vicechancellor, chancellor, vicar general for the Archdiocese and lived with Cardinal Spellman from
May 1958 until the Cardinal’s death (Cohalan 1983, 376). Many thought Cardinal Cooke to be
Spellman’s chosen successor. Terrence Cooke “was a hands on administrator with an intimate
knowledge of the Archdiocese, but he preferred to work in the background and not in front of the
media.” Quoting an unnamed director of Catholic Charities for New York, Reese continues:
“Cardinal Cooke was very good on advocacy, but he tended to low-key his advocacy. . . . A few
years ago we were pushing for a moratorium on (apartment) conversions, which was another
way of getting rid of [poor] people and gentrifying. Cardinal Cooke was behind us and he would
meet with Mayor Beame, but he wouldn’t go public on it” (Reese 1989, 12).

Societal Changes
Lacking the bombastic style of his predecessor, Cooke did not seek the media’s attention,
nor did he desire Spellman’s celebrity with non-Catholics. Cardinal Cooke presided over a period
of even greater tension and change in American society when, according to Monsignor Thomas
J. Shelly, “The combination of the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement helped to make
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the late 1960s and early 1970s one of the most turbulent periods in American history”
(December 23, 1999 edition of Catholic New York).
There were the Archdiocese’s own internal challenges as well. In his The History of the
Archdiocese of New York, Thomas Shelly continues: “In addition to the turmoil in American
society, American Catholics had to contend with the changes introduced into the Archdiocese of
New York by Vatican Council II. In New York, the responsibility for guiding the Archdiocese of
New York through this difficult period fell upon Terrence J. Cooke” (Shelly 1999, 57).
The economic and demographic challenges that were facing the Archdiocese under
Cardinal Spellman only accelerated under Cardinal Cooke’s tenure. The Archdiocese had to deal
with the fallout from the corporate sector exodus from New York, the flight of white ethnic
Catholics, and the decline of the port, plus other factors such as the rise of organized crime,
corrupt unionism, government programmatic interventions, lack of local investment, and the
Archdiocese's own passivity (Fischer 1995; Danielson and Doig 1982, 328-333; Mello 2010).
With the government doing more of the work that the Archdiocese of New York had done
providing cradle-to-grave services, all things were in flux. Stein notes, “[l]eft governments made
welfare expenditures—income maintenance, education, health care—the central part of public
expenditures. In the United States, federal aid to education, Medicare, Medicaid, and various job
programs put more flesh on the scrawny American welfare state” (Stein 2010, 13).
The political parties were in decline and factionalized; regular Democrats—Tammanystyle political leaders and clubs—faced off against Democratic reformers. The difference for the
Archdiocese was that the reformers were not Irish nor in many cases Catholic. They did not share
the values of the Archdiocese and differed with it on social issues. “Part of this shift was
represented by the decline of political parties in the United States, and with that decline came the
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disappearance of the close connection between the local politician and the individual,” writes
Allen (1993, 283). Similarly the close connection between parishioners whom the Archdiocese
served, and to whom its hierarchy was ethnically akin, weakened along with city demographic
and power sector shifts.
Making matters more difficult, Cooke did not have the same tools at his disposal as had
previous Archbishops. He could not avail himself of a Tammany Hall in its prime or of
unchallenged diocesan power; Tammany’s power was diminished by largely non-Catholic reform
Democrats, and the Archdiocese's power was diminished by the passage of divorce reform, the
legalization of abortion, and by the liberalizing force of Vatican II.

New World
All this led to a much different administration under Cardinal Cooke. Cohalan writes:
It was expected that [Cooke’s] administration would concentrate on local affairs and
would continue the policies and programs of his predecessor. In fact, [Cooke’s]
administration differed greatly from Cardinal Spellman’s because Cooke’s administration
encountered three major long term, unrelated, and almost simultaneous events, the full
dimensions of which were unforeseeable in 1968 and have changed many things in New
York: the effects of Vatican Council II, the great changes in moral standards of the
country that showed themselves from the early 1960s on (Cohalan 1983, 279).
So how did Cardinal Cooke respond to this new world? Shelley writes:
A native New Yorker with a genial personality and an enviable capacity for hard work,
Cardinal Cooke made no effort to imitate Cardinal Spellman as a national or international
figure. Instead, he made his contribution on the local scene, bringing to the leadership of
the Archdiocese two qualities much needed at the time: pastoral sensitivity and
managerial skills. Critics faulted him for lack of vision (1999, 57).
Was Cardinal Cooke’s duty to project vision, or was it more important to protect the
Archdiocese in a time of crisis? According to Vigoda-Gadot, leadership might be defined as
“behavior that gives purpose, meaning, and guidance to collectivity by articulating a collective
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vision that appeals to ideological values, motives, and self-perception of followers" (2007, 662).
He further notes that the outcomes of such behavior are heightened awareness of organizational
values, unusual levels of effort, and the forgoing of followers’ self-interest for the good of the
collective.
In a time of great change, Cardinal Cooke opted to protect the Archdiocese from outside
influences while maintaining its own inner hierarchical structure. The result was that the
Archdiocese seemed impervious to the world. Twenty minutes north of Saint Patrick’s Cathedral,
fires raged in the South Bronx and neighborhoods crumbled. Even closer to the Archdiocese
offices crime rose, and in Upper Manhattan heroin dealers became the celebrities of the day. That
turmoil could have led to absolute revolt among the parishioners or the priesthood. Cooke’s job
was to insure that the hierarchy remained intact, if possible, and that he maintain institutional
power with full and total control.
This attitude was necessary as the very makeup of the flock changed with the times. The
world of the “good Catholic” had changed. Massa writes that “good Catholics—that is Catholics
who regularly attended Mass, did their Easter duty, and made sure that their children attended
Catholic school—could also be counted on to dutifully pay their taxes, show respect for Police
Officers, and send their sons to fight America’s wars” (Massa 1999, 112). Now, “good Catholics”
certainly were among those protesting daily during the Cardinal Cooke years. They milled about
at the Whitehall induction center in lower Manhattan and were among those going to fight in
Vietnam.

The Common Good
What it meant to be a good Catholic shifted in the eyes of many parishioners in this
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period from a strict doctrinal understanding to an appreciation of the common good. Influenced
by social movements and a changing cultural ethos, lay Catholics in New York understood the
common good differently than the Archdiocese. One example was the legalization of abortion in
1970 in New York State despite vociferous opposition by the Archdiocese. Supported by liberal
Republican Governor Nelson Rockefeller, a Protestant, the legislation signaled the end of
Tammany control of Manhattan, the Bronx, and of both chambers of the state legislature
One analysis might be that the passage of abortion reform was a victory for those whom
social scientists have referred to as “cosmopolitans.” Richard Hofstadter writes:
The fundamentalists are “locals” in Robert Merton’s terminology: that is, they take their
values from the traditions of local society; the modernists are "cosmopolitans" in that
they are more au courant with what is going on in the nation-wide mass society, whether
or not they approve of it. Both are engaged in politics, but the fundamentalists have a
special edge because they want to restore the simple virtues of a bygone age and they feel
themselves to be fighting in a losing cause (Hofstadter 1952, 88-89).
Many who had seen themselves as “fundamentalists” had likely made their way from the
city to the suburbs. The reformers were dominating Manhattan politics and were waging battles
in the Bronx that resulted in the 1965 election of Puerto Rican reform Democrat Herman Badillo
as Bronx borough president. Badillo would then run in the Democratic mayoral primary in 1969
against former Mayor Robert F. Wagner and Mario Procaccino. Mayor Wagner was closest to the
Archdiocese but sufficiently cosmopolitan to keep out of the abortion fray, which he could have
entered as a respected public citizen and Catholic. Wagner hurt the Archdiocese of New York
politically by refusing to further empower the last of the Tammany bosses, Carmine DeSapio,
who within a few years would be sent to prison on federal corruption charges.
[I]n the Wagner administration [1953-1965] in particular there was an unspoken rule
against the granting of any favor that if published could reflect on the good name of the
administration. This stemmed from the mayor himself. He was jealous of the good name
of Wagner, and he was independently wealthy enough to scorn opportunities to make
more money (Moscow 1971, 193).
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John V. Lindsay, with the support of Governor Nelson Rockefeller and the help of the
largely Jewish Liberal Party, beat Wagner in 1969. Catholics would find their way to the newly
founded Conservative Party and their candidate National Review editor William F. Buckley.
Lindsay, a cosmopolitan, won the election—and re-election in 1969—further isolating the
Archdiocese and making it less relevant. Cardinal Cooke could have broken with the past to
become an influential connection with the reigning cosmopolitan political culture, but he did not.
The passage of divorce liberalization in 1966 and abortion legalization in 1970; the
election of John Lindsay coupled with the flood-like urban exodus of white ethnic Catholics; the
increasing migration of Puerto Ricans in New York City and the Archdiocese's failure to absorb
them as equal parishioners; the changing of power centers brought on by the shift away from
industry domination by the docks and manufacturing—all influenced Cardinal Cooke’s apparent
decision to primarily attend to the administration of the Archdiocese and to exit from the
temporal political world of his predecessor.

Cardinal John O’Connor
John Cardinal O’Connor’s position within the pantheon of Archdiocesan leaders was
paradoxical. With American cultural life, and even more so New York’s, representing the
culmination of social movements—feminism, civil rights, sexual liberation, and personal
choice—that lifted traditional constraints from individuals and social groups. how would the
Church make its morality understood? Was there a leader who could assert the primacy of
religiosity in an increasingly secular world? One approach was to recast the Church as the
guarantor of the values that motivated the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Monsignor
Peter Finn extolled Cardinal O’Connor as a leader capable of guiding the Archdiocese in that
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direction. While discounting the Archdiocese's opposition to abortion and birth control, Finn
called O’Connor a defender of women. “The homeless, the AIDS victims, and the whole
question of women’s rights—no one was more pro-women than John O’Connor. He was
incredible with women, incredible in the best sense of the word and a whole bunch of other
things.” Finn added that “he was also well connected and politically skilled,” which was the sort
of leadership the Archdiocese needed:
[Political leadership] brings you through doors and sanctuaries where otherwise you have
no input at all. I sat with O’Connor in the Wall Street towers with the Ambassador of the
United Nations, a personal friend of John O’Connor. He was able to influence, reach out
to the Middle East and the problems over there for Catholics. We went to Ireland on a
peace mission and he met with all of the authorities in the south and then went up to
Belfast in the north (Finn 2011).
Gabe Pressman described O’Connor’s style of political leadership as highly visible:
There are two different political types. Spellman worked behind the scenes. O’Connor
was more overt. He became a buddy of Mayor Koch. And his whole attitude was very
open and embracing to all groups. I’m sure he had Jewish, Irish, Italian friends. He
certainly was open to all the minorities. He was an Irish Catholic. He was a
quintessential New Yorker in many ways, even though he was an immigrant from
Philadelphia. He had a gift for embracing people and making them feel as though they
were well liked and that he understood them. I remember when he took on the AIDS
situation. He would go over at night, without a camera or anything like that, he would go
over at night to minister to the victims of AIDS at St. Clare’s Hospital. And he had a
warmth about him that I’m sure made the patients feel good. He didn’t do it for as a
show, he did it because he really cared about people. He loved people (Pressman 2011).
Cardinal O’Connor as a model for the kind of leadership that would help the Archdiocese
adjust to new political and social realities:
With the exception of Cardinal O’Connor, there’s been a lack of flexibility in the
leadership of the church. I think O’Connor, had he lived longer, would’ve probably
accomplished more in the way of embracing perhaps a new philosophy. I’m not sure
what he would’ve done. He was a labor leader in Philadelphia. He was rigid in his
ideology, I guess, as far as the church was concerned. But he also was a very practical
guy. And I think he might’ve eased the pathway a little bit toward great diversification
and power for the Church, or at least put a stop to the slide in power (Pressman 2011).
Pressman went on:
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[O’Connor] would’ve recognized the new immigrant groups and maybe helped them,
induce them to follow the teachings of the church. I don’t know, perhaps he was a
creature of his times. He happened to be more mellow and more tolerant than some other
leaders of the Church (Pressman 2011).
“O’Connor played a real role pushing hospital executives to deal with 1199 [the Hospital
Workers Union] and bring them in and they made a break from some of the other hospitals that
were treated [bargaining] as a management/labor dispute,” said Bruce Gyory, who, along with
Gabe Pressman, credited O’Connor with being the type of leader the Archdiocese needed to ease
its transition into the constantly changing cosmopolitan political culture.

John Marino had mixed feelings about O’Connor’s ability to unite the flock, restore the
Archdiocese to its service mission, and provide the relationships that would result in a new
political relevance:
I listened to O’Connor when he was in Pennsylvania, in the Poconos, wherever it was . . .
give a sermon. It was all about abortion. And that was his unbelievable … narrow focus
when he came here. Did he do good things? Was he a good cardinal? In certain ways he
did. He was certainly a more outgoing guy than Egan was and less defensive. But I think
that we had a weak cardinal [Cooke] and then we had a cardinal [O’Connor] who was
much more focused on issues of saving souls, in his mind, than in building a Church and
the power base of the Church (Marino 2009).
John Marino said:
They [pastors and priests] liked O’Connor because they felt O’Connor cared more. I
think of O’Connor as this anti-abortion cardinal mainly because I was in the political
world dealing with it on a daily basis. But they view him as a guy who cared about poor
people and didn’t shut those parishes and didn’t do a lot of the things that Egan did
because he didn’t want to hurt those people (Marino 2009).

Cardinal Edward Egan
Frank Macchiarola recalls the first time he met John Cardinal O’Connor’s successor
Edward Egan:
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My recollection is . . . the [mayoral] inaugural. And there was a line of dignitaries across
the front row, dignitaries. The last seat of the first row was occupied by Cardinal Egan.
He was the most forlorn-looking person. And I thought to myself, wow; if Spellman had
been here, he would have been front and center. So that to me was a graphic illustration
of what had happened over time. Has it [the power of the Archdiocese] eroded? The
answer is absolutely yes (Macchiarola 2009).
Nor was Gabe Pressman’s description of Egan flattering:
Egan was a rigid guy. I don’t know that he was a bad guy. He made his mark in canon
law. He’s an expert in canon law. So he was not of this world, he was kind of a clerical
nerd. A nice guy, but not a man who really had a great deal of insight, as far as I can
observe, into the mechanics of reaching out to a city (Pressman 2011).
“Egan was petrified,” said lobbyist Martin McLaughlin:
Egan was afraid because of all the pedophilia in Hartford . . . and that he didn’t do
anything about it. And I know for a fact, when we were doing real estate for them, and I
would say to Dave Brown, what the fuck is wrong with them? He says, he’s not going to
sell anything because he doesn’t want to be accused of pooling money to defend
pedophilia cases (McLaughlin 2009).
“Sure, I mean, the church is only trying to survive,” said Vincent Pitta:
I think there was a marked change in both the role and the complexion of the Catholic
Church during Cardinal Egan’s tenure, much different certainly from Archbishop
O’Connor. I think the new Archbishop is trying to reclaim both the Church’s stature, its
influence in the community, its touch with the common man, while at the same time,
hanging on to the Church’s core principles, but certainly about survival (Pitta 2009).
With changes in the social composition of the Archdiocese Eagan has faced different
problems than his predecessors. The precarious financial position of Catholic education was the
culmination of social trends that the Archdiocese had managed to avoid. “Most immigrants can’t
pay tuitions necessary to keep Catholic schools open, and the best source of Catholic education
has always been Catholic schools” (Pitta 2009). Egan would preside over school and parish
closings, and the sale of Archdiocese-owned real estate within the city, the first head of the
Archdiocese to do so, while planning for the future needs of a growing suburban population.
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“Egan, when he came in, we had some meetings, Puerto Ricans and Hispanics met with
him, but he never followed up, and the word was that Egan was only interested in going back to
Rome, that he loved Rome and he really didn’t like New York and as you may have noticed . . .
he made really no impression in New York at all” (Badillo 2009). At times Eagan seemed
politically clueless. William Cunningham remembered attending an event:
One time I was invited to the Cardinal’s residence. And it was Cardinal Egan and
Cardinal Egan was looking to raise money for the two hundredth anniversary of the
Church, and he had a group there. And Mayor Bloomberg showed up that night. And
Cardinal Egan was speaking and he saw Mayor Bloomberg and sort of nodded and
acknowledged that the mayor was there. And then he told a story which he used an awful
lot about how Rudy Giuliani had said he couldn’t run the city without the Catholic
Church, because of the hospitals, the schools, and the social programs that they ran. And
that was a very big thing with the Cardinal (William Cunningham, May 2009).

Mugavero and Spellman
Stephen Aiello raised the issue of personality and leadership in a different context,
comparing Cardinal Francis Spellman—the head of the New York Archdiocese during a period
that many interviewed described as a time of great power and influence—and Bishop Francis
John Mugavero who led the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brooklyn from 1968 to 1990:
Power, like energy, just doesn’t disappear. Yes, [Mugavero and Spellman were] very
similar to the extent that they really were thought to be real shepherds to their flock. They
were out there, took strong positions, had political contacts, civic contacts, and
community contacts. So yes, similar personalities. I think what you’re seeing now is
declining authority and power, something you see generally that’s happening to the
Catholic Church throughout the country and in New York in particular (Aiello 2009).
Conclusion
Each cardinal, with his own individual leadership style, embodied the ability of the
Archdiocese of New York to wield influence in social, economic, and political arenas. Further,
each cardinal was able to shepherd and mold future leaders within the Archdiocese's own ranks.
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The Archdiocese of New York is not creating leaders like these any longer. There is a class of
leader being created, but it is a differently styled leader.
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CHAPTER V. NEW YORK POLITICS, LABOR AND THE CATHOLIC SCHOOLS
The historic loss of Catholic political power, of labor and union influence, and of the
preeminence of the New York Catholic school system is the focus of this chapter. Drawing from
interviews, the literature on economic and political transformations in New York, and an analysis
of the evolution of Catholic thought, I explore the evolution of the Archdiocese of New York’s
organizational infrastructure and its political decline. My inside interlocutors ask whether the
Church has lost its political and moral authority and what it means to be a Catholic.

Tammany Hall
Catholic political power, at least through the Spellman era, owed its strength to a
combination of the Archdiocese’s identification with the Irish, a powerful demographic force that
simultaneously existed as an outsider group; the alliance the Church had with Tammany Hall, the
city’s preeminent political powerhouse through the first half of the 20th century; and the quality
of its leadership. Those forces that brought power to the Archdiocese had a logic that could not
be sustained as the city evolved in the latter half of the century.
I have sketched out the Irish community’s dramatic encounter with nativism and
Archbishop Hughes daring defense of his parishes but would like here to focus on a political
struggle over education and social service funding, which had a lasting effect on the Church’s
communal identity, its organizational coherence, and its alliance with Tammany Hall. During the
1840s Hughes sought public funding for parochial schools to counter the Protestant orientation
of the public school system. When his demand to the state legislature for equal public funding for
Catholic schools went unheeded, Hughes turned inward and committed the Church to financing
an independent parochial school system (Brown and McKeown 1997, 14).
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Through the early 1840s control of New York City schools rested with the Protestantcontrolled Public School Society until the passage of the Maclay Bill created a new school
system in which religious instruction was prohibited and denominational schools went unfunded.
Rejecting schools without religious instruction the Archdiocese saw no option but to build its
own school system. “To preserve their religious heritage,” noted Catholic historian Jay P. Dolan
writes, “and remain loyal to their past, Catholic immigrants were forced to challenge the
Protestant sectarianism of American schools” (Dolan 1975, 104). But having lost the battle to
fund Catholic schools, the Archdiocese’s constituency and leadership found themselves further
isolated.
While unable to procure funding for parochial schools, social services were an entirely
different matter. The Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum (RCOA) “received its first share of state
funds in 1833, and in 1846 the Common Council [equivalent to today’s New York City Council]
leased property on Fifth Avenue and Fifty-first Street to the asylum to build a new institution.
The RCOA also began drawing public school funds from the [New York City] Board of
Education and in 1859 received $5,875 from that source and an additional $4,000 grant from the
state legislature (Brown and McKeown 1997, 15). It was in social service funding that the
relationship between Tammany and the Archdiocese of New York would begin, and it was
through social service funding that it would continue.
Archbishop Hughes’s leadership style proved to be “the voice of politically enraged
American Catholicism. He was not a member of Tammany Hall. But he was, to be sure, the
boss.” In his rise to prominence he not only demanded equal justice for Catholics but challenged
the popular linkage of Americanism with Protestantism (Golway 2014, 32, 33). Along the way he
personified the emergence of boss rule in the Church. Later, that boss rule would foster the
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Archdiocese’s coherence and aid in its quest for power. “The variety of national groups
demanded a degree of control to prevent schism in the church; at the same time the rapid
expansion of the city required ‘a new mode of government’ to consolidate church affairs. Boss
rule effectively met these needs” (Dolan 1975, 175). This need for “boss rule” to control and
effectively contain and neutralize group schisms also made room for pluralism. Hughes publicly
espoused inclusion for all ethnic and religious groups in New York City and within the nation,
and Hughes “provided Tammany Hall’s future leaders with one of their core beliefs: New York
contained multitudes, and those multitudes deserved a share of political power rather than
lectures in Americanism” (Golway 2014, 37).
In severing that “linkage between Americanism and Protestantism,” Hughes increased the
flow of funds from public coffers to Archdiocese of New York programs for the poor. His
strategy had lasting effects. Notably, “during the second half of the nineteenth century, Catholic
institutions grew to the point that they received the lions’ share of public support…by 1900
nearly 20,000 children were cared for yearly in Catholic institutions with public support” (Brown
and McKeown 1997, 15).
The practice of using private non-government agencies in New York City began in the era
of Archbishop Hughes as the struggle over getting and spending should not be underestimated.
Political scientist John Mollenkopf notes that "Government and politics shape the city’s
trajectory….public services help to organize public life.” (Mollenkopf 2011, 171). The child
care system was to become a battle ground between the Archdiocese and the Children’s Aid
Society, a Protestant institution. Hughes saw Protestants use the Society to remove children in
need from Catholic homes and thus from the religion of their parents.
“Catholics soon came to regard,” wrote Brown and McKeown, “the Children’s Aid
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Society as an unqualified menace that had caused thousands of Catholic children to lose their
religion and thus their only hope of eternal salvation…Catholic leaders used the threat of child
removal to build their case for new and enlarged Catholic child-caring institutions to which poor
parents might turn to preserve their children from the reach of Protestant child-placers” (1997,
17).
It was knowing how to work the political system that determined the flow of public
dollars to charities in mid-nineteenth century New York, and the Archdiocese used its
knowledge, and ties to the Democratic Party, to considerable gain. “Irish immigrants quickly
discovered the advantages of party politics in the United States and developed their potential as
political brokers through membership in the Tammany organization. The Irish presence in New
York Democratic politics offered a growing advantage for Catholic child-care institutions in the
pursuit of public funds” (1997, 15).
Ironically, Tammany, was originally controlled not by Catholics but by Protestants until
after the fall of William “Boss” Tweed. In fact, Tammany’s first Irish-Catholic boss, in 1874, was
“Honest John” Kelly who “was also devoutly religious and had originally intended to study for
the priesthood” (Welch 2008, 24). Kelly, apparently following Hughes’ boss rule tactics, “purged
Tweed’s supporters from [Tammany] the Hall. According to some observers, the new leader
tightened Tammany’s chain of command by using the Catholic Church as his model, and made
himself more of a boss than Tweed had ever been” (Ibid., 25) It was during Kelly’s Tammany
leadership that New York City elected its first Irish Catholic mayor, William Grace.
Tammany Hall’s need for votes to elect its own, and the Irish Catholic propensity (Erie
1990) to engage in politics coupled with Hughes’ leadership style served as the model for
Tammany operations (Golway 2014; Welch 2008), which continued until the mid-twentieth
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century when white ethnic Catholics left the city for the suburbs, radically altering the population
of the Archdiocese and undermining Tammany control.

Failure to Include the Left
A century after Hughes came to the aid of Irish immigrants another group of migrants,
Puerto Ricans, arrived in large numbers in New York City. The Archdiocese failed to meet the
needs of its new migrant constituents, and it missed an opportunity to take advantage of the
growing labor movement and liberal ideas. The rise of the public sector unions could have
allowed for a new power base for the Archdiocese, much as the ports and construction trades had
functioned in previous generations. There was, however, a deep undercurrent of distrust of
organized labor, and wariness about the increasing liberalization that was sweeping the country,
all of which made it unlikely that the Archdiocese would adapt to the changing times.
The rise of the reformers and progressive social movements began to erode the
institutional thinking outside the Archdiocese of New York and ultimately within it. At a time
when priests in movies and books were portrayed as populist and progressive heroes in the battle
against corruption, the Archdiocese’s hierarchy rejected such sentiments. Similarly during the
post-World War II period, when Russians and Communism were America’s foes, they became
the focus of the Archdiocese's spiritual concerns. The historic antipathy between the Archdiocese
and any person or institution defined as “communist” or left-leaning was well established, but
the rejection of leftist progressivism isolated the Archdiocese and its leadership from its
adherents. According to Massa, Chancellor of the Archdiocese James Francis McIntyre:
viewed with suspicion or even outright hostility priests who evinced anything like
progressive sympathies. Any cleric who publicly voiced pro-union sentiments; who
supported ecumenical or interdenominational programs . . . all such liberals quickly
received disapproving letters with more than a subtle hint of threat (2001, 89).
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Just as organized labor was gaining political power, the Archdiocese moved away from
the movement that was to become so dominant in New York City. The Church’s fear of
communism stopped it from leveraging the newfound power of the labor movement to its
advantage.

The Gravediggers’ Strike
As it was for Pope Pius XII, battling communism in all its forms was a critical
commitment of the Archdiocese. But Catholics in the city were far less concerned with
communism than with making up for sacrifices they had made during the war years.
Gravediggers at Calvary Cemetery in Queens went on strike seeking a reduction in hours—from
48 to 40 hours—and extra pay, plus time and a half for Saturday labor. Spellman saw the 1949
strike as the work of Communist agitators and his animosity served as a rejection of all things
reminiscent of left-wing social activities (Freeman 1989). After all, Cardinal Spellman was a
leader of the anti-communist crusade and Vicar to the American armed forces. He went so far as
to voice concern when the National Council of Bishops took a position against the use of nuclear
weapons (Cooney 1984).
Spellman’s behavior during the 1949 gravediggers strike was hardly surprising. Like the
waterfront workers, most of the city’s gravediggers were union members. And he usually treaded
lightly around unions. This time it was to be different. One thousand dead Catholics needed
burial, and the Cardinal ordered seminarians to work as scabs (Zeitz 2007). Spellman determined
that the strikers, members of a local of the left-leaning Food, Agricultural and Allied Workers
were Communists. The union was an affiliate of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO),
whose leadership contained Communists. The idea of Catholics being Communists or affiliated
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with Communists was unacceptable, and he “escorted (scab) seminarians into service.” The
impact on the Archdiocese of New York and its relationship to labor would be long-term as the
“image of seminarians working as strike breakers—literally digging up the earth and burying
corpses—was powerful enough to overcome the community’s allegiances to organized labor.
Without the support they needed from other unions and Catholic leaders, the striking
gravediggers went back to work” (Zeitz 2007, 71-72).
Father Robert Sirico, president of the Action Institute, a free-market think tank, came to
Spellman’s defense:
There is a popular distortion about how Catholic social teaching views unions. Even in
the 1949 gravedigger strike, Cardinal Spellman only acted after the union had rejected an
offer of a three percent raise. There were also 1,000 bodies awaiting burial. This should
be a clear example of the legitimacy of breaking a strike (Sirico 2011).
Siricio was wrong, however, according to Joseph J. Fahey, writing in The Catholic Worker:
“Spellman alleged that the workers had come under the influence of Communist agitators and
that he was ‘proud’ to ‘be a strikebreaker'” (2010, 1).
An article that appeared in the Catholic Herald without a byline, announced the strikeending settlement and played up the decision of “the grave-diggers, who were nearly all
Catholics … to transfer” to another union (Fahey 1949). In a United Press International wire
story Spellman crowed it was “the most important thing I have done in my ten years in New
York” (Spellman 1949).
The Archdiocese never absolutely supported unionization. At best, it was always a
marriage of convenience. Robert Caro, writes in The Power Broker:
The relationship between Archdiocese of New York, Irish-Catholic contractors and the
Irish-Catholic building trades unions, had traditionally been close and directed toward
pressuring the City for more public works, which provided simultaneously jobs for
Catholic parishioners and through the contractors’ religious contributions, funds for
Catholic parishes and charities. Moreover, the Archdiocese, perhaps the largest owner of
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real estate in the City, constantly needed favors from the government (1974, 741).

The AFL and ILA
During the post-war era, the Archdiocese of New York’s relationship with its bastion of
labor support on the docks was always complicated and uneasy. Karl Malden’s romantic
portrayal in the 1954 film On the Waterfront of a priest fighting against mob control of the docks
rang true. In fact his character modeled after the real life Jesuit, Father Peter Corridan, detailed in
James Fisher’s On the Irish Waterfront: The Crusader, The Movie and the Soul of the Port of
New York (2009) had a less happy ending. The mob-dominated International Longshoreman’s
Association (ILA) with support from the employer’s group, the New York Shipping Association
(NYSA), would ultimately win a fierce election battle, beating back an attempt to clean up the
piers.
Reasons for the ILA victory were complex, but certain factors are clear. The AFL
attempted to portray the ILA as Communist-dominated because of the supposed involvement of
Harry Bridges in a series of wildcat strikes. Bridges was leader of the west coast longshoreman’s
union, who although he never admitted to being a Communist Party member, was certainly a
fellow traveler. Public officials aligned with Governor Thomas Dewey who aligned himself with
Father Corridan and the AFL against the ILA. James Fisher quotes from a letter found in
Communion of Immigrants sent to Corridan by a dockworker: “Why should I vote AFL when it
is using the same high-handed tactics and employs the same type of low characters as the ILA?”
(2000, 284). Corridan was attacked by the very men he had sought to protect. “Corridan’s
partisan advocacy generated a backlash that worked in the ILA’s favor by inciting longshoremen
to defend their piers militantly against any and all threats from the outside” (Ibid., 285).
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It was Catholics telling outsiders to stay away, and it was Catholics overwhelmingly loyal
to the Democratic Party who resented the involvement of Republican Governor Dewey. The ILA
remained in power. Ted Jelen writes of the longshoremen who defended their turf, that “many
Catholic immigrants migrated to ethnic enclaves in large cities in the eastern and Great Lakes
regions of the United States. For many such immigrants and their descendants, religious and
ethnic identities were difficult to distinguish” (2006, 72).
Yet even the pleas of a priest were rejected when it came to making the decision to
exclude outsiders from the heavily-Catholic environment of the waterfront. The position of the
Archdiocese became clear after the ILA victory: Father Corridan was sacked. The McCormack
family, who were major participants in NYSA and leaders of U.S. Trucking, were also major
financial contributors to the Archdiocese. Fisher writes that McCormack’s power was such that
the head of the ILA served at McCormack’s pleasure, and that McCormack was a “pillar of the
New York Archdiocese and the universal Archdiocese of New York, reaping the honors and
accolades befitting a recipient of investiture as a Knight of Malta and later a Grand Knight of the
Holy Sepulchre and a Knight of the Grand Cross, all bestowed by papal appointment” (Fisher,
2009, 48), all honors that would have been vetted by the Archdiocese (Cooney 1986).

Decision-Making Model
Cardinal Spellman had an unusual and often thorny relationship with organized labor.
Though a champion of the poor and a public enemy of Communism and all things that appeared
to deviate from prevailing conservative social norms, he would pick and choose when to invoke
his higher principles. Corruption on the waterfront and support for priests working with the
victims of organized crime seemed less important to him than protecting important financial

111

backers of the Archdiocese of New York. Further, the McCormack family was also aligned with
Tammany, which had a well-documented relationship with organized crime (Allen 1993; Glazer
and Moynihan 1964; Jacobs 2006).
Here, the Archdiocese’s decision-making process resulted in a non-decision. Spellman
did not to intervene on behalf of the labor force against the ILA in the port battle (Bachrach and
Baratz 1980). He appeared to condone the corruption and exploitation. Revelations of the
relationship between organized crime and the remnants of Tammany Hall illustrate that the
Archdiocese was further isolated from wielding its influence and political legitimacy. It was
forced to remove itself from public view and was left to focus instead on its core missions, which
were not overtly political. These missions included managing and operating schools, hospitals,
nursing homes, and universities, and overseeing the work of the priests and the nuns, who
provided largely unpaid labor for those enterprises.

Public Sector Worries
The Archdiocese had no control over public sector unions, nor could it rival their power.
Nor did it politically identify with public sector unions, which were considerably more
progressive than those in the private sector. For example AFSCME, American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees, actively opposed the war in Vietnam and public
funding for Catholic schools, and it supported unionization of Archdiocese-operated hospitals
and nursing homes. In addition, some unions employed publicly identified Communist Party
members. Such was the case of Jack Bigel, who was an advisor to the New York City Sanitation
Men’s Union—a Teamster affiliate—who though for a time was blacklisted lived to play a major
role in the resolution of the city’s 1975 fiscal crisis.
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At the other end of the political spectrum, the AFL-CIO’s leader George Meany
supported the war in Vietnam, as did Raymond Corbett, the head of the New York State AFLCIO, and the construction trades—some members of which participated in attacking and injuring
scores of anti-war demonstrators in lower Manhattan in 1970. Support for the war was the
position of the Archdiocese of New York; not surprisingly those individuals and many in the
trades mentioned above were Catholic.
Furthermore, fears of communist activity continued to be a factor that influenced the
Archdiocese’s decision-making. This was especially significant considering that one of the major
labor leaders of the era, Transport Workers Union president Mike Quill, was a Communist as
were many of the union’s organizers. These were not the Irish the Archdiocese of New York had
known.
In fact, the whole of the left agenda was antithetical to the Church, but it was not just the
ideological orientation of the labor left that was inimical to mainstream Catholicism. The social
basis of public sector unionism was outside of the Archdiocese’s social milieu. For example,
“when asked what was the key to DC37 success . . . union leaders answered without hesitation:
‘Lillian Roberts’” (Maier 1987, 53). Roberts was a District Council 37 organizer, an African
American, and a woman. Her presence was sure to remind the Archdiocese of New York that
despite the Vatican II reforms, reproductive issues remained a dividing line separating the
Archdiocese from the emerging women’s movement. Furthermore, a black leader with no ties to
the Archdiocese was not a likely acolyte to an institution beginning to find its power base
diminished. The Archdiocese had limited, if any, influence with the new forces in New York City
politics. Public sector unions and their leaders were responsive only to their local union
memberships. They did not need the Archdiocese to act as an intermediary.
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Concerns about Communism and leftist political activity were a serious focus for
Cardinal Spellman who had traveled officially to lend his support to anti-communist, protofascist dictators in the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, among other places. His decision
after the 1955 Conference on the Spiritual Care of Puerto Rican Migrants to locate the
missionary organization for Puerto Ricans in New York was a significant one. The choice to
locate it in an existing parish where, although their numbers were diminishing, Irish, Italian and
other white Catholic ethnics still worshipped, was a unique configuration in New York. In
addition, the office established in the Chancery, the Office of the Coordinator for Spanish
Catholic Action, reported directly to the Cardinal, and was to be a central point of coordination.
Its mission was “articulating a principle of unity for pastoral action on behalf of Hispanics and
calling for an integration of these, our newest and numerous Catholic citizens, into the existing
pattern of archdiocesan life so as to avoid the unhappy and undesirable evolution, in effect, of a
separate diocese within the archdiocese” (Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich1955, 104). Cardinal
Spellman saw the Archdiocese activities as a “necessary effort to stop the spread of communism
among the poor and such a notion was doubtless part of his motivation to take a new initiative
among Puerto Ricans” (Diaz-Stevens 1993, 98).

No Longer All on the Waterfront: The Port Changes
The New York port had through the years been a stalwart and a symbol of Catholic
support and power. The unions were presided over by Catholics, the men who worked on the
ports were Catholic, and the businesses directly located at the port were run by Catholics.
Towards the end of World War II, however, the port began a steep decline. In truth, the
decline of the New York side of the port had been on-going, but accelerated towards the middle
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of the century. New York City was changing rapidly. Private sector labor unions were losing
members, jobs were relocating to the suburbs, and so were the families that had been part of the
white ethnic blue-collar world that comprised the Archdiocese's churches, schools, and regular
Democratic voting block.
Mello writes of stark changes that occurred in less than twenty years through a
combination of regulation by government agencies (often assisting port management at the
expense of port workers), disinvestment in the New York piers, union battles, purposeful
exclusion of left-leaning workers, and containerization (2010). The West Side was strictly Irish
territory and remained that way when it came to port employment until the time that the
Manhattan side of the harbor became desolate and empty, and the once-thriving port was dead.
“By the mid-1960’s, not only would containerization drastically reduce the number of working
longshoremen in the port, but also the greatly increased size and weight of container ships would
render the finger piers of the west side . . . obsolete” (Fisher 2009, 294). All had cut significantly
into the port bastion of blue-collar white Catholic labor. With the decline of the port, the
Archdiocese could no longer rely on the influence and wealth that prominent port-centered
businessmen supplied. There would be no replacement for this relationship with the private
sector business world.

The Waterfront Commission
Changes in the industry and a decline in port employment accelerated with the formation
of the Waterfront Commission. Created in 1953 as a result of the New York State Crime
Commission report, the Waterfront Commission was meant to address “the health of the great
port . . . imperiled by inefficiency, corruption, and ‘deplorable conditions involving unscrupulous
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practices and undisciplined procedures, many of which [were] criminal or quasi-criminal in
nature’” (Fisher 2009, 234). Although the Waterfront Commission had been created to remove
corruption in hiring and to act against the influence of organized crime on the docks, its powers
were expanded to include the licensing of all dockworkers. Mello argues that this commission
was especially harmful politically as it strove to remove radical longshoremen and leaders from
the docks. Mello confirms two other important factors. First, he writes, “[t]he Commission
increasingly attempted to place itself between the shipping companies and the longshoremen,
often serving as a strong arm to enforce the employers’ demands” (Mello 2010, 124).
The Waterfront Commission presided over an on-going economic disaster for those who
performed the manual labor that fueled the profits of the shipping companies and other industries
connected to the waterfront. Over approximately ten years, as a result of increased Waterfront
Commission enforcement, the population of longshoremen working at the port dwindled to half
its previous size. A primary contribution to the corruption was the system of hiring
longshoremen, which had relied on daily gatherings of men seeking work with many turned
away for unspecified reasons. This created an environment of distrust and despair ripe for
loansharking, payoffs and extortion, adding to the corruption of labor unions and the growth of
organized crime. This system would now be “legislated out of existence and replaced by an
industry-wide system of licensing, registration and hiring information centers all controlled by
the Waterfront Commission” (Mello 2010, 124). The Commission would have the full authority
and police powers of the states on both sides of the harbor—New York and New Jersey—and the
compact between the two states would be approved unanimously by the New York and New
Jersey state legislatures. Passage of the bi-state compact was also required by the United States
Congress, which voted to do so nearly unanimously. The Waterfront Commission was initially
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the idea of the same Jesuit, Reverend John “Pete” Corridan, who was the model for the Karl
Malden character in On the Waterfront.

The Port Authority
Meanwhile, the cost of moving goods through the New York side of the port was
substantially higher in a constantly unstable labor market. “Longshoreman at the close of the war
had staged a series of debilitating wildcat strikes, repeatedly shutting down almost all waterborne
commerce in the city,” write Glanz and Lipton. The City, which “already boasted the highest
docking fees of all the major Atlantic ports,” had invested little in the modernization of its
valuable waterfront (2003, 48). The Port Authority of New York preferred to invest in New
Jersey. “[B]y 1955 the Port Authority had invested more than $22 million in Port Newark, cargo
handling at the port had expanded steadily, and the authority announced plans to create a new
marine terminal adjacent to Port Newark, in Elizabeth” (Danielson and Doig 1982, 329-330).
Ten years later that investment in Port Newark would increase nearly four times, and the bi-state
agency would invest nearly $200 million in Port Elizabeth.
During the same time period, the Manhattan waterfront languished. The Port Authority
would take control of Manhattan’s aged piers, if the City of New York would agree to accept
payment of several million dollars a year in return. The Port Authority recognized the
problems—modernizing the city’s 200 docks and piers—facing New York as its waterfront’s
prospects declined. The aged piers rotted while the politically victorious Port Authority created
the region’s future harbor and its work force in New Jersey. “At the end of the 1970s, the
authority’s facilities in New Jersey were handling 10 million tons, seven times the cargo passing
through its New York terminals. The City department, now re-named Ports and Terminals, still
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controlled large number of piers and other waterfront facilities” (Danielson and Doig 1982, 333).
The fiscal crisis of 1975 likely made any significant pier investment impossible. In the
competition between agencies, the Port Authority had won. The Port Authority had structured the
battle so that it could win (Doig 2001, 258-259).

Public Sector Unions Grow
As the private sector and unions representing private sector workers declined, public
sector unions grew. “In 1954 just under 35 per cent of the nonfarm workers in the nation
belonged to unions, but within 20 years this skidded to 21.9 per cent. Facilitating this erosion in
union organization and influence was a long-term structural shift in the U.S. economy.
Employment growth flattened out in traditional union strongholds like manufacturing” (Bellush
and Bellush 1984, 157). New York City reflected these national trends, and for Puerto Ricans this
trend meant fewer opportunities. For the Archdiocese of New York it meant another ally, private
sector labor, would be less available to assist.
The general decline of the city’s private sector labor force injured the political ability and
influence of the Archdiocese. In contrast, public sector labor unions were growing in numbers,
power, and political capacity. Firefighters and police officers remained heavily Catholic, and
attempts to increase minority hiring by those agencies ultimately required legal battles and
federal court intervention. Unionization had created better pay and opportunities for suburbandwelling public safety workers who traveled to the city solely to work.
The rise of public sector unionization also created opportunities in non-uniformed
civilian agencies for minority group members and non-Catholics. They were also able to
organize and compete in these new political campaigns. The campaigns no longer relied on
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Tammany to turn out new immigrants to ensure victory, wherein power, patronage jobs in the
public sector, and contracts for the private sector entities sufficiently connected would remain
with the few. In the new campaigns, unions played greater roles, as did professional consultants
and field organizers. No longer would the word going out from the parishes or pastoral letters or
even hints from the pulpit have the same value. The Archdiocese would no longer be protected
politically, nor would it get its way in Albany, which had once been the case when Tammany
supplied the Archdiocese with votes it needed to impress the state legislature.
The self-interest of labor and the politicians who needed labor’s money, members, and
organizing ability trumped the need for life support for dying regular Democratic Party
organizations and the interests of the Archdiocese. Allen writes, “[g]iven the new political
realities of New York . . . Tammany’s traditional wellsprings of power—its control over
patronage, its ability to command the loyalty of immigrant groups whom it had befriended and
helped, and its skill at manipulating elections—were all virtually defunct” (1993, 261).
In 1953, then-Manhattan Borough President Robert F. Wagner was elected mayor, and
“between 1956-1965, Wagner moved the City toward full recognition of unions for its
employees” (Maier 1987, 47). In l961, Wagner was elected to a third term on a reform platform
that challenged the regular Tammany Democratic Party organization. Defeating Tammany and
investing the unions with power had clear effects on the Archdiocese and the old order. The
willingness of District Council 37, which was the largest of the non-uniformed public sector
employee unions, to strike was a key structural change which characterized the new era. In
addition, recasting the struggle to organize and bargain collectively as a civil rights issue—
during the period when civil rights, women’s rights, and gay rights—were to become critical
arguments and reasons for collective action, upset forever the calm needed for strict, hierarchical
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organizations such as the Archdiocese to function.

The Power of the Municipal Unions
Municipal unions had taken over the roles of both Tammany Hall and the Archdiocese.
They provided access to the political system for the powerless and the cradle-to–grave services
the Archdiocese of New York had provided for generations. Union contracts would offer health
care and even choices of plans for union members. In the case of District Council 37—the largest
of the public sector unions—free-standing clinics would be established to provide care on
demand. This same model found its way into the private sector when a Sicilian immigrant, Vito
Pitta, who was a former stevedore and hotel worker, negotiated joint industry/union operated
health care clinics for the City’s twenty-five thousand unionized hotel workers. The unions
negotiated contracts that provided payment for work, uniforms and other clothing required at
work, including eyeglasses. The contracts also provided educational benefits from high school
through graduate school, pre-paid legal representation, and legally-protected pensions. It was
Tammany and the Archdiocese rolled into one. In the 1970s laws and regulations were put in
place mandating automatic dues collection and the agency shop for city workers, thus
institutionalizing the above benefits and securing union control. There was in the case of
particular unions “a satisfactory harmony with the relevant needs and desires of the great
majority, if not with all of the members of the organization, and of the persons served by it”
(Likert 1961, 116).
For those who could not speak English, taking and passing civil service tests were not
easy tasks, and city employment was hard to obtain. “Despite prosperous incomes, generally for
whites and for a growing minority middle class, the city’s welfare rolls mounted rapidly between
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1960 and 1970,” The Latino population—still largely Puerto Rican in those years—was unable
to find work. Nearly “half of the city’s Hispanics were on relief, and almost a third of Blacks, as
compared with less than 4 percent of the white population” (Bellush and Bellush 1984, 366).
During this period although there was limited growth in the private sector, local public
sector employment increased. Furthermore the wealth of the public sector grew as the role of
government increased. What the municipal unions did in usurping the roles of Tammany and the
Archdiocese was to redefine the city’s political structure, even in the midst of an unstable
environment. They also usurped the role once held tightly by the dwindling private sector
unions, which had been “responsible for the material production of wealth . . . [Hence] political
labor sets the conditions under which the wealth is appropriated” (Collins 1979, 50).

Political Action
Federal funds for urban renewal, highway construction, and welfare payments would
increase the need for public sector workers, giving their unions a growing constituency and cause
for collective action. Political action by the unions to protect their members’ gains would grow,
giving members further incentives to act as a collective entity (Olson 1968). Unions registered
their members to vote, trained them to participate, and made significant financial contributions to
friendly candidates’ campaigns. In addition, union phone banks, printing presses, members
working to “get out” the vote did as much or more than traditional old-style Tammany
Democratic organizations had done for favored candidates. Clearly, politicians would pay
attention to organizations that had the power to turn elections. As Mayhew has written,
politicians would seek to remain in office in part by engaging in constant “credit claiming,”
currying favor with the new political bosses, the municipal labor unions and their officers
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(Mayhew 1974, 49). Voting for legislation supported by the union helped ensure reelection.
The public sector unions filled the political vacuum left by the fading port and private
sector jobs that were lost as the port’s importance dwindled. These unions filled the roles once
held by Tammany Hall and the Archdiocese—to provide the troops to win elections and to make
sure the loyal were rewarded— and a network of cradle-to-grave services.
Coinciding with the changes in the structure of the city’s politics, the machine was
replaced not by reformers but by unions. While reformers raised the concerns of the new social
movements as a means to shear Tammany of its power, and those movements generated
structures that would ultimately replace the machine and reap some of its rewards, it was only
the unions that had the raw political power that was once solely the province of political bosses.
Although the unions fought for those without power, they were not reformers. Their job was to
ensure their own power, and the simplest form of power—to get one actor to do what it does not
want to do—was their model (Dahl 1989).
Political scientist David Truman cites a study of “local unions led by communist officials
but largely made up of Catholics . . . those Catholics in the union who most closely approximated
the communist view ‘tended to withdraw from the religious fold’” (1993, 163). The Archdiocese
began to withdraw from overt political activity during the reign of Cardinal Cooke. Most
members of municipal unions were not Catholic, nor did the unions have any allegiance to
Tammany Hall, and as a result there was no sanction, material or moral, to force Catholic
compliance. Thus it was easier for politicians to work with the left-leaning municipal unions.
They watched them do battle against the conservative and Catholic dominated construction and
trade associations, whose daily operations were managed by the state and national AFL-CIO. For
municipal unions, the national and state bodies had little value. It was the municipal unions who
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had the troops, the printing press, the checkbook and the bodies with which to organize. The
“best’” of the Archdiocese of New York had left for the suburbs and moved from its base in
Manhattan and the Bronx. The left and the traditional Irish Archdiocese of New York were not an
easy fit.
Ideology could and did trump religion in Truman’s study. Trade unionism in its purer
form had little corruption at its onset, lacked a religious component, and certainly leaned to the
left of the political spectrum. Furthermore, the new trade unionists, Victor Gotbaum and Lillian
Roberts of District Council 37, for example, had allegiance only to union members.
Left behind were the poorest of the poor: Puerto Ricans. They were not part of the private
sector or public sector labor. Tammany did not value them nor did the reformers; nor were they
important to the Archdiocesan hierarchy. Only to the struggling parish priests in Bronx
neighborhoods were Puerto Ricans significant. In addition, the neighborhoods in which Puerto
Ricans remained behind presented great challenges—crime-ridden and drug-infested, they either
were or would soon be on fire.

Tammany No Longer Matters
Tammany Hall was in decline, as was the enforcement mechanism needed to sustain the
political power of the Archdiocese of New York. The fall of the longstanding political machine
further compounded changes in the city’s private labor sector. In 1953, then-Manhattan Borough
President Robert Wagner was elected mayor on a reform platform that challenged the Tammany
Democratic Party organization. The cascading effect of Tammany’s downfall continued with the
rise of the reform movement, which successfully used organizational skills fueled not by
patronage but volunteerism to oust Tammany’s last boss, Carmine DeSapio, and install a little-
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known activist named Edward I. Koch.
The creation of power bases that relied neither on Tammany nor the Archdiocese but
replaced both as organizing locations for newly-arriving migrants was new in New York politics.
The unions could provide services through welfare funds, free-standing health clinics, employerpaid health insurance, and other benefits based on collective bargaining. All of this constituted
much of what the Archdiocese of New York once provided for its immigrant adherents: life-long
support services, which later extended to higher education programs for union members.

Civil Service Reform
The new political soldiers were not Tammany patronage jobholders who knew that their
jobs could disappear if another candidate or reformer were to beat the Democratic organization
regulars. Civil service reform, competitive examinations, and background investigations of city
employees ended much of the patronage system. What made it more striking was that the new
political soldiers were people of color, women, and later gays, all of whom were rising up to
defend their rights and protect their political gains.
The old political soldiers were leaving, being replaced, or becoming inconsequential after
Mayor Wagner’s defeat of Tammany in 1961. His 1965 executive order institutionalized
collective bargaining for city unions. Puerto Ricans bypassed the Archdiocese when seeking
power. Instead, they would in many cases cede their votes to new local bosses in the Bronx.
Ramon Velez, for example, used poverty programs to create a service empire that eclipsed other
political organizations, even the Archdiocese. New York’s most recent arrivals would find
recourse in ethnic nationalism and align themselves with reformers like Herman Badillo, who
became the first Puerto Rican elected as Bronx borough president and first Puerto Rican member
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of Congress elected from the mainland. It was the same sense of ethnic identity that drove the
Irish to protect their Archdiocese
The Tammany-Archdiocese coalition still existed, albeit with less influence, but the effect
of its actions remained the same: It sought to direct “the provision of goods for the broader
public and [to] concentrate rewards toward regime elites and core coalition members”
(Trounstine 2008, 39). The work of the unions answered to a different set of constituents,
however. The unions were no more noble than the political realists of the Archdiocese, but it was
in their interest to expand government—that brought more union jobs—by bringing goods and
services to the broadest possible public, a different mandate than the Tammany/Archdiocese
coalition’s.

Factionalism/Retrenchment
The unions, then, effectively became the new Archdiocese, and union locals symbolically
became the new parishes. Union leaders became leaders of the new Archdiocese, providing the
power and muscle to ensure that their members’ will of members was enforced and gains
protected. The actors changed their names and titles, but the roles remained the same. The union
hall became the new church, led by a new collection of cardinals – heads of public sector labor.
In the future, however, this realignment would result in a politics of retrenchment. Why?
Shefter writes that retrenchment policies arise when a group—in this case unions—“has recently
gained political power [and] begins to assert claims upon the government for greater public
benefits or a larger slice. . . . [T]he government responds to these claims because it is allied with
the group in question or because it cannot withstand its opposition” (1994, 234). In this case, the
claims on the government were increased wages and benefits for union members, and the unions
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had the muscle to back up their claims. They could stop the government from functioning by
striking or by taking job actions. They could use their members as foot soldiers in political
campaigns to help friends and punish foes.

The New Democrats
New forms of income for the city would be required because the foundation that
supported Tammany could no longer be counted upon. The city was leaking private sector jobs
and its base of white ethnic middle-class taxpayers. As Teaford notes:
[n]o city invented taxes more readily or raised them more quickly than did Mayor
Wagner’s New York. Though faced with financial crisis, Wagner opposed increasing the
burden on real estate and kept the property levy relatively stable. . . . New York City thus
resorted to increases in the cigarette tax, the sales tax on meals and liquor, the general
business tax, and the financial business tax (1990, 142).
The unions would be blamed for these increases, and it was primarily the poor who
would suffer because of them.
Issues fomented by changing economics, changing populations, non-English speaking
new-comers, and shifting power centers were further complicated by the social issues of the
1960s. The New Democrats—much different from Tammany stalwarts who once dominated New
York City politics—were more interested in opposing the war in Vietnam or participating in the
battles for women’s equality and gay rights.
These social issues prevailed in reformer movements and society at large. The Church’s
positions should be understood as a partial rebuke to Vatican II, which had threatened the
Archdiocese's authority. Cardinal Spellman, head of the Archdiocese and Vicar General of the
Armed Forces, supported the war in Vietnam and was a backer of the China Lobby, which was
drenched in the anti-communistic rhetoric of the era. Similarly, the Archdiocese abided by the
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Catholic Church and opposed passage of laws prohibiting discrimination against gay individuals.
Pope Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae, warning Catholics about birth control in the face of the pill’s
growing popularity, created further dissent (Massa 2010). Last, newspapers, such as the Journal
American and the Daily Mirror, that once faithfully transmitted the Archdiocese’s conservative
views ceased publication after the102-day 1962 newspaper strike.
Scholars write: “Individuals who are more active in the Archdiocese of New York are
more likely to pick up political cues from clergy and fellow parishioners, thus providing a closer
link between religious belonging and beliefs on the one hand and political behavior on the other
hand” (Layman 2001, 57). The cradle-to-grave care provided by the Archdiocese to its once
largely Irish flock, and now to its again changing population through a constricted and controlled
parish structure, ensured political continuity—so long as the system of operation did not change.
Minority population growth within Manhattan and the Bronx would challenge this longfunctioning system. In fact, the population shift increased the overall costs of city residence as:
[T]he city’s operating expenditures [began] to increase at a faster rate than its annually
recurring revenues as a result of: the increasing power of non-whites and their political
allies, reflected in the rapid growth of expenditures on programs serving Black and
Puerto Rican clienteles; the inability of mayors, for political and institutional reasons, to
finance these increases by holding the line on expenditures flowing to other segments of
the city’s population, especially white working class voters and municipal employees;
and changes in the structure of New York politics that reduced the influence of taxpayer
interests relative to those demanding expenditures (Shefter 1985, 113).
Simply put, the Irish and Italian Catholics were being asked to pay more for services they might
not use and to receive less, while the opportunities for Puerto Ricans in both municipal and
private sector employment would decline.

Labor and the Changing Role of Catholic Power in Labor
My interviewees shared their varied thoughts on the union ascendancy. “The victory
127

accorded for municipal unions was when Wagner allowed municipal unions to be organized,”
said Frank Macchiarola. “Once that movement occurred, the municipal unions were able to
accumulate enormous political power, and they took that power because the government itself
was highly centralized, and they didn’t have to fight store by store or employer by employer.
They took the whole system on” (Macchiarola 2009). Peter Vallone makes a direct
comparison between the power of municipal unions and the Archdiocese, using the analogy
of voting blocks. “I think it’s an indication of the reality today that politicians react more to
people of voting blocks, and that unions are a definite voting bloc. The Catholics are not a
definite voting block any longer” (Vallone 2009).
Reverend John Jenik, who spent most of his career as a parish priest, confirms that
municipal unions had little direct impact either on him or on his parishioners. “A handful of
people in the parish that would have good [union] jobs. Just a handful. There are a couple of
teachers, they grew up in the parish. They still live there. There's a fireman married to a teacher.
They're the exception” (Jenik 2011).
Peter Powers, speaking about the rise of municipal unions, saw them competing with the
Archdiocese for the loyalty of working people:
I think the unions have failed and then it’s just a question of whether the church could
spurn the unions. The unions are given a special pass in our society and my dad was a
labor organizer. So I grew up understanding unions, and they are there to organize the
underclass and I think they’ve done a very lousy job of doing that. I think they’ve done a
good job of holding to what they have, but they haven’t gone out there, I think, enough to
organize the poor guys and the underclass and that’s where I think unions fail. If they had
organized that, they’d be much stronger and have much more political influence today
and I think we’d all be better off. And frankly I think the church would have more
influence because a lot of the underclass are members of the church (Powers 2009).
Talking about the positioning of the Catholic Church nationally, which has been seen by
some to be liberal on social issues, Powers said:
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Catholics for years [are] very public about social related issues and I’m not talking about
abortion and things like that. I’m talking about basic human rights. You know fair wages,
right to education, I mean all these things that matter to the church . . . Unions were a
way to organize people together because they would organize around a common
economic or a justice thing. People won’t organize through the church on that. Unions
were a way to do that and it could have been useful I think [if] the church and the unions
work[ed] together . . . it could have been a very valuable tool (Powers 2009).
Commenting about private and public sector unions and their relationships with the Archdiocese,
reporter Gabe Pressman observed:
When I look at the whole picture, the evolution of the unions, say on the waterfront, I see
the economics of the unions influencing the power of the Church. I didn’t think of it as
the power of the Church, but there was definitely a link between the unions and the men
on the waterfront. And I guess . . . when you look back, the Church was very, very . . .
dexterous. Or they were nimble. . . . [T]he members of the church, and the leaders, were
able to latch on to each group, each demographic change. And worked to exploit the
power they derived from that. But as New York has changed, and the immigrant
population of New York has changed, the Pentecostals, and all these other religions, and
non-religious people. . . . I guess it really involves the decline of the formal church
structure. The real power of the Church now has to reside in the individual clergymen
and how well they relate to people. And I’m not sure I know who’s going to win that
competition (Pressman 2011).
It can be argued that old line Democratic Party clubs, like the McManus organization in
Hell’s Kitchen, has performed many of the services now performed by the public sector unions.
From James McManus’ perspective, Tammany Hall Democrats, including his family, did the job
of unions for generations:
We were . . . too effective, we got the people their thirty-five hour week, we got them
good salaries. We got them guaranteed their jobs, we got laws protecting them in their
jobs where they didn’t need to go to the Church or the unions to really hold on . . . You
know people would say to me, especially you know people from the media . . . you think
organizations will come back and I said yes, when things get so bad for the . . . people
that they have to organize to get things done, you know, we haven’t reached that point but
you know I see it coming especially with this economy. The companies that different
things are using this as an excuse to not to give raises or even cut salaries. No more
overtime and so the working class is being very, very . . . hit (McManus 2009).
But Edward Ott, former New York City Central Labor Council leader, explains that “The odd
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thing is, is by the time you get to 1972, a couple of other things are going on”:
Not only had the executive and managerial group moved out of the city, corporations
begin to leave, pull their headquarters out of the city for other places. The old
manufacturing and light industry jobs that were New York’s to give, they were going.
1960, you’re talking a million barges a year across the Hudson. By 1968, that’ s down to
like a hundred thousand and dropping like a barometer in a hurricane. Why? They made
a decision: disconnect the railroad from the main part of the city. The warehousing
industry, everything collapses (Ott 2009).
He continued:
Prior to this period, the character of this labor movement is unions fighting with private
sector bosses, garment strikes, even the rail and bus lines were private until the last one
goes, Fifth Avenue Coach goes in the late 60s under Lindsay. Everything’s municipalized
and they’re taken over by the state because of funding. So things that were private before
give a certain character to the labor movement. Private sector unions are in economic
combat every day with employers. Public sector unions, they learn to lobby and litigate.
It’s a very different skill and consciousness. In the hospital sector, 1199 takes a bunch of
disparate unorganized hospitals and turns them into a hospital industry. The Hospital
Association is formed. The League of Voluntary Hospitals is formed in response to the
potential power of the union . . . . By the time Rudy Giuliani runs for mayor, his low key
campaign message to business was very clear. We’ve got to find ways to strengthen the
private sector—twenty- six percent of the city’s economy is in the non-profit and public
sector. That’s what he was telling the Wall Street guys. That was his message. It was
getting hard to attract people to the city with a public sector that was such a big part of
the economy. You’ve got to remember, the ‘70s fiscal crisis is not over power. It’s over
who’s going to pay for what. (Ott 2009).
What Ott was referring to was happening all across the country, but in the national
discussion it was “the death of New York.” From the vantage point of the Archdiocese, this
seemed like a unique situation. Many of the jobs lost in the private sector belonged to its
parishioners. Many of the public sector jobs at risk were those of minority group members who
had limited relationships with the Archdiocese.
It was not only the Archdiocese or Tammany Hall that was missing out on opportunities
in changing economic and social trends. Labor lawyer Vincent Pitta identified a weakness of the
labor movement. “I think frankly there was a lack of foresight”:
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Unlike the church, which built churches and dioceses outside of the city, the labor
movement by and large did not build institutions in the outlying regions. Most of the
developments in Nassau and Suffolk County, the surrounding areas, came from New York
City people who [purposely] relocated businesses and industry outside of New York City.
Labor officials in those areas were shortsighted and thought that as long as their members
in New York City had jobs or were being taken care of, they didn’t have to worry about
anything else . . . . only to wake up ten and twenty years later to find out that the industry
and the jobs that relocated to Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester counties are competing
with industry here. Because they didn’t organize the people in Nassau, Suffolk and
Westchester counties, those companies operated either non-union or operated at a
substantially lower wage and benefit base so that they competed unfairly (Pitta 2009).
The collateral damage from the movement of industry and jobs disproportionately fell on
Catholics and continued the erosion of Catholic social power. Over time, union jobs were
replaced by non-union jobs, even as the Archdiocese of New York expanded to the suburbs to
meet its flock outside the confines of the city.
As usual, Conservative Party chairman Michael Long tersely notes:
[T]he coalition that made the Church powerful was the police, the firemen, the Teamsters,
[and construction workers] . . . If you remember Vietnam . . . the silent majority, the
parade of hard hats down through the canyon. . . I marched in that parade . . . those guys
were Irish, Italian, the cops in those days . . . quite frankly a large number of them all
joined the Conservative Party, registered. The Fire Department members were involved
in the Conservative Party. There was . . . clearly a patriotic, religious fiber. While the
Conservative Party had certain planks in their platform that didn’t bode well with the
unions. The membership, even some of the leadership, overlooked them because they saw
the Conservative Party and the Church as their allies in the fight for holding back the
social changes that were taking place in their communities, their neighborhoods. Those
are the very people I talk about that have picked up [and moved away,] and they all came
from a different generation. You have to remember . . . many of those cops, firemen,
Teamsters, and ironworkers, they all served in the military, either were drafted or
volunteered. The cops of today are very non-political, you can’t look at a New York City
Police Department and say, what conservative guys these guys are, that’s not the case
anymore (Long 2009).
The response to the demographic changes, according to Long, was that some adopted a
vociferous conservatism that combined patriotism and Catholicism.
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Did the unions replace the Archdiocese of New York in a power role? Pollster Douglas
Schoen says yes. He saw the changing nature of labor unions, the rise of municipal labor and the
changing role of Catholics in the labor movement as:
[A] reflection of changing ethnic roles and where the money was. Anyway, so I think the
union issue is an inter-ethnic change in power that has more to do with, not only an ethnic
movement, but also a resource movement. Put another way, the Working Families Party
is what the Church used to want to be . . . A receptacle for immigrants, aggregating
interests, moving blocks of votes and money (Schoen 2009).
Herman Badillo had once been a candidate for political grooming by the Archdiocese, but
realities had drastically changed:
When I was running for office, my basic support, ninety-nine percent of it, was from the
unions, and they were not Catholic unions, they were public service unions, [with
leadership from] Dennis Rivera, and all the others. The same thing with the blacks. Those
are the people that sustained the elected officials. In the Bronx all of these guys would
not get elected, if it wasn’t for the unions. That’s the problem in Albany. The unions
control Albany because they elected Albany. Catholics [as an entity] could have endorsed
candidates and gotten and made contributions to them . . . . politicos as you know,
respond to those who contributed to their campaigns. I’m one of the candidates who can
tell you, they [the Archdiocese] have not provided any substantial support to people who
are running for office in New York. We’ve also lost the business . . . and the waterfront
really no longer exists. It has moved to New Jersey and the church did nothing to prevent
that, and so that influence went to New Jersey. [The Archdiocese] never got involved in
trying to get office people unionized. They’re not organizers, let’s put it that way. They
don’t seem to be, the Catholics (Badillo 2009).
When Paul Crotty was growing up the Church had an influence in the labor movement. It
was not just that union members also happened to be Catholic. The Church had a cultural
influence. It was as though Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum still had a hold over rank-and-file
Catholic workers. “We always had them around the house [union members], always talking
about Catholic doctrines, the right to organize, the right of working men to have decent wages, to
have living wages so they can buy a house, educate their children, provide some opportunity so
they wouldn’t have to be a steel worker. … The Catholic Church … they were always very
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supportive” (Crotty 2011):
William Cunningham drew an explicit portrait of a strong cultural bond between faithful
Catholics and their involvement in labor unions:
It’s an interesting analogy to draw between labor and the Church because they both use a
lot of the same language, brotherhood, family, all of the sort of rituals that you go
through. Earlier groups achieve a certain level of success and then they move on, and
then a new group comes in and needs the old structure to raise itself up. So in the case of
labor I think what you saw is people came in, they fought for labor unions, they got labor
unions, they rose through the ranks, their children went to college, their children went to
law school, the children aren’t in labor unions. And so you saw declining membership in
the traditional labor unions in the private sector, in factory work … [Then] you have
people coming in who perhaps don’t speak the language that well but they get a job they
get a menial job as the saying goes and a labor union is their protection. It’s how they get
from eight dollars an hour to nine dollars an hour, and that’s where 1199 [the hospital
workers union] comes in, fighting for the people, as Dennis Rivera used to say, the people
who clean the bed pans for the frailest and weakest among us. And he always cast his
members as though they were doing Mother Theresa’s work, and they were getting paid
very poorly. He used religious analogies that way. And I think in labor you have a growth
in the public sector unions, and a decline in the private sector unions and an overall
decline in people in unions just as a function of the way society and the economy
changed over the last 40 years (Cunningham 2009).
Father Duffell wondered about the extent of influence unions “still” had:
[T]he unions on the West Side, when I was there I mean we had a lot of Teamsters.
They’re still here and of course the dockworkers I mean . . . it’s still some but they’re not
on the West Side, they’re out in Brooklyn . . . I mean they’re still on the super-liner piers
down there but the waterfront spread out a great deal. When I was down there, it was
very active. A lot Irish, there’s a lot of Italians in there (Duffell 2011).
Rather than the symbolic culture of ideas and values Thomas Dunne emphasized the
ethnic lineage and material support that labor unions shared with the Church. Those connections
had less political efficacy than they once had, though:
The head of the AFL-CIO was Dennis Hughes today, before that Eddie Cleary, Corbett. It
was Corbett, Cleary, Hughes, and . . . they all touched base with the Church. They all
raised money for the Church. But when it came to politics, there was a divide. They
didn’t listen. They endorsed their own candidates. They didn’t listen to the Church. The
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Church . . . they wouldn’t even consider talking to them. . . . They would be . . . a proper
respect, but the Church never dictated to them who they should endorse. I think most of
the labor leaders today . . . are Catholics. Eddie Malloy, Dennis Hughes. Ahern. I think
they’re all Catholic. I think they still go forward, but I don’t think labor is as powerful as
it used to be. Nor is the Church (Dunne 2011).
Dunne mentions private sector labor leaders but does not note the powerful public sector labor
leaders of this or past generations. Missing from his comments are names like Victor Gotbaum,
Barry Feinstein, Albert Shanker, or Lillian Roberts, all well-known and important municipal
labor union leaders.
Advisor to Governors Mario and Andrew Cuomo, John Marino saw a natural affinity
between organized labor and the Archdiocese. He also talked of the relevance of religious and
ethnic ties to that connection:
My father was . . . driven to organize labor. I mean, as a Teamster. And he saw them as
the salvation. And for working-class people, the labor union, whether it was the
Teamsters or whatever it was, that was the guy that was fighting for you. And I think that
there would be a natural connection between the Catholic Church and unions. First of all,
because the unions were run by the ethnics, by the Irish, the police and the fire
[department]. And then the sanitation, and the Italians, and transit. So you have all of
these unions. And I’m sure the Church was [close] to some of the labor leaders. All of
these guys had ties to the church (Marino 2009).
Speaking about Italians and Irish, Monsignor Don Sakano credits labor unions for their
economic rise. “I think the labor unions had something to do with it as they became
professionals. Everybody I meet . . . their sons and daughters are artists, and everything else but
laborers . . . [this was] done by unions” (Sakano 2011). Sakano also said that he thought the
national economic shift from manufacturing which had significant impact on New York City and
thus the parishes of the Archdiocese made unions overall less relevant. “We’re much less a
manufacturing nation. We’re more service oriented. . . . But in terms of unions in general, just
look at the clothing industry. It’s gone” (Sakano 2011). When asked about public sector or
municipal unions and their impact on the Archdiocese of New York, Sakano asked a valuable
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question. “Where do Catholics work? . . . [M]ost think of the police department or fire
department. This is in terms where you know you’re going to find a Catholic, right? Teachers”
(Sakano 2011). But he admitted that when he thought of jobs as Catholic, he thought about blue
collar jobs.

Changing Catholic Culture on the Ground:
What Does It Means To Be a Catholic?
The structure of New York’s economy was changing as was the power of various actors:
labor, the Church, racial minorities and ethnic groups. Women were stepping up, and traditional
political machines were waning in their influence. And the cultural rebellion of the 1960s, and its
conservative backlash, had repercussions throughout the city. I have noted some of the doctrinal
and liturgical effects of Vatican II, but what did it mean to be a Catholic in everyday life?
Andrew Napolitano places the question squarely in the religious realm, and his reference
was pre-Vatican II:
Pope Paul VI made it so easy for Catholics to get annulments, which allowed them to get
remarried. That the concept of whom God has put together let no man put asunder, was a
joke. And this removed the pressure for Catholic spouses to stay married no matter what,
because they could still go to Mass after they remarried because of this mumbo-jumbo
that you never were really married; it was an annulment and it was mumbo jumbo—and
so divorce became acceptable. And once that was acceptable, one of the last things that
the Church would ever imagine approving, a lot of other things became acceptable. And
this all watered down the tradition of Catholic identity. And that weakened Catholic
politicians because they couldn’t command the groups anymore (Napolitano 2014).
Liberalization and secularization according to Napolitano weakened the Archdiocese of New
York and its ability to determine and promote behaviors consistent with its belief system. The
“watering down” mentioned by Napolitano might also have extended to the declining pressure
on Catholics to attend parochial schools.
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Changing Catholic culture redefined appropriate Catholic behavior. “Well some of them
are practicing Catholics and some of them aren’t practicing Catholics,” says Thomas Dunne
about his co-religionists. “By that, I mean they don’t go to Church on a weekly basis. They don’t
contribute money to the Church. [They] assimilated into American life” (Dunne 2011).
Dunne elaborated on this assimilation:
[T]hey’re into the general population. They’re not denied jobs because of their
Catholicism. So they’re in the mainstream. They work on Wall Street. They work in the
law firms. There’s some lingering prejudice out there, but it’s usually hidden. But
sometimes you hear it, usually from the wealthy. But they’ve [Catholics] assimilated.
They’re not denied a job because of being Irish, or what Church they go to. . . . [P]eople
say they’re Catholic. [But that means] you are a Catholic because your parents are
Catholic. Why are you a Democrat? Because your father was a Democrat. Why are you
a Republican? Because your father was a Republican. You registered as your family did
(Dunne 2011).
Catholicism , has become a label that identifies people with their religious history but not
necessarily a set of religious practices.

Decreased Church Attendance
One of the strongest indicators of a change in religious practice is the decline in regular
church attendance. Catholics are expected to attend Mass every Sunday and receive the
sacrament of Eucharist at least once every Easter season. Confession in preparation for
Communion is mandatory as well. Data on the precise number of Catholics attending Mass, their
frequency of attendance, and the accuracy of those reports are hotly debated topics among social
scientists and Church scholars and leaders. There is, however, a consensus that the number of
Catholics attending Mass and their frequency of attendance has declined since the 1950s. James
McManus said people just stopped going to Church as much as they once did:
[I]n the 1960s everything started to change. In the 1960s . . . younger people . . . [were]
not going to church . . . and that really influences the older people. They stopped going
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to church and then the . . . Church started to have to deal with the Republicans too,
because . . . they grabbed a few seats, so they kind of tried to stay out of politics. . . .
[W]e don’t get involved in politics and of course they were under a lot of criticism by a
lot of these left-wing groups that . . . were too involved in politics. So they pulled out of
the political arena and today other than probably Madison Avenue with the Cardinal
having influence with the mayors and governors and such, the local parishes don’t get
involved at all in the politics (McManus 2009).
McManus acknowledges that the local parishes did in fact serve as organizing locales and that
the parish priests did help in getting Democratic machine loyalist voters to the appropriate
polling location. Edward Ott calls attention to the fall in church attendance among all Catholics:
[I]t’s not unique to New York. They’re not church-going religious people anymore.
They’re basically secular Catholics. People used to sweat bullets if they couldn’t find a
place to get some non-meat on Friday [prior to Vatican Council II reforms eating of meat
on Fridays was prohibited]. If they couldn’t’ get their kid into Catholic School it was a
family crisis. Not anymore. Sorry, it’s just not. People are not religious in the same kind
of way. The Church is not the cultural icon that it once was (Ott 2009).
Monsignor Don Sakano agrees that fewer are attending church. Furthermore, he stated:
[E]ven those that are, I think . . . the statistics tell us that fewer Catholics are going to
church on a regular basis. Fewer marriages. . . . When I was eighteen people got married
before they were twenty-five. A lot of people associate the success of the church with
bigness. Both materially and in members, even in suburban parishes. The Church, as a
whole, in the United States is diminishing (Sakano 2011).
What does the decline in church attendance mean? Has it affected aspects of the Church’s
mission? Is the Archdiocese of New York still reflective of and dedicated to the most needy?
Does the Church’s mission have anything to do with the decline in church attendance within the
Archdiocese? Is it still dedicated to the immigrants it has served, and who continue to arrive in
New York? Stephen Aiello addressed this issue in his interview:
I think it’s the Church of those folks [who use] social services. I still think it’s the Church
of a number of very successful wealthy people who see themselves as members of the
Knights of Malta or the Holy Sepulchre . . . and still give to the Church. You still have a
number of people like that and they’re not all that old. I have friends who are in those
orders who give to the church not only financially but their time, their expertise, so . . . I
don’t know why [attendance has declined] except in the general [context of the]
diminishing of influence and authority of religion per se. This whole pedophile thing has
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been a disaster for the Church, and I think its impact will be seen in the participation of
Catholics in their organized Church. I think people have moved away from authoritarian
religion to a great extent (Aiello 2009).
Catholic culture relying and its religious practices, according to Aiello, has been affected by
education and technology, which have increased secularization. “I think it’s been education. I
think it’s been technology. I think we’ve become a much more secular society regardless of the
mega evangelical Christian churches” (Aiello 2009).
William Cunningham sees many forces at work that explain the decline in attendance. In
fact, Cunningham sees a more “scattered flock,” less confined to local parishes, requiring that the
Archdiocese follow the flock wherever it may go rather than expecting the flock to remain in its
once packed urban parish locales. Cunningham said:
I think what happened is all of these forces have had an impact on the Church, and so
today you’re seeing Archdioceses of New York and the Archdiocese in Brooklyn closing
parishes and it’s very emotional to the people who remain there. But instead of one
thousand people at the Sunday masses in some of these parishes there’s one hundred,
there might be fifty at a weekday mass, there might be thirty, even fewer in some
parishes. And the upkeep of those buildings, they require maintenance. They have to be
where their flock is. I mean that’s the teaching of the Gospel: You got to go out and
preach the Gospel, you have to go where the flock might be. That’s what the shepherd
does. Well, the flock is scattered. They’re not clustered the way they were years ago
(Cunningham 2009).
Michael Long blames reform for changes in the emotional quality of services which in
turn transformed the relationship between congregants and their parish priests. He blames
Vatican II for reduced church attendance. From his perspective, weakening of the “rules” made it
much easier for Catholics to re-define their individual relationships with the Archdiocese and its
priests.
They just changed the whole dynamics and . . . no longer could you go to Church and
hear . . . hell and brimstone speeches. Latin was going out the door, guitars were coming
in, the modernization of the Church. Our Churches weren’t empty. Our Churches
became empty after... I mean I lived through it, and I saw the decline in attendance
because it wasn’t important anymore. You know they started changing holidays, they
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started changing the rules of the Church. All those people who were obeying all those
rules said, “look if they can change that easy, what’s the sense of worrying about going?”
(Long 2009).
“The Church had its own problems within the Church,” said lobbyist Martin McLaughlin.
“People left. People became, as the Pope calls them, cafeteria Catholics. They didn’t go to
church anymore. Half of these churches are empty” (McLaughlin 2009). McLaughlin saw the
Archdiocese experiencing difficulty in adjusting to the reforms and to the changing social
environment. The decline in attendance meant the local parish was no longer a central point in
Archdiocesan lives. He compares the 1960s and 1970s to behaviors of his youth:
[T]he Catholic Church was very great at exercising control. And if you go back to old
Ireland, the priest was the most powerful guy. And even when I grew up, the priest was
more powerful than anybody. You did your dances at the church. You did your basketball
games at the church. The church was an integral part of your life. No more. No more.
But it used to be, you did everything at the church. Everything functioned out of the
church. So that disappeared. I was in a choir, I played basketball in my church, I went to
dances in my church: It was the nucleus. Even when I went away to high school, I came
back to the church. But after a while, it moved away. You got away. And the churches got
smaller; they contracted. A lot of the gut Catholics had gone. Churches got bigger in
Westchester. They got bigger, and all the guys from the Bronx, Frank McLaughlin, they
all were Bronx guys. Where did they go? They went to Yonkers, and then they went
further up in Westchester. So you lost that nucleus of middle-class Catholics. And when
you lost them, you lost a lot of power because they were all votes. They were all votes
(McLaughlin 2009).
McLaughlin continues:
The parishioners were the voters. Now you see these churches closing. If you go down
to the Lower East Side, we just closed a whole bunch of churches down—or said we
were going to close. You walk from St. Bridget’s and just walk in a circle, [and] you’re
going to walk by fifteen churches. And they’re all empty. They cost a fortune to heat and
run, and nobody’s going there. So they’re not collecting any money from the tithing or
anything else. And they don’t tithe like the Jews do or the Protestants. They always got
by with the basket. (McLaughlin 2009).
In Hell’s Kitchen single people replaced the Catholic families who were once one of the
Archdiocese’s strongest church-going groups, according to Democratic District Leader James
McManus:
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The families moved out of Manhattan and you have pretty much just single people, and
they don’t go to Church as much. They’re not involved in the Church. Family people are
usually involved in the Church because the kids are going to the Catholic schools and
they keep close watch on the Church and the school because their kids are there. So I
think it’s the loss of families here in the New York. We lost a lot of the Catholics
(McManus 2009).
Apathetic Attitudes
Peter Quinn sees a correlation between leaving the inner city parishes of the Archdiocese
and ignoring Church edicts. For Quinn the Archdiocese and its priests lost their authoritative
nature. Quinn explains:
I think when there was that cohesiveness, the Church was this voice of authority, and in
some ways it was a conflict to have an authority like that. You listen to them. You listen
to the priest. What the Cardinal said was important. I don’t think it’s terribly important to
most Catholics anymore. And they are a decreasing number. I have a daughter at
Fordham Law School, and my son’s at Fordham. They have a total different relationship
with the Church than I was raised up on (Quinn 2011).
He adds that ritual was more important when he was being raised in the local parish church.
“[T]he ceremonies, they were the center of their lives. Like Benediction . . . It was very ritually
rich and comforting in a way. It could be stultifying. But they’re in another world.”
Judge Andrew Napolitano, biting in his remarks, expresses dismay about the Church
losing its religious value. He sees the Archdiocese as a religious institution much more than a
cultural or social entity.
Same church, same teachings, same rules; just different discipline. So in the years that
you’re interested in, the Church loses its authority over its flock. And its flock loses
respect for tradition and teaching. And Catholic politicians believe that they have more
freedom to pursue interests and political avenues of richness that are inconsistent with the
Church teaching, because the Church will not strike back at them. In a nutshell, that is
what happened all over the country, with some exceptions (Napolitano 2014).
Why were Catholics no longer listening? What does it mean? Monsignor Donald Sakano
reflected:

140

We just don’t have a constituency that listens effectively to the political opinions of the
Church. Gosh, the mind goes in so many different directions. I’m just thinking how the
Church became perceived as being not wishy-washy, but it changes its mind on things.
So, you know, during that era, eating meat on Friday was a mortal sin. You’d go to hell if
you had a hamburger on Friday, to oops, that no longer counts.
Those sorts of changes rattle people a bit and so to reduce the confidence that
what the Church says is true all the time. At the same time people are becoming much
more educated, and they can make their own decisions about things. Add to that what
people felt was wrong about the birth control issue. Even if, and I’m not even
commenting on whether or not they were right in saying the church was wrong. But the
majority of people by dint of the number of children that Catholics have, it was wrong.
And so the Church does not have a moral voice that dictates how they should vote, ergo
the Church loses its political power (Sakano 2011).
Monsignor Sakano further explained how a perceived loss of faithful followers affected the
Archdiocese’s influence:
It lost its constituency. Politicians notice that . . . the Catholics voters are not persuaded,
even influenced by the Church leaders. They [unwed couples] all live together and say it
with impunity. Now that indicates they don’t care about the church’s teaching in that
regard. And if they don’t care about the teaching from that part, they don’t care about the
teaching of the Church in other parts, whether it’s birth control, divorce . . . right down
the line. I mean, they don’t even know what it is much less think that they are obligated
to it, or should be obligated to it (Sakano 2011).
Father Duffell puts a sociological spin on reform, power, and the Church doctrine. The power of
large numbers and efficacy of community affect the Church’s influence politically and morally:
[I]t’s the people that God gathered in a particular place and their numbers are stronger or
weaker in terms of the numbers of people that are there. I mean politicians had to listen
to the Church. [E]ven . . . today with all of its limitation, any politician would give their
right arm to get twelve minutes on a Sunday morning with whatever group of people it
might be. People have to make their decisions, but they’re got to be guided. . . if the
preaching is really real, it’s not telling people what to do, but it’s pointing out. The
preacher is supposed to know his people so well that he knows their problems, that he
speaks the Word of God in such a way that they can bring their problems to him and find
some answers. But they’re challenging things too, I mean a lot of times people don’t
even preach about social justice which I don’t think you can preach the Word without
talking about justice. They go hand in glove. I mean you have to give life to your faith
(Duffell 2011).
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Moral vision and social justice provide the means through which faith is transmitted, and that if
more preaching of this sort were done, parish priests might likely have fewer empty seats during
Mass.
“Can the Catholic Church influence by preaching correctly,” asked long time Cuomo
advisor John Marino:
Yeah, I think they [can] probably influence . . . other than the most conservative
Catholics, very few Catholics pay attention to what the Catholic Church has to say about
anything that relates to politics. You think a monsignor or a priest is going to be able to
get up at a pulpit a week or two before the election the way it might in a synagogue and
say, this Obama is a great guy? People aren’t going to pay attention to that. People don’t
give a hoot what the priest says about politics. People don’t give a hoot what the cardinal
says about politics.
They want to hear them talk about religion. They want to hear them talk about
how they themselves can make it to heaven, how they can live a better life. That’s what
they want to hear from the pulpit. And you’ll see people paying attention to the priest
doing that. And you know you don’t see that as much in New York anymore as you do in
other places. I mean, you go outside New York, you still hear Catholic priests acting like
Southern Baptists, you know, with "the Supreme Court has . . ."—I heard about a guy in
South Carolina do that . . . : "We have a Supreme Court that decides to legislate things
that are immoral.” I don’t hear that kind of stuff locally. And I go to Mass upstate. I’ve
actually been pleasantly surprised that they’re not trying to do the politics from the altar
anymore. (Marino 2009).
Changing Mores of Catholic Education
We return to the importance of Catholic schools because of their power in creating a
flock of faithful congregants. The viability of Catholic schools remains a reflection of the
fortunes of the Archdiocese as well. John Marino explained:
Now Catholic schools are falling apart. I don’t understand fully why, but our Catholic
schools are falling apart People send kids in the city to Catholic schools is only not to
send them to public schools [but also] not to send them either with minorities, which is
unfortunate. Or they think the Catholic schools are better. The truth is, I went to Catholic
school my whole life until I went to NYU for my second graduate degree, and I didn’t get
as good an education as somebody who went to public school. That’s why I’m such a
dope. . . . I didn’t get as good an education. I went to Fordham struggling because I went
to Catholic school. I thought I knew Latin; I didn’t know Latin, I had not been taught
Latin, despite that I went to a Catholic school, Catholic high school. . . . there are good
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Catholic schools, but I’ll tell you something, you go to Westchester now where our
Catholic school was—and we had a good Monsignor—but we have in our Catholic
school maybe eight to ten kids in each class, in some cases, twelve or thirteen. You’re
talking about eight grades or nine grades including kindergarten of hundred kids maybe, a
little more than a hundred kids, maybe one hundred and fifty kids in an entire school.
That school is only kept open because it’s a wealthy parish.
There are these schools in Brooklyn where people send their kids only to keep
them away from the public schools but the education is not as good. Teachers aren’t
trained the way they are in public schools. There are some lousy public school teachers,
sure, but the truth is, is public school teachers are better than the Catholic school teachers
and I can make a case that in our area, our public school teachers are probably better than
most of these fancy expensive private school teachers but the Catholic schools. I hate to
put it this way, but even Catholics look down on the Catholic schools. I love when
Monsignor comes over and tells me how, you know, he got two kids, they got two kids
into Regents this year, that’s terrific, right? . . . There are smart kids everywhere (Marino
2009).

Catholics No Longer Sending Catholic Kids to Catholic Schools
Monsignor Peter Finn spoke about the disadvantages parochial schools experienced.
Among other things they lack Catholic students and can no longer rely on Catholic teachers. He
puts a positive spin on the situation but through faint praise he suggests their identity and quality
suffer:
Great efforts have been made to make sure that people that we do bring in to our system
have a Catholic identity. It’s a part of a whole new realization which I am part of too and
to make sure that they were confident and trained. You get good people [as teachers] and
I had one here before school opened this last year in mathematics, Columbia graduate.
We knew we wouldn’t have her for long. We had her for a year, [and] they call her up
before school opens and offer her a job and she has no choice. The money differential is
too big so she goes (Finn 2011).

Fiscally Untenable
The Archdiocese’s fiscal stability put in question its ability to maintain its institutions.
Stephen Aiello noted that “at a time when [churches, hospitals and social service facilities] were
built . . . you had many more students going to parochial schools that you don’t have now. Now,
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as far as the numbers are concerned, I think it’s just a matter of finance; they can’t support the
systems that they have” (Aiello 2009).
“I know the schools declined,” Reverend Jenik said, blaming tuition and an increase in
demand for Catholic school education from families who did not have the financial wherewithal.
James McManus agreed that the fiscal situation was untenable:
[T]hey lost parishioners. They lost money. They lost their schools in many cases. The
Archdiocese had to support the different schools that they wanted to keep open and the
whole system kind of broke down. With the lack of money from the Archdiocese, [there
was] a lack of influence. When you give money you have a lot of influence, and they lost
it. The Church just went down with the neighborhoods (McManus 2009).
McManus cites a specific example to make his point:
[T]he Archdiocese has been supporting Holy Cross Catholic School, which is on 42nd
Street and Sacred Heart Catholic School which is on 51st Street. You know they only
have four hundred, five hundred students in that. When I went there, there was fifteen
hundred. You know but there’s only four or five hundred and even with that, they have to
charge tuition because the Church no longer can keep the schools running, for many
reasons, not only the lack of . . . money coming in. It’s also the expense for teachers.
You don’t have the nuns and the brothers who were cheap labor. You know with nuns,
you feed them and the brothers, you feed them. You gave them a roof over their head and
you had twenty-four hour workers seven days a week. So a lot of them have lay teachers
because they don’t have the religious people (McManus 2009).
Monsignor Finn held a somewhat more positive view. “Truthfully,” he said,” the Church
continued, at a pretty steady pace, even today. I think some of the statistics show that people are
still there and with us,’ but, he admits that the people are “not in the numbers they were in terms
of regular participation in church life. I lost people [from school] this year that had no desire to
pull their kids out but they can’t afford it. This, in the face of the fact that we are the only
democracy in the world that doesn’t support non-public education…that, to me, is very sad.”
The Archdiocese faces a structural problem; parents cannot afford to pay tuition. “Three hundred
something per month. [The school] sustains itself by fundraising. It sustains itself by whatever
we can get from the parish collections. We underwrote the school this year with $145,000” (Finn
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2011).
Journalist Sam Roberts agreed:
[The Archdiocese of New York] scaled back its activities because things were expensive;
because the teachers unionized. They used to have free teachers, in effect. The expenses
went up. Maintenance of the facilities went up, and they lost a lot of the wealthy power
base that supported it, a middle-class power base that supported it (Roberts 2009).
Schools Located in Parts of the City Where Catholic Kids Don’t Live
The demand for Catholic school education is not new to the present era. Aureo Cardona
remembers that in the 1950s “grammar schools were full. If you remember, the Catholic
elementary schools had one grade, one class per grade. That grade was full so I couldn’t go there.
So what they did was they bused me from St. Antoninus on Fox and Tiffany St. to St. Catherine
of Siena on 86th between York and 1st” (Cardona 2011). He admits leaving the South Bronx
for the Upper East Side to attend school was difficult. “I went over there, and I was first
fighting with the Italians and then Irish and the German kids. But eventually I became part
of the family. It was okay. Some of the kids that were on the bus, darker kids, darker skin,
Latino kids, it was hell and they never really integrated” (Cardona 2011).
Returning to the social issues he perceived to be responsible for the changes confronting
the city and the Archdiocese of New York, Michael Long noted:
There was a force . . . I think the biggest exodus was because of forced school busing.
They didn’t want their kids to be shipped to another end of town. People had bought their
homes or rented apartments in places like Maspeth and Cyprus Hills and Glendale and all
of a sudden strangers show up. Blacks were being boarded to these schools. Schools
started to decline because of racial problems. So people just picked up, sold their houses,
g[o]t out of their apartments and went out to Long Island because of education. So I think
education was a key factor that young people just picked up and left. The answer is you
have now almost four million people living out in Long Island, in Nassau and Suffolk
County (Long 2009).
Reacting to the idea that Catholic schools were lingering in places where Catholics had
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been moving away, Monsignor Sakano remarked: “Certainly large attendance was gone. A
struggling school was there, I taught in the school in the 1970s. And the student body was from
all over New York City. It was not an indigenous local school” Sakano 2011).

Competing with Other “Choices”—Charters, Good Public Schools
The white ethnic exodus created a condition that had not existed before for the
Archdiocese’s schools. Parochial school education kept the loyal faithful. Now it had
competition from city schools. And competition with free schools had its consequences.
Stephen Aiello noted that the Archdiocese:
voiced issues of financial problems and competition from non-Catholic schools. People
now had other choices.
To his credit, [Cardinal] Egan put the financial house in order, but looked to close
[schools]. They want to lease those schools for specialty districts like District 2 in
Manhattan, District 6 in Manhattan. [When] they talk about a declining enrollment,
enrollment of people going to school, it may not be a declining number in the population.
And remember I think to hear, one of the concerns of the Catholic Church in New York is
the growing number of Hispanics who kind of moving towards an evangelical
Protestantism away from Catholicism so I think that’s part of it too (Aiello 2009).
Competition is not simply for school attendance, finances and stature, but also for the newest
immigrants’ loyalty.
Peter Powers felt that:
The Church’s strength was always in urban settings. You had a lot of poorer people who
needed the church [to] come in. People got more educated, they moved away, They didn’t
need the church as much. They found other things to do. There was more likelihood
they’d go to public schools because they always moved to a district with great public
schools. Did you ever see a couple buy a house first time, their first house with kids, did
you hear them say, I bought this house and it’s got a lousy school district? The first thing
they say it’s got a school district because that’s what people look for. We didn’t need the
Catholic schools at this point.
Herman Badillo noted the different perceptions of public and parochial schools when he
was growing up:
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[W]e felt the parochial schools were inferior to the public schools because we had
standards in the schools but now there are no standards in the schools. Ask anybody—
Puerto Rican, black or whatever background—given the choice, they’ll go a parochial
school. In closing down parochial schools, the Catholics are closing down what is a basic
constituency for them and a loyal constituency and the parochial school kids do far better
than the public school kids, even though they may be Hispanic. They’re going to go to
parochial high schools and they’re going to go to religious colleges like Fordham . . . and
they are going to bring in money and they would contribute to the church, like Sonia
Sotomayor does. She’s a product of the parochial schools, not of the public schools
(Badillo 2009).
Conclusion
The decline of the Church’s political power that these interviews suggest is directly
related to the reduction in private sector unions and the decline of Catholic schools as the unique
and only choice of Catholics. Therefore, as the cradle-to-grave system created by Archbishop
Hughes unraveled, the spiritual and physical reasons for the parish and Church to remain
connected were severely diminished.
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CHAPTER VI. DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS
Major demographic changes within the boundaries of the Archdiocese have underpinned
many organizational and political shifts of the Catholic Church in New York City. As I have
outlined throughout this dissertation they include: a decline in the number of parishes and
churches in the Bronx and Manhattan; a dilution in the religious identity of Catholics in the
region; a decline in the number of priests and nuns, including those teaching in the parochial
school system; a change in the importance of Catholic education; new patterns of migration; and
an exodus of a significant percentage of the Catholic community from the city to suburbia.
Questions remain: What sense did parishioners make of the changes enumerated above?
And how could the Archdiocese of New York operate within its new political and demographic
realities?
Many of my interlocutors saw the social and political shifts in the city, the exodus of
white ethnic Catholics from the Archdiocese and the in-migration of Hispanic Catholics to the
city, as equally significant factors in creating new realities. Interviewees were critical of the
Archdiocese for failing to plan for these changing realities and for failing to respond to the
changes as they occurred.
The problems the Archdiocese faced were not unique to New York City. In fact,
archdioceses throughout the nation were facing similar issues but their responses were quite
different in most cases. The 2003 National Study of Parish Reorganization by the Conference for
Pastoral Planning and Development found that: “Many dioceses and parishes have little or no
experience with the conditions, issues, and structures that are encountered in the course of parish
reorganization. The experience is frequently one of exploring uncharted territory and devising
new ways to respond to these new conditions" (Conference for Pastoral Planning and
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Development 2003). The Archdiocese of New York was organizationally ill-prepared for such
changes. Confronted with comprehensive shifts in its environment, it failed to mount a formal
planning process to address these shifts effectively.
Some have argued that the New York Archdiocese may have over-anticipated the
“market” for its goods and services. During the Spellman era a building program of schools and
parish churches within the Bronx and Manhattan was undertaken to serve European Catholic
immigrant populations and provide them with communal, religious and social service facilities.
The construction included hospitals, schools, parish churches, universities, nursing homes, and
orphanages. But the Archdiocese had no insider knowledge of the shifting Catholic population.
Nor could it affect where Catholics lived. The Archdiocese believed that the poor were the
responsibility of the Church (Brown & McKeown 1997). And so where there was space, multiple
facilities were built in the same neighborhoods. As populations shifted beginning in the mid-20th
century, re-siting these facilities was not a consideration. Franciscan Father Michael Weldon
describes the institutional dilemma the Church faced in ministering to peripatetic souls while
maintaining a real estate portfolio:
There is no indication that Catholic Christianity is dying out in this country. The latest
statistics in fact show growth with infant and adult baptisms every year. Still, the skylines
of our cities are marked with the spires of an age of Catholic Church life now gone,
shattered by history and social movements beyond all of our control, and maybe the best
we can do is grieve as well (Weldon 2004, xviii).
In what was probably a long-term stance of denial, the New York Archdiocese did not even begin
to adopt a formal re-organization plan until the early 21st century, commissioning studies that
were made public only in 2006. New York Times reporter Michael Luo describes the situation the
Archdiocese had to address:
[The church confronted] a growing shortage of priests, coupled with the changing
demographics of the archdiocese, which in its entirety stretches from Staten Island in the
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south to the Catskills in the north. Some churches in the northern suburbs have been
bulging at the seams, while others in the city have struggled to get by, often requiring
large financial subsidies from the Archdiocese (Luo 2006).
Other Catholic jurisdictions faced with the same issues responded earlier. For example, the
Diocese of Syracuse produced a 200 page document in 1988, “Reconfiguration: A Diocesan
Study Document,” (Lang 1988). The Archdiocese of Chicago, with an estimated Catholic
population of 2.3 million, commenced planning for a different future, in 1992, and issued
Tomorrow’s Parish, a guidebook to set the course (Archdiocese of Chicago 2006). Planning for
the future was described as a means to allow Chicago to be “an evangelizing Church that reaches
out to transform our society into a civilization of love” (Archdiocese of Chicago 1998, 3). Such
planning was considered to be within the context of the mission of the Archdiocese of Chicago
and implied that re-organization was a religious duty. San Francisco's Archdiocese, experiencing
an exodus to the suburbs by white ethnic Catholics, began its realignment process in 1989
(Weldon 2004). In contrast, like its counterpart across the East River, the Diocese of Brooklyn
did not announce a clearly defined planning process until 2005 (Brooklyn Diocese Pastoral
Planning Mission Statement 2005).

Population Growth
The area the Archdiocese of New York covers—New York County (Manhattan), Bronx
County, Richmond County (Staten Island), and Putnam, Orange, Dutchess, Rockland, Sullivan,
Westchester and Ulster counties—experienced population growth into the 21st century. Data
gathered from the 2000 U.S. Census show that in the geographic area covered by the
Archdiocese of New York there were 5.5 million residents, an eight percent increase over the
previous census (U.S. Census 2000). The population growth was most significant in the northern
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portion of the Archdiocese and not in the city. The Archdiocese issued a statement from Cardinal
Edward Egan on March 13, 2006, in which he said:
Over the past 50 years, there has been an extraordinary change in where the Catholic
faithful of the Archdiocese reside. For example, somewhat more than 25 per cent of our
parishes are located in the borough of Manhattan, even though only around 12 per cent of
our people currently live there. In large numbers, Catholic families have been moving to
the so-called “upper counties,” such as Rockland, Orange, Dutchess, and Putnam, where
they clearly and urgently need to be served (Egan 2006).
In a press release issued on March 28, 2006 discussing the “re-alignment” of its operations, The
Archdiocese announced the closure of 15 parishes, including eight in its New York City
boroughs and seven in Westchester, Orange, and Dutchess counties. Fourteen schools were also
recommended to be shuttered. A longer list of parish mergers and school and parish closings
was issued in January 2007. Of new churches to be built in this “realignment” two of nine
churches were located in New York City, St. John Neuman in Staten Island and St. John Nam, in
the Bronx, which was mandated to be relocated (Archdiocese of New York 2007).
In 1908, one hundred years after the Archdiocese of New York was established, the
Bronx, Manhattan, and Staten Island together contained four times the population of the
remaining northern counties of the Archdiocese. By 1970, however, approximately 35 percent of
Archdiocesan members lived in its northern counties. In 2000 that number rose to 40 percent.

Realignment
The closings of schools and parishes announced in 2006 under the “realignment” were a
precursor. In January 2007, an additional twenty-one parishes were slated to be closed.
“Cardinal Egan originally intended to plunge into the redrawing of parish lines soon after he
became archbishop in 2000, but the scandal over sexual abuse by priests made him put it off”
(Luo 2007).
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What role did race and ethnicity play in the Archdiocese of New York’s decision to
reorganize? Did the Archdiocese officials simply decide to “follow the money” to the suburbs
while abandoning the New York City boroughs within its territory? Data from the United States
Census give a sketch of changes occurring in the demographics of the area that the Archdiocese
covers. For example, 51 percent of the population of the ten counties the Archdiocese includes
was white (U.S. Census 2000). Interestingly, its black population nearly doubled from the 1990
to the 2000 census, from nine to sixteen percent. The white population had declined by five
percent while the Hispanic population had grown by 25 percent from the 1990 to the 2000
census. The 2000 census also shows that in 2000, 24 percent of the area's population was under
the age of eighteen—approximately 1.5 million—15 percent higher than in the 1990 census (U.S.
Census 2000; U.S. Census 1990).

The Archdiocese’s Irish Hierarchy
The Irish domination of the Archdiocese of New York has historical and sociological
roots that stretch back centuries. The Church’s diocesan structure was created in the twelfth
century and has lasted with few changes into modern times (Richter 1988). This relatively
unchanging organization explains, at least in part, the rigidity of its decision making.
Additionally, British colonialism lent political legitimacy to Irish Catholicism as its religiosity
took on an oppositional ethos. The poverty and oppression that the Irish suffered at the hands of
the British created the social conditions that allowed for the flourishing of religion and
otherworldliness in opposition to daily life. The identification of the Church with a collective
solidarity would serve Irish immigrants and their offspring well in New York. Marx and Engel’s
description of the power of religion is apt, although most believers would reject its call for the
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abolition of the same:
Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the protest against
real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of the heartless world, just
as it is the spirit of a spiritless condition. It is the opium of the people. To abolish religion as the
illusory happiness of the people is to demand their real happiness. The demand to give up
illusions about the existing state of affairs is the demand to give up a state which needs illusions.
The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo the criticism of the vale of tears, the halo of
which is religion (Marx and Engels 1975, 38).

The Irish used politics to protect the Church from political power imposed from outside.
In writing about the Catholic Church in Ireland, social scientist Ted Titley notes that “the sphere
of influence of the Catholic clergy . . . extended into Irish political life,” with the goal of
“preserving the purely Catholic nature of [their] institutions . . . [T]hey supported the stance
taken by the hierarchy on the question of state versus Church control” (1983, 10). The laity and
membership of the Church in Ireland did not have a voice in the conduct of Archdiocesan
activities. Titley writes:
The relationship between these two groupings [clergy and laity] is by definition a
paternalistic one, for the clergy purport to teach a body of divinely-revealed truths and
dispense spiritual favors….Theological suppositions are not the product of consensus
opinion, but of revelation which comes down through the clerical hierarchy. In a world of
unquestionable eternal verities there is little room for individual inquiry or democratic
debate (Titley 1983, 151).
It is not a surprise then that the institutional behavior of the Catholic Church in Ireland
would be replicated as much as possible by the Irish-dominated Archdiocese of New York.
Although they ministered to congregations, the priests in Ireland and in New York were not
decision-makers—that role rested with the bishops and authorities, in Rome. The local clergy
remained messengers within “a system of beliefs in a divine or superhuman power and practices
of worship or other rituals directed towards such a power” (Argyle and Beit-Hallahmi 1975, 1).
What both the Church in Ireland and in New York did was to practice a religious model
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much different from the one practiced in continental Europe. Michael Argyle and Ben BeitHallahmi contend in The Social Psychology of Religion, that the traditional church and practice
of the religion were “pushed to the periphery of modern life, while in the US . . . religion has
undergone a process of internal secularization, which has kept it ‘modern’ and visible. Much of
the functions—[be] they social, psychological, or cultural—fulfilled by American churches
should be considered secular rather than religious in the traditional sense” (Argyle and BeitHallahmi 1975, 27). It can certainly be argued that the cradle-to-grave service delivery system
practiced by the Archdiocese fits that description; the system was critical to bind new Catholic
immigrants to the Archdiocese (Wood 2002).

Catholic Schools Play a Role
Catholic schools hoped to provide a “moral-political content” in the face of this
assimilation and acculturation:
The Catholic Church had long offered schools for its own faith community, and
beginning in the 1970s, as public schools in poor inner-city neighborhoods deteriorated,
urban Catholic schools opened their doors to non-Catholics. For instance, in New York
State, minority [non-Catholic] enrollment in Catholic schools increased from 12 per cent
in 1970 to 36 per cent in 1991. In the New York City borough of the Bronx, the minority
enrollment in the early 1990s was up to 85 per cent (Cimino and Lattin 1998, 165).
The development of the Irish school system was profoundly influenced by the presence
of a politically powerful Catholic priesthood because of the traditional importance the Church
attached to the priesthood’s educational functions. The Church claimed “a special place in the
education of youth . . . [It sought] the sole right to direct the education of Catholic children,
including the supervision of all secular teaching, to insure the exclusion of ideas contrary to the
faith” (Titley 1983, 5). The management of education would be the responsibility of local parish
priests and local dioceses. Sociologist Grace Davie explains in The Sociology of Religion, “[i]t
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may indeed be the case that one function of religion is to mitigate the hardships of this world and
so disguise them” (2007, 27). In this country, the Catholic Church certainly functioned in part to
create a parallel America, a self-governing Catholic America with its own rules that determined
whether its adherents would find eternal rest in heaven or eternal damnation in hell. Such beliefs
had a powerful hold on American Catholics, prompting them to follow diocesan dictates without
much question at least until the convening of the Second Vatican Council.

Puerto Ricans Have Trouble Integrating
The difficulties that Puerto Rican migrants experienced integrating into the Catholic
community in New York were summarized in a 1972 letter to Terrence Cardinal Cooke:
[O]ne half of the Catholics are Spanish speaking. Of the 407 parishes of the archdiocese,
97 provide services in Spanish. Among the over 1,100 diocesan priests, 134 speak some
Spanish and for four of them, it is their native language. In the parishes staffed by
religious orders, there are 68 Spanish-speaking priests, 16 of them native speakers. In
addition there are 76 native Spanish-speaking priests working in our parishes, although
for the most part, they are considered visitors to the Archdiocese (Diaz-Stevens 1993,
205).
This was not news to the Archdiocese. To address the issues it convened a conference in 1955 in
San Juan, Puerto Rico under the direction of Cooke’s predecessor Cardinal Spellman. The
objectives were to identify strategies to confront the Archdiocese’s changing demographics. In
the dedication of the Report of the First Conference on the Spiritual Care of Puerto Rican
Migrants, Cardinal Spellman himself wrote that:
Puerto Ricans are Catholics, ninety per cent of them at least. In fact, in New York City
about one of every four baptized persons is probably Spanish-American. They arrive on
our Continental mainland with the Cross about their necks and in their hearts…but with
no priests to attend their migration. Theirs is the first such Catholic group in the history
of American migration (quoted in Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich 1955, 7-8).
Unlike other immigrant groups, they brought no priests with them because there were
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none to bring. The Conference reported that one parish in Puerto Rico contained “92,000 souls
and seven priests . . . [in a] geographical area, sometimes approaching a hundred square miles,
covered by a single parish—so often by a single priest” (Ibid., 17). With a terrain that was often
mountainous, priests traveled by foot or mule. And to the chagrin of many a Catholic on the
mainland Puerto Rican culture bore little resemblance to the Catholicism of the American
Archdiocese of New York. While the Irish and Puerto Ricans shared a colonial legacy, times had
changed and Puerto Rican nationalism was at odds with the ideological staples of the
conservative Cardinals Spellman and Cooke.

A Cultural Divide
The cultural divide between the Archdiocese’s hierarchy and its Puerto Rican
congregants may have been as significant as any other factor in explaining the inability to bring
Puerto Ricans into the pews to replace departing white ethnic Catholics. The decentralized and
egalitarian Pentecostal sects managed to succeed where the city’s largest religious denomination
could not by harnessing the power of culture. “The Pentecostals,” Herman Badillo recalls, “came
up with the idea of having more than just sermons in the church and they began to have music
and entertainment and they brought in even more people, Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics, to
the church because they became a form of entertainment” (Badillo June 2009). While in:
1961 there were 42 Catholic parishes in New York City with Spanish-speaking Roman
Catholic priests, but only one was Puerto Rican. By contrast, preachers and ministers of
Pentecostal churches in New York were almost all Puerto Ricans, which meant that in
such churches members could rise rapidly….[F]ully 50 per cent of Puerto
Rican marriages were being conducted in Protestant churches (Badillo 2006, 83).
Catholic education existed in Puerto Rico, but was barely a factor in daily life. It might
have accustomed Island parishioners to the necessity of a religious education, but, as in parish
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life, the Church struggled to meet the needs of its members. The Cardinal’s Conference report of
1955 found “25,000 children in parochial schools, [and] 500,000 in public schools. . . . It must be
assumed, therefore, that a greater number of the Puerto Ricans still lack instruction in even the
basic essentials of their religion” (Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich 1955, 19).
The Archdiocese frequently concentrated its energies on what was different about New
York’s new arrivals. They spoke a different language and had, according to the Archdiocese, a
different sense of basic morality. The 1955 Conference reported that in Puerto Rico:
[T]he most serious moral problems are centered in the family, in attitudes toward sexual
behavior, in consensual unions, in the broken family, in the care of children. This creates
serious problems for the family on the Island; it also leaves the family exposed to serious
problems when they come to New York. . . . Consensual unions account for about 25 per
cent of the marriages in Puerto Rico. About 30 per cent of the children are illegitimate
(Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich 1955, 30).
The report noted that the same trends were continuing in the Puerto Rican community in New
York City.

No National Parishes
Puerto Ricans, however, were not to be given the same community-based parish support
that had begun with the Italians and extended to other immigrant groups. National parishes
existed in areas throughout the Archdiocese. On Manhattan’s West Side, for example, parishes
where liturgy was conducted in parishioners’ native language were well established. The national
parishes, instrumental in creating social networks to conquer New York’s vast and often clannish
job market, became launching grounds for political action and were the norm in the Archdiocese
(McManus 2009).
The concept of the national parishes is well defined by Fordham University sociologist
Reverend Joseph P. Fitzpatrick who wrote:
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In Catholic life, [the] immigrant community was centered in the national parish. It seems
very doubtful that the immigrant would have kept the Faith, had he not had the constant
support of his own people in this type of community which more or less reproduced in
the United States the little village from which he or his people had come. It is becoming
more widely recognized today that the practice of the Faith is much more a cultural
matter than we had previously been willing to admit . . . the national parish provided an
opportunity for a gradual transition to American ways. The slow drift from the national
parish was associated with a gradual adjustment to American customs and a growing
familiarity with the ways in which the Faith was practiced in the United States.
Therefore, by the time the immigrant children had become American; they had learned
also how to be Catholic in an American way (1955, 84).
But an alternate decision was made regarding the Puerto Rican immigrant community,
which was to integrate Puerto Ricans into existing parishes. The fear was that the Puerto Ricans
were not “culturally” suited to be part of the Catholic fabric of New York. In the minds of the
Archdiocese’ leadership Puerto Ricans were hardly proper Catholics in behavior, liturgy, or basic
education. The Cardinal concluded after the 1955 Conference that the only way they would be
brought to the faith was to be integrated into the Archdiocese. No national parishes for Puerto
Ricans.
These were hardly the Catholics desired by New York white ethnics as pastoral partners,
nor, based upon Fitzgerald’s writing, were they accepted by its priests. Dolan goes on to write
that:
[T]his clash of cultural emphases and presuppositions at the religious level led American
Catholics to complain about the religious “bad habits” of the Puerto Ricans, precisely at
the level of authority and sexual morality. Accustomed to measure Catholic loyalty by a
strict fidelity to institutionally mandated practices such as regular attendance at Mass,
compliance with one’s “Easter duty” and to the laws of fasting and abstinence, American
Catholics were shocked at the Puerto Ricans (Dolan and Vidal 1994, 67).
White Ethnics
In Democracy’s Promise: Immigrants & American Civic Institutions, Janelle Wong
writes that “scholars who have traced European groups as they evolved from marginal to full-
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fledged members of the white majority argue that contestation over white status and the
construction of whiteness are critical elements for understanding the unequal distribution of
social, economic, legal, and political power” (2006, 18). Blue-collar, Catholic ethnics judged
Puerto Ricans to be other than white despite the lack of status those same white ethnics had
experienced and the prejudice they had faced.
Puerto Ricans’ “bad Catholicism” and the stigma of being non-white made them
unquestionably unacceptable. They faced these hostilities without recourse to their own
community, i.e., the national parishes (Ferree, Fitzpatrick and Illich 1955). If integration of these
“bad Catholics” was to be achieved at all, it would only be through their “bleaching,” which in
Cardinal Spellman’s era required political re-education. After all, the hero of New York’s Puerto
Rican community was Vito Marcantonio, a stalwart of the Communist Party’s popular front and
American Labor Party congressman, who by Cardinal Spellman’s measure was a communist.

Differential Decision-Making
Archdiocese policies that were in force during the Irish and Italian waves of immigration
were not in evidence for the newest and most numerous Catholics arriving in New York. The
Archdiocese kept its parishes operating while the Bronx burned and urban renewal uprooted
existing communities, but the needs of the Puerto Ricans overwhelmed the social service
networks and were only modestly addressed by the post-Spellman Archdiocese. And Puerto
Ricans did not fit into the Archdiocese’s power triangle in the same manner as the Irish had, as
Tammany was dying. They were even less purposeful to the reformers or new Democrats whose
sights remained focused on issues very different from the needs of the struggling migrants.
Puerto Ricans were hardly accepted in local parishes. As Ana Maria Diaz-Stevens (1993)
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documents, they were banished to the basements of parish churches where they would hold
services. The same discrimination against Puerto Ricans in their local churches was extended to
the priests who ministered to them in Spanish. Thus rather than creating a sense of unification,
integration and assimilation, Cardinal Spellman created instead a centrally controlled two-tiered
Archdiocese, where the hierarchy defined those who worshipped “upstairs“ and those who
worshipped “downstairs.” Consequently, it was only in the Protestant and Pentecostal churches
where Puerto Ricans could become leaders. The same pattern continued during Cardinal Cooke’s
era, when issues confronting the increasing number of new migrants were consigned to the
Office of the Spanish Speaking Apostolate.

The Seventies
The demand-making that accompanied rising social movements around the country
during the 1970s did not spare the Archdiocese. Although conservative clergy headed the Office
of the Spanish Speaking Apostolate (but the Office did employ many Latinos), they demanded
changes. The Office sought a Spanish-speaking Vicar General within the Chancery who had
power to create change: the appointment of auxiliary bishops who were Hispanics plus
community involvement in decision-making.
The Cardinal and the Archdiocesan hierarchy responded, and the result was a “series of
inconclusive meetings and exchanged memorandum. . . . [T]he final strategy was to reduce the
staff of the Office of the Spanish-Speaking Apostolate” (Diaz-Stevens 1993, 214). Priests who
had not been involved with the Office were in some cases rewarded with promotions, while those
identified with the Office and its activism were shunted aside. Ultimately, the office was reduced
to insignificance. The Archdiocese in the Spellman and Cooke years came “to see its ministry to
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Puerto Ricans in terms of converting them from a defective form of Hispano-Caribbean
Catholicism to an American form of Catholicism, and to hope this could be done in one
generation” (Dolan and Vidal 1994, 69).
The Archdiocese did not in the immediate post-Spellman period use its moral clout nor its
perceived political clout to fight for its newest parishioners. Similarly the political machine was
consumed by its fight against reformers. It sought instead to follow a pattern of New York State
politics dating back to the Constitutional Convention of 1894: keep the less powerful powerless
by allowing them little representation or access to power. Those overtures that were made to
Puerto Ricans were heroic actions initiated by parish priests who saw a human disaster and
sought with their limited budgets and tools to help those that they could. The result would be an
Archdiocese in crisis during a radically changed political environment.

White Flight
White ethnics in New York City were involved in a proto-social movement of their own.
Fueled by resentment, fear, and a large dose of beckoning opportunity blue-collar Catholics from
the city hovered somewhere between being activists and foot soldiers in a movement of white
flight. Robert Tierney, former New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission chair and
aide to Mayor Edward I. Koch, speaks to why whites left the city:
I think it’s all kinds of motivations. Sort of better, you know, go over the border, better
yourself, do better than the next generation. I think those are the sort of higher motives
that affect every series of generations. And then I think things were not so good . . .
there were periods of, say you go back to the ‘70s, crime and other things where whole
neighborhoods were really teetering and I think that helped push so-called “white
flight” . . . huge swaths of the Bronx and huge swaths of Queens and Brooklyn . . .
underwent that and I think it was just that a huge sociological, political event (Tierney
2009).
Tierney saw suburbanization as the desire for a better life, as did Bishop Jenik., White flight,
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however, would seem to include concerns about the rise of the non-white, possibly non-Catholic
population. Sam Roberts was more blunt:
Blacks. They were afraid of blacks. You know, starting after the [Second World] War, you
had the suburbs opening up. New York was becoming the anti-suburb. The suburbs
became the anti-city. . . . [P]eople wanted that Levittown backyard and little house for
their kids and stuff. And part of it was the city was becoming more threatening racially
and ethnically. It was not the city that they remembered. It was not the old story, the Ed
Koch story of the woman who asked him to make it like it was, the woman he met on the
boardwalk and [Koch] said he never had the heart to tell her it never was really what she
thought it was. But people had this image of much better times, totally forgetting the
Depression and all sorts of other things, and wanted to relive that, and felt more and more
threatened in a city that seemed to be going out of control. You go back to 1960 and
people were terrified of crime. So everything is relative. They were terrified of crime,
and . . . more and more of the crime was being committed by blacks, by Puerto Ricans…
white people wanted to move away from that (Roberts 2009).
Wanting a better life and moving to the suburbs meant escaping from non-Catholic newcomers;
and from not only crime but also the fear of crime. Former city councilmember and land use
lobbyist Walter McCaffrey noted racist reasons for many Catholics leaving:
[T]hey didn’t want to end up being now in a situation where they were going to be living
next to African Americans or Latinos. So you saw for example in housing projects that
had a high concentration at one time of Irish Catholics living there, now those folks were
starting an egress. In some cases they would go to the northern Bronx, for example.
Eventually they would end up going into Westchester, or you would see in Long Island.
You would see that exodus heading in that type of direction. Also they tended to do better
financially now with jobs, coming from union jobs they were able to afford buying a
house on the Island (McCaffrey 2011).
Perhaps the answer to what motivated whites to leave the city includes several factors. Stephen
Aiello alludes to a confluence of reasons that suburbanization appealed to many New Yorkers:
Well I can tell you from family experience. We stayed in the city, the Aiello family, but
here was a time when I was born through the time that I got married and left about ninety
percent of our families left. I didn’t see it as much as after [the] Second World War, but
after the Korean War, I would say close to half of my relatives who were just married, or
they were married a few years, started to move out and why? Because they could get as
they saw much better value for their money. Two, the value also meant that they could get
a little back yard. Italians also have a thing about you know the land, and you could get
that the Levittowns, the developments in East Islip, in Patchogue, in Brentwood, where
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else did they go? I’m trying to think but one was just on an economic basis. That was
number one. You could get more for your money and you’d have some space and there
was the thought too that places in the city were becoming less desirable. The taxes were
going up, minorities were moving in . . . crime went up, so I think there was a little bit of
racial bias involved in it. Team that with the economics and you thought you could get a
better way of life by leaving the city (Aiello 2009).
New York’s white ethnics left their city and their parishes; and if they chose to remain practicing
Catholics, they took their ethnic identities and their Catholicism with them to new locales.
Unlike its counterpart in Boston, however, the Archdiocese in New York took no steps to stop the
exodus of its flock (Gamm 1999).
Black Power
The movement of whites to the suburbs had a corollary: Black power. It was both a cause
of and reaction to the white exodus from the nation’s cities. As my interlocutors have explained
racial anxieties and fears motivated some of the flight to the suburbs. In addition, that flight
created a partial political vacuum taken up by minority politicians and social movements. The
social and political movements were accompanied by cultural movements that asserted Black is
beautiful, championed Afrocentricity, and advocated Puerto Rican pride. The Black Panther
Party and Young Lords captured the attention of radical youth and the fear and loathing from
older and conservative whites.
Stephen Aiello pinpointed the beginning of the Black power movement, the reaction of
the non-black population to it, and its influence on the Archdiocese:
I think you started to see the diminishing of the so-called Roosevelt Democratic coalition
[in] 1968. I believe you started to see the increased influence in the Democratic Party of
communities of color but specifically then African American, the somewhat beginnings
of the feminist movement. You had the Voting Rights Act three years before, you have the
Civil Rights Act, four years before. I believe you started to see the real beginning of
change in the Democratic Party, the loss of influence by white working class ethnic
Catholics, and by the Italian American group. I think that culminated if you can do this
historically, in the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan (Aiello 2009).
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Peter Quinn answered why blacks organized to create power: “As this industrial base of small
industries died in New York, there were no jobs . . . nobody planned that. You had the greatest
migration in American history is from the South – of American blacks to northern cities when the
industrial base is dying,” (Quinn 2011).
Aureo Cardona said:
Remember now, how blacks when they came to the city, especially . . . I’m talking about
my community. When they came to my community, they were used to very strong social
justice preaching and they were used to going to the Church to hide from social injustice.
You run the Church so the Klan doesn’t burn you out. So the Church was an important
place for them. Much different than for Puerto Ricans. We didn’t have to do that because
nobody chased us except the cops. So we always accepted our priests as… they walk on
water, whatever they do. They don’t have to do anything for me but my soul. Black
communities were used to . . . the firebrand preachers. And because it was a movement
going on in this country at the time. So when the blacks moved into the South Bronx it
was a different black community. They didn’t want to go into our churches and hear
Latin, preaching bullshit you couldn’t even understand, and then go back into social
injustice of the street and not have them say anything about it. They’re not going to buy
that . . . and the Catholic Church wasn’t going after them, wasn’t reaching out to them
(Cardona 2011).
“You had the rise of Black Power which scared the shit out of anybody who wasn’t
black, at the time,” remarked Daniel Chill. “The city was dirty. The city was crime ridden. The
city was racist. The city was broke. The parents…they left the neighborhoods for a better life”
(Chill 2009). And based upon Daniel Chill’s analysis, they were scared by Blacks and ran from
them to what they perceived as safer neighborhoods. Empowerment and Black Power had a
positive meaning for Blacks, but a negative meaning for non-blacks.
Former labor leader Edward Ott casts the effects of the Black power movement in a more
positive light than some of my interlocutors.
[T]hey’re not Catholics. Let’s go back. . . . pre-Voting Rights Act . . . white ethnic
politics makes complete sense because blacks are almost barred from voting even in
places like New York. They come out of the South, they’re not voters. They believe that
they’re going to be creating problems if they show up at the polls. Once the Voting
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Rights Act is passed, this country begins to change dramatically. The validation of
African Americans as voters, which Johnson signs, sends a message to every other group
and women’s movement takes up the banner . . . the same rhetoric as the civil rights
movement. Gays take up the same thing. The whole politic changes. The whole thought
process is the how deals are made. It’s completely changed once the Voting Rights Act
passes. Everybody’s in the game, and you’ve got to let African American’s vote, in
America, everybody can vote (Ott 2009).
“Here the Church has taken a much more principled stand on the immigration issue than
it did on the racial issue in civil rights," Bruce Gyory observed:
It [the Archdiocese of New York] wasn’t outright hostile to civil rights, but it wasn’t in
the vanguard of civil rights. Neither [Cardinal Francis] Spellman nor [his successor
Cardinal Terrence] Cooke had the same kind of pastoral influence. The Irish were always
pitted against the blacks and . . . you had that. Now we’ve had a diminution in that now
towards the blacks. It was almost I think in the Catholic opinion there was a revolution
(Gyory 2009).
According to Frank Macchiarola, Blacks, just as the Catholics had done, used their
churches as organizing locales. Theology, according to Macchiarola, became less important than
the ability to create power for communities that had felt powerless:
[T]he way the blacks get to where they are was to find leaders in religious communities.
But that’s not a religion. There’s no religion there. There’s a group of churches that have
a political agenda. But there’s, the depth, theological depth of most of the church
ministers who are in the social leadership, the theological depth is about four inches.
Political activism gets them there. And . . . you see the ripple effect . . . in parishes that
gradually changed over. The next generation, the generation of people moving in [today]
are much more tolerant. If you deal with this generation, you see enormous change. I
mean, that’s what makes Obama very believable as a candidate. It’s a point of pride.
Once the blacks elect somebody, the blacks start to judge those people on the same basis
that they judge everybody else. They’re not stupid. They say, you fooled me once, I’m
not being fooled again (Macchiarola 2009).
For Macchiarola, Black Power was a creation of leaders nurtured by the religious community,
but not of religion itself, which was quite entirely different from the Irish experience.

The Arrival of Puerto Ricans
The Puerto Ricans in the post-World War II era moved to a city amidst a social, economic
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and demographic revolution. The Archdiocese had lost its tools for maintaining solidarity in the
rapidly changing white ethnic neighborhoods of Manhattan and the Bronx. It had to contend with
six hundred thousand new Catholic migrants from Puerto Rico who arrived in New York City
during the period of 1940-1960 (Cohalan 1983, 296). By 1965, their number increased to
750,000 with nearly 250,000 settling in the Bronx alone (Cohalan 1983, 296). Puerto Ricans
maintained the Catholic population’s equilibrium in terms of absolute numbers, but unlike the
Germans, Irish or Italians who had come before, they were poorer, illiterate, and non-English
speakers arriving in an era that offered dwindling urban possibilities for entry level work. In the
early 20th century about 40 percent of New York City workers had manufacturing jobs
(Gonnerman 2011), and now those jobs were disappearing as were the jobs at the port. The new
immigrants brought little of what previous groups had brought. “Airport surveys showed that
half those coming to New York had no work experience at all,” writes Jonnes, “while eighteen
per cent had been farm laborers . . . at a time when one in two New Yorkers had finished high
school, [and] only one in ten Puerto Rican migrants had. Seventy per cent had not completed the
ninth grade” (Jonnes 1986, 102).
The economic changes, as well as the shifting of power centers, made life more difficult
for the new arrivals. For example, Glazer and Moynihan write, “[i]n 1950 there were 246,000
Puerto Ricans in the City. By 1960, this number had increased by two and one-half times to
613,000, or 8 per cent of the city’s population. In 1950, the average hourly earnings of
manufacturing production workers in New York City ranked tenth in the nation. By 1960 they
ranked thirtieth” (1964, 299). In addition, in 1959 the “median family income for Puerto Ricans
was $3,811 as against $6,091 for the all of the city’s families (and $8,052 in the suburbs of
Westchester)” (Glazer and Moynihan 1964, 300).
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Declining Job Market
As non-English speakers with low levels of formal education, Puerto Ricans found
themselves in a declining job market with housing in short supply; and unlike the Irish, they had
no political structure to bolster them. Like their Italian counterparts the progression from arrival
to parish to voting booth to job was simply not available for Puerto Ricans. Puerto Ricans
seemed to have arrived at the wrong time to the wrong place. “The industrial base that had in the
past provided the first jobs and glimmers of financial security for newcomers had ceased to
expand. As the city moved from manufacturing to finance and professional services, Puerto
Rican labor rested on tenuous foundations, positioned in marginal or declining sectors” (Karrol
1983 quoted in Trounstine 2008, 4). Additionally the patronage machine provided little help:
those in power wanted the votes, but they didn’t want Puerto Ricans as neighbors much less as
candidates.
The failure to assist Puerto Ricans extended surprisingly to sectors of the labor movement
where a lack of solidarity appeared counter-intuitive. The left-leaning International Ladies
Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) appeared to exemplify anti-Puerto Rican discrimination so
deep that it traversed the political spectrum. In testimony before the United States House of
Representatives, Herbert Hill, labor secretary of the NAACP, testified that the ILGWU
discriminated against Puerto Ricans. He described steady wage losses for unskilled and
semiskilled garment workers, an ever-increasing number of whom were Puerto Rican, “with no
gains in leadership positions for Black or Puerto Rican members. When charged with
systematically hindering the advancement of the union’s Black and Puerto Rican members . . .
ILGWU officials insisted, ‘We are not an employment agency’” (Thomas 2010, 188). For
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outsiders there were few jobs, limited protections provided by the union, and few possibilities of
advancement within the union structure. The more time they spent in New York, the less possible
it seemed that Puerto Ricans would become upwardly mobile.
Perceptions of race were also a factor. In describing his own experience growing up
Catholic and Puerto Rican in the South Bronx, community activist, former Democratic Party
District Leader, and real estate developer Aureo Cardona said, “Some of the kids . . . darker kids,
darker skin, Latino kids, it was hell and they never really integrated” (Cardona, March 2011). It
was during this period that the Bronx deteriorated very significantly and became a national
symbol of urban squalor and the decline of the City of New York.

Government Programs
So as white ethnics were leaving the city, the poorest, least educated, and least skilled—
Puerto Ricans—were left behind, unlikely to follow whites to the suburbs (Wilson 1987). Also,
New York’s housing stock was aging in the Bronx and in areas of Manhattan—the Lower East
Side, for example—where Puerto Ricans resided. Hoyt argues that aged housing drives change in
ethnic populations: those who can afford to leave do so, and those who can’t pay for better
housing are left behind (1933). The movement out of the city was abetted by government
programs including loans to veterans, mortgage guarantees for returning servicemen and women,
and a national highway program led in New York by building czar Robert Moses, which would
splinter traditional ethnic neighborhoods into pieces (Caro 1974).
The politicians appeared to allow the destruction of those neighborhoods in the Bronx
populated by Jews, blacks, and newly arriving Puerto Ricans almost as if it were permissible
public policy. As Shefter writes:

168

Those who governed New York during the 1950s defused opposition by accommodating
its major organized interests. The downtown business community was satisfied because
control over the development programs that were of prime interest to them was placed in
the hands of Robert Moses and/or various public authorities responsible only to their
bondholders (1994, 239).
Puerto Ricans were not likely to be bondholders nor were they part of the downtown business
community.

The Reformers
The reformers, those who opposed the traditional political machines that had controlled the
Bronx and Manhattan, also provided little assistance to recent arrivals. In fact, the drive to
reform was primarily a non-minority movement which “produced leaders who thought that the
liberal middle class could win elections without the party’s historic constituencies . . . they were
a middle class rooted in postindustrial sections of U.S. society” (Stein 2010, 52). Minorities and
unions didn’t matter. They were not of the same social class and the private sector unions were
too often conservative to seriously be considered as part of the new politics (Stein 2010). What
Puerto Ricans needed was a locale for organizing as the Irish had had—the Archdiocese of New
York parishes. They also needed jobs and patronage and a way into the political machinery and
into the Archdiocese in order to replace the Catholics exiting the city. But they got none of this.
Solutions, the reformers believed, had little to do with empowerment but rather with
fundamentally changing Puerto Rican neighborhoods through urban renewal. It was easy to
destroy neighborhoods where little political capital existed: no major institutions defended those
who lived in what the reformers and their allies thought were slums. Unfortunately, urban
renewal destroyed not only slum buildings but whatever social networks existed within them.
The Archdiocese rejected its role as a power and instead assumed a pastoral role. Consequently
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there was no political machine, no politically strong Archdiocese, and no educated class with
access to power to stand between homes and the wrecking ball. Subsequently, riots and fires later
destroyed much of what was not demolished by government order in the South Bronx.

Urban Renewal
The federal government provided the funds for urban renewal, tightly controlled by a
redevelopment bureaucracy in the grip of Robert Moses (Caro 1975). During the Moses period:
New York City alone accounted for 32 per cent of all construction activity under the
federal law [urban renewal funding]. Moses cultivated a wide array of allies from New
York’s liberal political circles. These activists, drawn from various civic organizations,
labor groups, chambers of commerce, local planning bodies, neighborhood groups,
hospitals and university boards, and elite non-profit community betterment organizations
were determined to save their immediate areas from slums and blight. If their ally Robert
Moses emphasized practical, achievable goals, they often imbued slum clearance and
rebuilding with lofty ideals (Zipp 2010, 164).
These same lofty ideals were not used to protect the homes of the First Avenue East Harlem
Italians or blacks or Puerto Ricans, but they were certainly in play when neighborhoods like the
Hell’s Kitchen of the McManus family were concerned. More and more urban renewal seemed to
mean minority removal.
On the political front, it would make no sense for those in power to cede control to Puerto
Ricans. Even though the white ethnic- and Irish-dominated political machines were dying, they
still maintained some local power. Winning elections was the way to power no matter the ethnic
or political make-up of a geographic political area. Winning elections was also the means to
spoils—accruing gain through the creation of a government (Downs 1957). Without the
Archdiocese acting as an intermediary, Puerto Ricans would find their way out of poverty,
substandard housing, declining city services, and a hostile economic environment in only one
way: gaining power by electing sympathetic candidates.
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Demographic Shifts
White Ethnic Catholics Move Out
What consequences flowed from the white ethnic movement to the suburbs? Former New
York City Central Labor Council leader Edward Ott saw suburbanization occurring among two
groups: Executives and managers moved out, and blue-collar workers followed. “Not only did
large numbers of white ethnics leave the city, but more importantly, the executive and
managerial class moved out into the suburbs. People who actually run companies, make
decisions, and develop networks” (Ott 2009). Citing personal experience, Ott explained the
consequences for those who remained in the city:
So here’s what happened. My sister goes to St. Pious the Fifth High School. We live in
South View Projects. She, Catholic girl, Catholic school, gets a job, second year of high
school, American Home Products. Who from? Someone who has a relationship with that
high school. Fifteen years later, that’s not possible, because those contacts have moved
out to the suburbs, and those relationships moved out to the suburbs. So a kid from
Nassau County has a better shot at getting a job on Wall Street or Midtown Manhattan in
a corporation based on those networks than a kid who’s still living in the South Bronx or,
or even North Bronx. So, that’s one big factor you can’t underestimate (Ott 2009).
For author Peter Quinn, the exodus to the suburbs seemed the outgrowth of natural
forces, motivated by an extension of the American dream. It started with the construction of
parkways and a lack of investment in public transit:
It’s not a New York phenomenon. I mean, New York, in a way, has done better. It was
one of these great national movements in American history, of immigrants. They didn’t
come here to live in apartments. They came here for the American Dream, which is a
house, a better job, a car, your kids go to college. So some part of it was . . . selfpropelled. They wanted something else (Quinn 2011).
He noted that suburbanization predated World War II, but its biggest boost came from post-war
legislation:
The industrial base in the city began to erode in the Depression, in the ‘30s. Those small
industries that started to go, I think actually the Depression slowed it down. I think it
would’ve happened faster without the Depression . . . they were moving out of industrial
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jobs. The explosion of education! In 1900, I think this is correct, there were 3,000
college students in New York state. Three thousand. . . I think the greatest piece of
social legislation of American history is the GI Bill. It was all about education. It was
like, after World War II [there was] this wave of prosperity, nothing like it in history has
ever happened. And these people rode. My parents were in the same apartment for fortyfour years. They didn’t want to move. It was just the way they were. But everybody
around us couldn’t get out fast enough (Quinn 2011).
Quinn cited other factors as explanations for which ethnic groups moved out the city quickest:
The cumulative effect of the social welfare programs from the New Deal and the postwar
prosperity [was] this pent up energy just burst out. So I think it begins slowly. It’s kind
of slowed down even more by the Depression and the war. And then after that it’s an
explosion, from 1945 to 1960, 1965. The Irish and the Jews [went first]. The Italians
tended to buy houses rather than, like the neighborhood where I lived, Parkchester, we
lived, Irish and Jews together. I think there were early rumblings maybe in the ‘20s with
the automobiles. People wanted a car. Better jobs. People got better jobs. The great
introduction, the thing that changed America; credit. You know, I don’t think you can
isolate one factor. It’s one of these gigantic confluence of different social factors come
in. And how much of it is crime and minorities coming in? Driving people, are they
fleeing that? Or are they following a dream? (Quinn 2011).
Monsignor Don Sakano, a former head of the Catholic Youth Organization (CYO),
recognized the positive role the government played after World War II. "[A]fter the war you had
opportunities that weren’t there before, FHA, VA and mortgage insurance was a major factor.
The building of the roadways, people out of the city and back into the city as a workplace, rather
than a residential place,” Sakano said. But he also noted a redefinition of Catholic life. “The meism . . . fewer children, more money available to sink into assets like home ownership and
swimming pools and those sorts of amenities people look for in a better life. And [they] invested
in a better life not having children” (Sakano 2011).
Peter Powers, campaign manager for Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s two successful mayoral
campaigns, saw the demographic shift and out-movement of white ethnic Catholics outside the
city boundary as:
Just people moving up, they grew up in one area, they got educated and for other reasons,
they wanted to live in other areas . . . as society became more mobile, especially after
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World War II, people didn’t want to live in ethnic enclaves anymore. They wanted to get
out there and experience different things, because they tended to have Irish
neighborhoods, Jewish neighborhoods and Italian neighborhoods. You don’t see that
anymore because people just wanted I think [to] move on and live out the American
dream. They wanted to also get a nice house which between road building and trains, they
could get a nicer house for less money, a little bit away and still work in the city. I think
it’s a normal part of immigrant groups to come, stay together in one area and then kind of
move out, I think there’s a history of that (Powers 2009).
Labor lawyer Vincent Pitta agreed with Peter Powers:
I think there was tremendous increase in the financial well-being and income growth,
most of those people who were primarily in . . . white collar profession after the Second
World War. They wanted a piece of terra firma that they couldn’t afford in the city. They
also wanted privacy, which living in a tenement doesn’t afford you. They wanted better
schools for their kids, and the same reasons have always held true (Pitta 2009).
The desire for a “better life” and government incentives cited by Sakano—Veterans’ loans, HFA
mortgages, new highways—increased the speed of the demographic shift which made the
Archdiocese more reliant on the newcomers, Puerto Ricans, to fill now emptying parish pews.
Dean of the New York City press corps Gabe Pressman who has covered city politics for
newspapers and television for sixty years speaks to the issue of race. “There was a lot of antiblack feeling. And I think their main motivation [in leaving for the suburbs] was to have an
enclave, an area to go to where their children can be brought up without crime” (Pressman 2011).
Father Francis Skelly, a South Bronx priest agreed. He said white Catholic families
simply wanted “to raise their kids. My sister moved to Rockland. Everyone but my other
brother was an engineer. He moved to Rockland. They all moved because they didn't want to
raise their kids in a city that was dangerous” (Skelly 2011). An increasingly dangerous and
foreign city populated by strangers as their co-religionists motivated more white collar ethnics to
leave for the "better life" described by so many I interviewed.
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School Chancellor Frank Macchiarola, like Walter McCaffrey, later defines the mass exit
from the city by white Catholics as a two-step process begun by economic need:
It’s economics. Now most of my family who has left the city, they left it for economic
reasons. . . . [T]he Italians in my family, they went to Staten Island, and after Staten
Island they went to Jersey. And it was all economics. And they have money . . . the
housing crunch in the City of New York pushed a lot of people out to Nassau County,
Levittown and places like that. And the idea that you could own your own car, which
began to happen not immediately, but pretty soon after. And the roads. And it was status.
It was status (Macchiarola 2009).
Andrew Napolitano stated:
I think the exodus began in the 50s. And I think they all started making more money. . . .
I was raised in a row house on Ampere Parkway in Bloomfield, New Jersey, which my
grandparents bought out of foreclosure in 1929. Somebody that lost it in the Depression.
A three-family house that they owned and they lived on the second floor. They rented the
first floor one-bedroom flat to my parents. And they rent the third floor, a very, very tiny
– what we would call today a studio apartment – to the same tenant for forty years. My
parents had a desire to give their children more than they got. They wanted my brothers
and me to have a backyard. They wanted a place to park the car. They wanted us to be
able to walk to school. So they saved their money, and we moved to the other end of
town where a developer bought a golf course and developed it into a sort of Levittownlooking development where the houses were all cookie cutter—they were one size or
another, small or big—but there were trees and there were backyards. And that was just
the normal, natural thing to do. Who replaced us in my grandparents’ house? Tenants
after tenants. Not the stability that was the case when we were there. I couldn’t go
upstairs and have a poached egg. I couldn’t go upstairs and have the homemade pasta. It
was a task to do that now. So that attenuated family ties as well. It gave my brothers and
me a better environment in which to be raised. We could walk to the park and play
baseball. We didn’t have to worry about cars going past the house at forty miles an hour,
because this new neighborhood, nobody drove at that speed (Napolitano 2014).
Marino cites the speed with which demographic changes came, a view shared by many of
those interviewed. The quality of life and the fear of crime attached to racial change occurred
quickly. “[T]hat changed literally overnight . . . this is 1956. So by the late ‘50s there’s this
exodus to the Bronx, not outside the city at that point for a lot of people, but to the Bronx and
then also from Brooklyn to Long Island, Bronx to Westchester, New Rochelle . . . because it

174

became this steady exodus almost north and east” (Marino 2009). For many, as previously noted,
the movement to suburbs was transitional; first to the outer boroughs and then to suburban living
outside the city’s boundaries.
Douglas Schoen, a pollster for Mayors Edward Koch and Michael Bloomberg, Governor
Hugh Carey and President Bill Clinton, pinpoints the demographic shift to the ‘50s and ‘60s
when people wanted to pursue a better life outside the city:
New Jersey, Long Island, Westchester. Better life, cheap real estate, better schools. . . .
[W]hat happened was, the work—for city employees, particularly the police—there was
no work requirement that the police live in the city. So they end up living on Long Island.
And so . . . the question is, why would you stay? What was the incentive to stay in a city
that was, by all accounts, declining, real estate was not appreciating, and the quality of
life was fraying (Schoen 2009).
Furthermore, Aiello responded to how he saw the church being affected:
I think that the Church lost some of its members. I think the impact was also people were
moving away from the Church to some degree and whether that was the war experience,
whether it was the beginnings of, especially as the ‘60s started, the beginnings of some
real social upheaval in this country and people thinking for themselves . . . you really
don’t see that lack of power of the Church until late ‘60s, early ‘70s (Aiello 2009).
Herman Badillo added:
The indication, is that there are not that many Catholics left in the city. There aren’t, if
you look at the [fact that] blacks are predominantly Protestant. The Hispanics are now
overwhelmingly Protestant. The Jews are still there, and they’re still very powerful.
About the only place you have Italians left now is in Staten Island and some parts of
Brooklyn. You don’t have enough Italians left to run for office (Badillo 2009).
Asked when did the exodus of white ethnic Catholics begin, Badillo said:
The exodus really started after the Second World War and it started because after the
Second World War [there was] the GI Bill of Rights where people who had served in the
armed forces were able to go to college. Also because the fact that it was easy to build in
the outlying areas, places like Levittown and there was a huge housing boom outside of
the city. The Irish, Italians and the Jews felt that they were living in housing conditions
that were not so great and here they had a chance because of the GI Bill of Rights, to buy
a house and get a mortgage with a very low interest rate, payable over a long period of
time. People who hadn’t had the opportunity to be homeowners, suddenly found that they
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could be part of the American dream and they jumped at that chance (Badillo 2009).
Badillo further explained:
[T]hey were young soldiers who came back. They wanted to have children and this was
the ideal conditions to bring up children, go to the suburbs. They had better schools in the
suburbs, and they could commute to work in New York City which was then very cheap
as well, so it was the ideal world for them. So they left in huge numbers during a very
short period of time (Badillo 2009).
Daniel Chill, in discussing the demographic shift, returned to its political implications:
So, if you want to get to the bottom line, dispersal of the Irish Catholic immigrant class
into the suburbs and out of the cities, was the major cause of the Church losing its control
over the political and cultural part of the city of New York primarily . . . they moved
away, they went out to Long Island and I don’t know what they do in Long Island, the
political power, but certainly not in the city of New York anymore . . . you take
demographics, blacks moving in, Catholics moving out, radicalism on the left and the
Catholic Church lost its sense of balance (Chill 2009).
Discussing demographic shifts, Paul Crotty identifies the 1960s as a time that had a
marked impact on the city and on what remained of the formerly dominant white ethnic
populations:
[T]hat’s the time Co-op City [a large North Bronx housing development] got going and
then emptied out all the white neighborhoods in the South Bronx. Those who couldn’t
afford to get to Westchester and Nassau, they moved to Co-op City. So, all the Irish, all
the Italians all the Jews are gone. Those structures and their families, their neighborhoods
and their cultural organization all of which had blended together, were dissipated. And
the neighborhood was abandoned to poor people. They were exploited and then when
they couldn’t pay their rent, you know they set the buildings on fire. (Crotty 2011).

Father Duffell talked about people “having something and getting out of the city. I guess in the
1960s, well the 1960s was a wild time too. Some people kind of fled” (Duffell 2011).
The demographic shift, according to consultant Bruce Gyory, affected the ability of the
Archdiocese of New York and Catholics to affect public policy in New York City:
When they moved to the suburbs so you had a diminution. Whereas the Catholic vote
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used to be forty years ago, thirty to thirty-five percent, it’s now down to . . the white
Catholic vote is now down to somewhere between seventeen and twenty percent of the
general election . . . you had a diminution of the white Catholic vote, because of the way
the Catholic Church, the institutional hierarchy, is. While they’re friendly to the
Hispanics on issues like immigration, it’s still an Irish- run church so they, so what you
have is a number of things got undone, their link to the labor movement largely got
severed as the labor movement became more driven by the public sector unions which
meant it had more of a Jewish and then a black and a Hispanic flavor but not the old Irish.
(Gyory 2009).
Gyory continued:
It’s the Ralph Cramden factor . . . when you look at the Honeymooners [the 1950s
television program starring Jackie Gleason, Art Carney, Audrey Meadows, and Joyce
Randolph] and you see what people lived in back then, and saw the opportunity that the
suburbs represented for a home in Levittown, and other developments. It was a nice place
to raise your kids. It was open space and it was a natural draw to the upward mobility
(Gyory 2009).
Hispanic Catholics Moving In
The health of the Catholic Church in the United States depends on Hispanics and new
immigrants. Currently, 40 percent of the Catholic Church in the United States is Hispanic. Were
it not for immigrants the Church would be shrinking as present-day members drift away or die
off at rates faster than Catholic children are baptized. Among parishes with Hispanic ministries
attendance at Mass is 22 percent higher and participation in sacraments is relatively high
(Paulson, 2014). But according to the Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life, one in
four Hispanic Americans is a former Catholic (Pew Research Center 2014). New York State
Conservative Party chair Michael Long concurs that the Church’s future depends on Hispanics:
“Well, I think the Hispanics certainly are important to the future of the Church here in the City of
New York and I think . . . I think the Hispanic are definitely important for the future of the
Church. I believe they will be the . . . they are the Irishmen of the future, they are the Italians of
the future” (Long 2009).
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Peter Powers responded in a similar manner:
I think they’re important to the church, in the sense that they are Catholics, they want
their kids to go to Catholic school. The Church helps by keeping the schools open. That is
the way that the church helps. I don’t think that they attract through the leadership of the
Church and I don’t understand that, why maybe I just don’t follow the leadership that
closely . . . I think you would think that they would be expecting that, to have more the
Latino or a Spanish name up there, but the Church does perform a lot of social services
for them, especially in education . . . where the local public schools aren’t as good as the
Catholic schools and they give these kids a lot of education that they wouldn’t get
(Powers 2009).
James McManus spoke strongly about the value to the Archdiocese of New York of the
Hispanic Catholics:
It’s getting more important and it’s getting more important as we get along the Hispanics
especially who are Catholic and ninety percent of the cases are . . . getting involved in the
Church, remember they were always outsiders back in the 1950s, ‘60s, ‘70s because the
Church was run by the Irish Catholics and of course in those days the Hispanics were
mostly Puerto Ricans. Even though they were Catholics, they weren’t welcome into the
Church (McManus 2009).
McManus conveys what could be termed an everyday understanding that non-Hispanics had for
the prejudice that their fellow Hispanic Catholics experienced. Acknowledging that Puerto
Ricans faced discrimination, he nonetheless notes that it was part of the natural order of social
life.
[T]here’s always somebody at the low wrung on the ladder. One time it was the Jews.
Next time it was the Irish and you know . . . and it works its way down. So the Hispanics
never really got involved in the Church. They went to Church but you know they could
never be sexton or work on the fundraising or anything like that unless it was to lick
envelops. But now that the Irish Catholics have moved away. . . (McManus 2009).
Walter McCaffrey seeks to spell out the reason for a lack of acceptance of the Puerto
Ricans:
There was still a reluctance because they were outsiders. They were new, so perhaps the
clergy, in good heart, wanted to accept but the internal structures within the parishes did
not accept. Again, who were the clergy at that point? They were not Latino- based; they
did not have that type of appreciation. They were in many cases now old Irish clergy, old
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German clergy and so they just did not have that ability to make that type of change. And
I think as a result they did not have the ability to reach out (McCaffrey 2011).
“The church lost its constituents and did not work to build up the new constituents who came in”
observed Herman Badillo bluntly:
The Puerto Ricans who were Catholics, the Puerto Ricans who came here from Puerto
Rico [in early waves of immigration] were not Pentecostals at all. They were one hundred
percent Catholic practically and in Puerto Rico there were very few Protestants. Puerto
Rico had been part of Spain since before 1898 and being a Protestant or a Jew was
prohibited. The legend is that the first Badillo came in the 1840’s. When he died he was
buried a half a mile from the cemetery because since he admitted to being a Protestant the
church would not allow him to be buried because he said on his tomb, he said Antonio
Badillo and in Spanish loyal Protestant follower . . . because the tomb said loyal
Protestant follower, the Catholic Church said no, no, he cannot be buried in the cemetery.
In fact, the town hall, the plaza, in the town where I come from, it’s a typical example.
You had the other side of the city hall . . . the Catholic Church. And people say that if you
wanted to get anything done, you went first to the Catholic Church and got approval, then
you went to city hall because the Church was that powerful in Puerto Rico. When I was
growing up, there was only one tiny church, there was only Protestant church—way out
of the way, I had to walk about a mile every Sunday to get there, and that was the only
Protestant church so that shows you that this is just before the war, when the Puerto Rican
migration began and continued after the war (Badillo 2009).
Aureo Cardona, when asked about the Puerto Rican Catholic in-migration, immediately
cited his sense that the Puerto Ricans were not accepted as equals within Archdiocese parishes:
[T]here’s no integration, New York City doesn’t integrate, it tolerates and that’s okay and
we live with that. The Catholic Church didn’t know how to kind of bring in the new
players that believe in its God and it’s dogma. The Irish just didn’t know how to do it.
Now I’m not saying… maybe I’m wrong, maybe they’re just so damn racist that they
didn’t want to do it. I’m believing that’s not the case (Cardona 2011).
Father Skelly said that when the Puerto Ricans came they weren't accepted at first in a lot
of churches. He recalls only one parish having a Spanish speaking mass which began in 1958.
“Some priests resented that they were bringing Latinos into the church—because it was a
change. People always fight change” (Skelly 2011).
Monsignor Finn, in contrast, believes the Archdiocese did its best to deal with the needs
of the newly arriving Puerto Ricans:
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I think they are overwhelmed because it was new. I hope this doesn’t sound wrong but I
have often wondered if the fact that the Puerto Rican population, could make a quick hop
back and forth to Puerto Rico, if that wasn’t something that slowed down (their
absorption into local parishes). Because the Irish couldn’t hop back to Dublin….They
(the Puerto Ricans) were transient and again, Americans in the sense that they never
voted for to be in the United States. I find that interesting too (Finn 2011).
Another differing view comes from political consultant Bruce Gyory:
It’s fascinating. Also the other thing to watch is the Hispanics like the Italians. The
Hispanics are not looking to the Church for their political leadership. [New York State
Assembly member and former Bronx County Democratic Party leader] Jose Rivera, and
[State Senator Ruben] Diaz, they’re not looking to call up [Cardinal] Dolan and say
politically I want to discuss a problem here the way that [one-time Bronx County
Democratic Party Chair] Charlie Buckley might have called Spellman (Gyory 2009).
Could the Archdiocese of New York have taken action to stem the flight of white ethnics,
and would such action, had it been possible, protected the Catholic school system? Long
responded:
I’m not sure they would have stemmed the flight, they might have held on to their power.
Okay, they wouldn’t have stopped the flight of people who were . . . jumping out because
their kids weren’t in Catholic school. They might have stemmed the flight . . . at that
point in history I don’t think the citizens—and I certainly am one of them—felt the
Church was standing up to what was happening in the City of New York when John
Lindsay took office (Long 2009).
Long, a leader of a successful anti-Lindsay administration ballot initiative to stop an
independent Civilian Review Board to monitor the city’s Police Department, is an ideological
conservative and who opposes “that whole type of thinking”:
[T]hat whole type of thinking drove people out of the city. The Catholic schools started
to empty out as people and their neighbors moved. Their neighborhood was changing
because the neighbors who might have been in public school were moving out. The next
thing that happened was the Catholic parents started to move out for a better way of life
(Long 2009).
But Walter McCaffrey saw the attraction of the suburbs—as opposed to the problems of
the city—as an important motivator, “I think again, because the ability of people to be able to
now move into a better housing setting for themselves and their families, a desire to end up
180

having what were better schools in the suburbs. . . . Better than the Catholic schools in some
cases, yes, absolutely” (McCaffrey 2011).

A Failure to Include
The political structure of the city shifted quickly as Democratic Party and Tammany
control of Manhattan and Bronx machine politics was ending. Yet the New York Archdiocese,
unlike Boston, took no action to stop the out-migration (Bergin 2011; Gamm, 2001). Puerto
Ricans, the “marginal Catholics,” might have regenerated the numbers needed to fill the empty
parish pews. The Archdiocese might have replaced the clout it had wielded among the portbased labor force by building up its powerbase among public sector unions. The question, then,
is what did the Archdiocese do to try to find solutions to the organizational, political, and
demographic challenges it was facing? What actions did it to take to deal with the crises it and
the city faced as a result of those challenges? What did it do to manage its relationships with the
newest Catholics, Puerto Ricans, and the newest worker organizations, public sector unions?
The Church was aware of the issues facing it but did little to address them. It and its Irish
leadership were apprehensive and perhaps a bit dismissive about the new migrants and the city's
progressive, public unionization. Although at times the Archdiocese had brought in new
constituencies, historically it had not been an inclusive institution. As New York changed, the
Archdiocese had trouble changing with it because of its inherent apprehension of outsiders, an
apprehension that it projected onto the new groups taking their place within the city's power
structure.
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Immigration and the Archdiocese’s Declining Political Power
The world that the Archdiocese of New York had known – in which protecting its
adherents from physical assault, abuse and discrimination was paramount—had ended as the
political power shifted to local governmental control. The cradle–to–grave welfare system no
longer served its purpose for the Irish in particular. The Archdiocese's way of controlling
competition between groups of members was to establish national parishes for each new
immigrant group, which it did not do for Puerto Ricans. “Competition between newcomers and
insiders takes the form of conflict over the ethnic niche,” which might be an apt description of
the situation between newly-arriving groups and the well-ensconced Irish (Waldinger 1996, 3).
Although migrants start at the bottom:
[T]hey enter the economy under the auspices of friends or kin, which means that they
begin with connections . . . Networks funnel the newcomers into specialized economic
activities; as newcomers flow into the workplaces where earlier settlers have already
gotten established, ethnic concentrations, or niches, gradually develop. The path up from
the bottom involves finding a good niche and dominating it—which means good jobs are
reserved for insiders, leaving the next wave of outsiders excluded. Thus, the search by an
earlier migrant group for labor market shelters eventuates in barriers that the next round
of arrivals must confront (Waldinger 1996, 3-4).
In New York, however, the power of the Archdiocese remained with the Irish even as the
outflow of these ethnic New Yorkers became a veritable flood to the suburbs. Power did not
transfer to the new urban immigrants, and, as we have seen, the Archdiocese rectified the
situation neither through symbolic action nor tangible deed. “The tendency of power holders to
adopt a negative assessment of those with lower status is confirmed. . . . [S]tudies show that high
social status stimulates the perception that subordinates are chronic shirkers of responsibility,
who require constant supervision and motivation” (Blaug 2010, 12).
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The Irish Catholic Archdiocese’s Failure to Integrate Italians
Stephen Aiello, a former New York City Board of Education president, observes that
when you view the history of the Archdiocese of New York, it “continues to be essentially an
Irish Archdiocese of New York”:
The Irish Catholic Archdiocese of New York I’ve always described somewhat more
Calvinistic than the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, much more rigid in how
they interpreted dogma . . . and there are individuals that, you know, that belied what I’m
saying, but generally speaking the Irish Archdiocese of New York reflected to a great deal
the political establishment. And especially in the Democratic Party where we were
guineas, we were wops, we were good for certain things, but certainly not for leadership.
So you see a parallel…the Irish were the Americans. They weren’t like us and their
Archdiocese of New York was a very rigid Archdiocese of New York (Aiello 2009).
Writing about 1960s New York City, Kantrowitz observes: “Catholicism seems to form
no integrative bond between the Irish and the Italians” (1973, 30). This group cleavage remained
unchanged over time. More to the point, “ethnic segregation . . . even Irish Catholic from Italian
Catholic, has declined little over a generation; then it would appear that, in reality, primary
groups—whether in the family, Archdiocese of New York, or other institutions—may still rely on
face-to-face interaction made easier by residential propinquity” (Kantrowitz 1973, 7). Simply
put, the Irish and the Italians seemed not to like each other very much. The idea that “many
Italian immigrants felt unwelcome in Irish Catholic churches,” might be a serious understatement
(Carnes 2003, 3). Carnes adds that the “vast Irish immigrant population gave New York
Catholicism a pronounced Irish lilt that offended the Italians” (Carnes 2003, 9).
John Marino grew up Italian Catholic in New York City in the 1950s, becoming a state
Democratic Party chair and an advisor to both Governors Mario and Andrew Cuomo. He recalls
vividly the manifestations of this ethnic division with the Irish and how it took precedence over
any sense of religious unity. “I think that the little beating up that we would take—I don’t mean
physically from the Irish—they were immigrants who had come before us; they thought they
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were better than us.” But despite the animosity, he notes that his parents “became big fans of
President Kennedy . . . because even though he was Irish, he was Catholic, and it excited them to
have a Catholic president. And let’s face it: everything else attached to him, the young guy and
all that, beautiful wife . . . it was exciting for them” (Marino 2009). Marino continues:
But for the most part, they always felt that the Irish thought “who the hell were they?”
and you know we were below them because we were Italians, “guineas” to the Irish quite
often. And I had never actually heard the word actually until I moved to Throggs Neck [a
neighborhood in the northeast Bronx], never heard the word. But I was old enough to
know what it meant when I was called it. . . . [I]n that little neighborhood we were totally
segregated from anybody else’s group. It was all Italian until the Latinos and particularly
the blacks moved in . . . I think that you know the Irish control of the Archdiocese of New
York which remains until this day, this Archdiocese, has always left Italians . . . can’t do
anything for you, you know. And now we don’t even have the Pope (Marino 2009).

The Archdiocese of New York and the New Migrants
Although coming from very different cultures, Puerto Ricans and Italians shared two
characteristics. Neither the Italian immigrants nor Puerto Ricans had English proficiency, and
both groups had significant liturgical distinctions from the dominant Irish in their Catholic
observance. Skilled jobs and union jobs belonged to those who had arrived before, who in most
cases had created the unions, staffed the unions, and made sure the jobs that helped the unions to
survive went to their namesakes. Puerto Ricans arrived in New York City at the very time when
“skilled manual occupations had begun to overtake common labor. . . . Unions in the American
Federation of Labor generally did not recruit Puerto Rican carpenters, bricklayers, tailors or
barbers” (Badillo 2006, 56).
Previous Catholic populations had helped create the physical, financial, and political
structure of the Archdiocese:
[T]he original Irish immigrants, with whom the Puerto Ricans were compared, had had
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the further advantage of arriving with their own Archdiocese and their own priests. The
hundreds of Catholic churches and schools all over New York testified to the great
accumulated influence and wealth . . . the Puerto Ricans, while nominally Catholic, did
not have their own clergy nor were they considered particularly devoted parishioners
(Jonnes 1986, 112).
Was it the economic distinctions that made integration unlikely? Was it discrimination
because of color or language? Was the safety net created by the Archdiocese for previous
generations of the flock no longer capable of keeping the new arrivals in the Archdiocese?
Cohalan writes that “because of their rapid arrival in such great numbers (they were the
chief reason for an estimated 80 per cent Archdiocese population increase from 1940-1970) their
poverty and their lack of religious personnel, no effort was made to organize the Puerto Ricans
into national parishes” (1983, 296). On the other hand, Cardinal Spellman “acted to strategically
integrate different Latino Catholic ethnic groups with European-origin ethnics, rather than setting
them off in ‘national parishes’ as had been done with Europeans or requiring total homogenous
‘territorial’ parishes'” (Ibid.). He stressed the importance of clergy fluency in Spanish, but he
died in 1967 as the crisis in New York City was worsening (Badillo 2009). Herman Badillo—the
first Puerto Rican borough president, a candidate for mayor, a congressman, and deputy mayor in
the Koch administration—recalls that many Catholic Puerto Ricans became lost to the
Archdiocese when they joined the Pentecostal movement because, unlike the Irish Catholics, the
Pentecostals spoke Spanish (Badillo 2009). Finke and Stark dispel the idea that “all the priests
had to do was to stand at the gangplanks and enroll the faithful as they disembarked” (1992, 9).
Difficult organizational work was required to counteract Protestant missionary activity and to
create a feeling of group identity among Catholics.
The Archdiocese’s success as an institution may have worked to its disadvantage because
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a sense of oppression within groups often contributes to group cohesion. “Ironically it is only
where the Catholic Archdiocese is in the minority and is somewhat embattled that it can generate
the vigorous participation we have come to associate with American Catholicism” (Ibid.). When
formerly impoverished Catholics entered the mainstream socially and economically, the nature of
their relationship with the Archdiocese was affected. The Archdiocese no longer remained an
institution based on devotion to ideals reinforced by a feeling of societal rejection. Daily survival
was no longer the question for the dominant Irish. Oates writes, “[b]y the 1940s and 1950s,
Catholics were joining the ranks of the middle and the upper class at a very rapid rate” (1999,
290). It was an established Irish hierarchy that no longer related to the challenges of new
immigrant Catholic communities.

Rise in the Non-White, Non-Catholic Power and Population
Evangelical Hispanics and Non-Hispanics
Interviewees noted a perceived increase in the numbers of evangelically connected
Hispanics. Community and housing activist Aureo Cardona noted the religious attraction of
Evangelical Protestantism: “[P]eople were hearing things they wanted to hear. People want to
hear, we have to get better here. That . . . God wants us to have a good life, not live in dire
poverty and die waiting a payoff in the next world" (Cardona 2011). Monsignor Peter Finn
agreed: “Pentecostals made tremendous inroads in the Puerto Rican population. . . We didn’t
have the people [clergy] to be in that group in the numbers, I mean we have them and we have
some strong places but not enough. It’s overwhelming” (Finn 2011).
Is the Evangelical impact as significant as many of those interviewed seem to think?
Peter Quinn says yes: "I think they [Hispanics] find their values are reflected there more. I
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mean . . . the Pentecostal, which is taking off, it’s not because they’re more liberal than the
Catholic Church. In many ways they’re much more politically conservative” (Quinn 2011). For
Conservative Party leader Michael Long, the answer to the Archdiocese of New York’s loss of
newly arriving immigrants is a return to Church doctrine, which in his view will help restore the
“Catholic power base.” Long said:
I believe the Catholic power base can wake up but we need the leader that’s going to
wake it up. We need the issues that’s going to cause it to wake up and . . . I hate to say
this, I just spoke at a Save Marriage rally in Albany, we had a nice crowd, six hundred,
seven hundred people, I think; without inflating the figures maybe it was a thousand I
don’t know . . . . It was mostly black and Hispanic ministers. It wasn’t Catholic priests. In
my day . . . we had these guys who were very outspoken and . . . most of them happened
to be Irish and no nonsense guys, tough men. They were not just priests; they were tough
men and I think that’s the other thing that took place and happened to our church. And
I’m sure, some of the priests hear me say this, and are upset with it, but they were tough
men. I went to Catholic grammar school. I had tough priests and I looked up at them, they
were my heroes and my leaders. They were . . . hats were cocked all the time, toothpick
in the mouth. They were tough guys. They were a different breed of guys at the time
(Long 2009).
Frank Macchiarola appeared to agree. “The Hispanics with the strongest moral positions
are not Catholic. They’re Evangelicals” (Macchiarola 2009). Douglas Schoen, mayoral,
gubernatorial and presidential pollster was also in strong agreement:
They are Pentecostals. They may go to church, to Catholic Church if they’re Catholic.
But they’re not organized politically as Catholics. Moreover, the Catholics are not Irish
and Italian; they’re Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Nicaraguans, El Salvadorians.
So there’s a disparate ethnic makeup. And there are a lot of very small churches that don’t
have anything other than a storefront and a charismatic preacher (Schoen 2009).

Conclusion
The Archdiocese of New York was late in responding to post-1960s changes in the social,
economic and political environment, especially when compared with other dioceses. A more
timely and appropriate response might have helped the Archdiocese preserve its power, or at
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least might have helped it to realign and refocus its power.
Although the ethnic composition of the Catholic population within the Archdiocese had
changed, its numbers had not significantly shrunk, and the Archdiocese highly valued its
parochial schools as a means to ensure transmission of Catholic belief to that population. Yet,
the Archdiocese continued to maintain schools—and parishes—at great financial cost within its
urbanized core, where significant numbers of an interested and involved Catholic population no
longer resided. Until the realignment of 2006, parish priests tended to remain at their posts in the
city’s most dangerous inner neighborhoods, ministering as the schools did to the poorest and
perhaps the least “Catholic” of their flock.
There was a failure of the Archdiocese of New York to integrate these poor Puerto Ricans
migrants and organize them into national parishes to serve as spiritual and organizing locales.
The Archdiocese thus denied Puerto Ricans what it had granted to earlier immigrants: the
opportunity to create social networks within its own traditions and culture that might have
resulted in greater upward mobility. The data indicate that this failure to absorb Puerto Ricans,
coupled with white flight, weakened the Archdiocese of New York and sapped its remaining
post-Spellman era political power. The flight of this whiter flock impaired the ability of the
Archdiocese to influence public policy and facilitated the severing of its link with the labor
movement. It missed an opportunity to replenish its faithful from among the growing Puerto
Rican population.
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION
In November 2013, Democrat Bill de Blasio became the first white Roman Catholic New
York City mayor of either major political party since Rudy Giuliani left office at the end of 2001.
The oath of office was administered on January 1, 2014, by the nation's 42nd President, William
Jefferson Clinton, a Southern Democrat and a Protestant. Mayor de Blasio’s wife, an AfricanAmerican, stood at his side. There were many speeches at the inauguration events held outside
City Hall. The city’s ethnic and racial hues were represented on the faces of those sitting above
the lectern, important for a city where in one of its five boroughs, Queens, as many as 170
languages are spoken daily.
Missing from the assembled crowd to welcome the new mayor was Timothy Cardinal
Dolan, the Archbishop of New York. The new mayor had campaigned for office on a platform
that included taxing the rich and reducing the ever-growing income disparities between the city’s
rich and poor. Servicing the less fortunate had always been a staple of the Church’s work.
Clergy representing several different faiths spoke at the inaugural ceremony. The leader of the
Archdiocese of New York, however, gave no speech or invocation.
Two weeks later, Mayor de Blasio and Cardinal Dolan met at the Cardinal’s residence.
One headline proclaimed: “Mayor de Blasio and Cardinal Dolan meet, vow to try to bring Pope
to New York” (Durkin 2014). De Blasio described himself in another story as not religious but
as a man of faith. The reporter wrote that the discussion between the two included talk about the
recently rejected East Midtown zoning plan that the Bloomberg administration had supported
(Durkin 2014). Also reported was that the Church-owned property in the area that would have
been rezoned would remain as is, since the city council had rejected the entire plan.
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De Blasio and the Church both share deeply-held concerns about the poor. But de Blasio
won the elections with support from left-wing labor unions, the LGBT
(lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender) community and abortion rights activists. He was a candidate
of the left-leaning Working Families Party, which certainly would have been anathema to
Cardinal Spellman. De Blasio’s life-long support for wealth redistribution and other social
reforms bore no resemblance to Church's traditional posture. He came to the Powerhouse not as
a mendicant but as a mayor, meeting the leader of another of the city’s many constituent groups.
The meeting was unremarkable.

Restating of the Question
The social, economic, and political shifts described in this dissertation comprise part of
the increasingly unstable urban environment of the second half of the twentieth century, an
environment that definitively affected the Archdiocese of New York. I asked prominent New
Yorkers with years of experience working with or for the Archdiocese about the last half century,
its tumultuous times and their effects on the Church. I consulted a voluminous literature on the
City, ethnic relations, the Catholic Church, and local politics. Drawing as well on demographic
data, I found that my interlocutors offered insights into Archdiocesan influence and power, and
they provided answers about how the Archdiocese lost its ability to influence political decisionmakers, social and labor movements, and its own parishioners during the last part of the
twentieth century. This dissertation refutes the argument that the Archdiocese lost power
because its parishioners left for the suburbs.
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Power, Decision-Making, and Influence in Public Life
I contend that the Archdiocese lost opportunities to capitalize on the changes that were
going on around it, and these lost opportunities ultimately resulted in a diminution of its power
base. In 1962, Pope John XXIII convened Vatican II, which produced reforms that were meant to
bring the Church into the modern world. Despite these reforms, however, the Church was
headed instead for a collision with emerging social movements that sought improved standing
for women, minorities, and the LGBT community. And although the Church perceived itself as
embracing diversity, the Archdiocese did little to work with or help Puerto Ricans, the newest
Catholic migrants. Many of these new arrivals shifted their allegiances from the Catholic
Church to the Evangelical movement and thus were lost to the Archdiocese as a group that could
have refreshed its old power base of suburbanizing white ethnics.
The Archdiocese lost not just loyal individuals: As the public sector unions became
prominent, as waterfront jobs were being shipped to New Jersey, as the Democrat reform
movement took hold, and as Tammany's clout declined, the Archdiocese lost considerable
political influence. Its adaptations were too little and came too late to bring the Archdiocese
back to its former position of influence and power within the cultural and political tumult that
was the New York City of the period.
The Archdiocese tried to wield its influence throughout the times of urban unrest in New
York City, but it simply could not find a toehold in the shifting cultural and political landscape
after it suffered the losses noted above. In addition, the structure of the Church hierarchy made
finding that toehold even more difficult. As Wilson has indicated, the Archdiocese's lack of
nimbleness was woven into the very fabric of its structure. Far from being able to create a
"specialized unit" to deal with changing times, and despite Vatican II, he noted that bureaucratic
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entities, such as the Archdiocese, possessed “… an administrative apparatus so large as to be
immune from popular control” and by extension the winds of popular change (Wilson 1975, 2).
Most of my interview respondents agreed that the Archdiocese exemplified Wilson's idea that
“(F)rom the point of view of their members, bureaucracies are sometimes uncaring, ponderous,
or unfair” (Ibid.). Certainly this particular ecclesiastical bureaucracy was not responsive and
agile in the way it needed to be to retain the weight of its influence.

Church and State: Inherent Conflict
The Church continues to believe that it must be involved in public affairs. In Catholics,
Politics & Public Policy: Beyond Left and Right, Cochran and Cochran ask: “What does public
life need from Catholics?” And then they answer:
[A]ction. Public life needs involvement of faithful Catholic people. In particular, the
Church sees it as a special vocation of the laity to take an active role in civic life. Even
though deacons, priests, bishops, and religious women may from time to time speak and
act on political issues that are not their special calling. Instead, laypersons deeply
immersed in the world are responsible for bringing their faith to bear on public life
(Cochran and Cochran 2003, 6).
That is precisely what Catholics, directed by the Church's instruction on the morality of action,
had always done as participants in New York City’s public life. Providing that direction might
have been how Cardinal Spellman saw his role, as he was considered the “political priest.” Both
he and Cardinal Cooke, the “administrator priest,” were most concerned with protecting the
institution they served, certainly attempting to preserve its temporal influence within its religious
constraints, but ultimately they saw that influence diminish. It is as though they rediscovered
Matthew 6:24, that “No one can serve two masters.” The Archdiocese of New York opted,
however, to serve structural rigidity and bureaucratic habit over its parishioners’ needs.
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Did Cardinals Spellman and Cooke consider rationally and comprehensively the extent
that their actions would or would not protect the Archdiocese and preserve its influence? Stone
writes that rational decision-making can be defined as “. . . not deciding by habit, intuition,
voting or other ways. . . The ideal of perfect rationality would require a person (or an
institution) to consider all possible alternatives . . . and evaluate all the possible consequences of
each” (Stone 2002, 233). Both cardinals certainly decided by habit and precedent. And although
they might well have attempted to evaluate what the consequences of their actions or non-actions
portended, it would have taken a crystal ball to predict the scope and depth of the changes going
on in urban America and the extent to which those changes would affect the Church.
Although the Archdiocese never had direct decision-making authority or power in
political or sociocultural arenas, the Church had a history of strong influence and a collection of
powerful proxies. In Dahl's paradigm, the Church had virtual power, able to produce votes from
its parishioners. Thus, it could “force” the government to do what the Church wanted it to do
(Dahl 2005). After the liberalization of the urban landscape that occurred in the second half of
the twentieth century, however, the influence of the Church and its allies declined significantly.
On votes of importance to the Church—divorce liberalization, abortion reform, gay marriage,
and residency requirements—the Church failed to influence city and state legislatures to vote its
interests. Although the Church could not control what went on in the temporal world, it could
continue its own mission to ensure that “people of faith,” as Cochran and Cochran describe,
would make their voices heard in the public arena (Cochran and Cochran 2003).
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The Church as Integrator?
The Church saw itself as the great integrating agent and Americanizer of its flock, a view
supported by Cardinal Spellman’s service as vicar general to the Armed Forces and as staunch
defender of the American way against communism. But as we have seen, the Archdiocese was
of little use in helping Puerto Ricans and others considered non-white integrate, and its lack of
accommodation might well be viewed as isolating these newer arrivals from their Catholic coreligionists and, initially, from the American mainstream. Non-white Catholics had indeed been
integrating into mainstream America but largely without the help of the Church.
Immigrant groups do not necessarily remain stuck in their status for extended periods.
“Most fundamentally, groups rise and fall over time. The fortunes of WASP elites have been
declining for decades,” write Chua and Rubenfield (2014). Dahl writes that the purpose of
political activity by ethnic groups is “to enlarge the opportunities for ethnics to rise without
undue discrimination in a system that contained built-in inequalities in the distribution of
resources” (Dahl 2005, 33). What Dahl is saying is that ethnic groups fight discrimination not
the system itself. Thus if the Archdiocese of New York had the sort of power described by the
Dahl model it would object to those who appeared to impede its parishioners' upward mobility,
and to use its power to counter the offense through the electorate.

Power, Past and Present
How much power did the Archdiocese actually have? My findings suggest that the
Archdiocese had far-reaching, substantial influence and power, but such influence and power no
longer exists.
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Did the Archdiocese have sufficient power under Cardinals Spellman and Cooke to force
other public actors to do what they did not want to do? During the Spellman era, the answer
appears to be yes. Cardinal Spellman understood the political usefulness of linkage to various
social networks in creating power, and during his era, political strength derived from such
linkages. But during the Cooke era, the correct answer appears to be maybe. Certainly, the
Archdiocese had strongly opposed legalization of abortion; regardless, the law passed in 1970
during the Cooke era. Did the Archdiocese of New York have the power to force legislatures to
maintain restrictive laws, or to prevent the passage of more liberalizing laws? The ultimate
answer is no. On votes of importance to the Church cited in this dissertation—divorce reform,
abortion liberalization, gay marriage, and residency requirements— the Church failed to
influence city and state legislators to do its bidding.

Summary
This study seeks a greater understanding of the significance of religion in the history of
late 20th century New York City politics. In particular, it focuses on the Archdiocese of New York
and how it addressed the demographic changing of the guard that occurred when Puerto Rican
migrants came to New York City and Irish and Italian Catholics left for the suburbs.
Suburbanization came to mean a new life—cleaner, healthier, and whiter, and less reliant
on the Church for temporal goods. The American dream of the post-war era, then, seemed to
mirror the cliché of a white picket fence surrounding a suburban back yard where young children
could play, unafraid of crime, neighborhood tensions, and the threat of diversity. New
communities in the suburbs filled by those fleeing the city would loosen their ties to the
communal and social structures that had allowed their descendants to climb from poverty to the
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middle class.
Suburbanization was a transformation brought about by a mixture of social carrots and
sticks. The federal government initiated an interstate highway system that made exodus from the
old city to the new suburbs easier; supported programs and agencies that helped returning
servicemen gain access to higher education—ending their reliance on working-class jobs and
working-class wages—and low-cost guaranteed home mortgages; and unleashed an unplanned
urban renewal process that destroyed neighborhoods. Other forces affecting the Archdiocese’s
position in this shifting urban landscape had local antecedents: the altered labor and economic
environment that led to the rise of the municipal union; and the loss of waterfront jobs—once the
economic engine of regional commerce. Municipal unions, not political machines, would lead
the new minority middle class, fueled by an ideology at odds with both Cardinal Spellman-style
“Americanism” and Cardinal Cooke's passivity. New York’s minority communities and social
movements—civil rights, gay rights, women’s’ liberation—dominated the political discussion.
The Archdiocese of New York and Catholic theology appeared tied to an outdated urban past and
to a politics that the quickly secularizing younger generation raised in the suburbs sought to put
behind itself.
A confluence of changes, then, confronted the Archdiocese, an institution that remained
reluctant to change and interactive only with the secular world when it needed the power
temporal political forces could provide. That system worked well until the mid- to late 1960s.
Passage of divorce law reform in 1966 and the legalization of abortion in 1970 quickly informed
those who thought otherwise that the Archdiocese and the Cardinal were indeed mortal, and to
challenge them did not result in public humiliation and eternal damnation.
Communities suffering from the destruction and isolation of urban exodus and the rapid
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changes in the city’s power centers and economics might have believed the Archdiocese could
have done more to relieve their distress. Although institutions generally fled areas like the South
Bronx, it was the Archdiocese with its individual parish priests, seen by many as heroes
possessing great faith and bravery, who remained at their posts. Parish priests ministered to New
York City’s new arrivals and to others left behind during the great exodus. They were the face of
the Archdiocese to those who had been discriminated against and who had little hope for the
future.
It has been said that the Archdiocese fled the city for the green suburban grass and left
behind those John Cardinal Hughes’s immigrant church pledged to serve. But the Archdiocese
did follow the flock: New churches and schools were built as the population to be serviced
moved from the city. Despite, however, clear financial strains, the Archdiocese did not plan or
publicly present closure plans for urban churches and schools until 2006. It maintained its
facilities in the city far longer than prudent fiscal management would have dictated.
Finally, it is not that the Archdiocese is without power today. Any entity with such large
real estate holdings and so many followers cannot be discounted. But the nature of its power has
changed. It has become less of a temporal, institutional force within the city and more of a
spiritual force within the ranks of its faithful. The power of the Archdiocese rests with the ability
of its leaders to minister to its flock and not to the politicians it hoped would protect it.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS APRIL 2009-JANUARY 2014
Aiello, Stephen. Personal Interview. 23 June 2009.
Stephen Aiello, PhD, served as president of the New York City Board of Education from
1975-1980. A former New York City high school teacher, Aiello was spokesman and
chairman of the Italian-American Civil Rights League.
Badillo, Herman. Personal Interview. 15 June 2009.
Herman Badillo was elected Bronx borough president in 1965 and ran for mayor of the
City of New York in 1969, 1973, 1977 and 1985. He was elected to the US House of
Representatives and served from 1971-1977. He was also a deputy mayor during the
administration of Mayor Edward I. Koch. Badillo was the first Puerto Rican elected and
appointed to those posts. He also served as New York City commissioner of relocation,
responsible for the relocation of citizens displaced by urban renewal/slum clearance
programs during the administration of Mayor Robert F. Wagner in the early 1960s.
Bergin, Monsignor Thomas. Personal Interview. 7 September 2011.
Thomas Bergin is the former Vicar for education for the Archdiocese of New York under
Cardinal Terrence Cooke. He is today a parish priest and serves as chairman of the
Staten Island Catholic Schools Board, appointed by Cardinal Timothy Dolan.
Cardona, Aureo. Personal Interview. 24 March 2011.
A life-long resident of the South Bronx, Aureo Cardona is a former Democratic Party
district leader. Cardona developed affordable housing and oversaw rehabilitation of
burned- out apartment buildings in his community while working at the South Bronx
Housing Corporation and at SEBCO, both locally based non-government organizations.
Carey, Donald. Personal Interview. 11 October 2011.
Donald Carey, active in education reform, has been an investment banker and insurance
company executive. He also served as an unpaid advisor to his father, Governor High
Carey, who is credited with saving New York State and New York City from bankruptcy
in the 1970s.
Chill, Daniel. Personal Interview. 19 May 2009.
Daniel Chill, a graduate of Yale University Law School, has served as chief counsel on
the Assembly side of the New York State Task Force on Demographic Research and
Reapportionment for more than thirty years. He is an expert on population shifts and on -census- driven alterations to legislative districts in New York City and New York State.
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Crotty, Paul. Personal Interview. 21 September 2011.
A United States federal judge, Paul Crotty was New York City finance commissioner and
Department of Housing Preservation Development commissioner for the City of New
York. In addition, he served as New York City corporation counsel where he appeared
before the United States Supreme Court.
Cunningham, William. Personal Interview. 5 May 2009.
William Cunningham was an advisor to Governors High L. Carey and Mario Cuomo. He
also served as chief of staff to US Senator Patrick Moynihan. Cunningham has also been
communications director for Mayor Michael Bloomberg.
Dunne, Thomas. Personal Interview. 6 April 2011.
Thomas Dunne presently serves as vice-president for Governmental Relations and Urban
Affairs at Fordham University. Active in politics and political campaigns in New York
City, Dunne—former vice-president of Public Policy and External Affairs at Verizon—
has also been an administrative judge for the New York State Department of Social
Services and vice-chair of the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board.
Dufell, Father John. Personal Interview. 4 October 2011.
Father Duffell served as pastor of the Church of the Ascension located in Manhattan’s
West Side. He has been an advocate for immigration reform and for changes in church
doctrine on homosexuality. His parish has been noted for new programs and parish
religious activities to increase immigrant religious participation.
Finn, Monsignor Peter. Personal Interview. 14 September 2011.
Monsignor Finn, ordained in 1965, and named a monsignor in 1986, has been associate
superintendent of schools in the Archdiocese of New York and also served as rector of St.
Joseph’s Seminary, Dunwoodie, where future priests are trained.
Gyory, Bruce. Personal Interview. 16 July 2009.
Bruce Gyory has been a senior advisor to three New York governors: Hugh Carey, Eliot
Spitzer and David Paterson. He is an adjunct professor of political science at SUNY
Albany. Gyory traces his political roots to the old Liberal Party in which his father
Nicholas Gyory—an official of the Furriers Union—was an officer.
Jenik, Reverend John. Personal Interview. 28 July 2011.
Father Jenik has served as pastor of Our Lady of Refuge parish. He has spent 40 years
working in the Bronx, witnessing the destruction and resurgence of neighborhoods. He is
noted for battling to rid communities of crime, drug use, prostitution and other urban ills.
199

He has been a leader in creating affordable housing and has been vicar of the northwest
Bronx.
Keough, Karen. Personal Interview. 12 May 2009.
Karen Persichelli Keough served as director of New York operations for then-US Senator
Hillary Clinton. The daughter of a New York City police officer, Keough, has also
worked for New York City public sector union District Council 37, chief of staff to a city
councilmember, and on the campaign to elect David Dinkins as mayor.
Long, Michael. Personal Interview. 10 July 2009.
Michael Long is chairman of the New York State Conservative Party. A former Marine
and the father of nine children, Long managed the campaign that in 1966 defeated Mayor
John Lindsay’s police/civilian complaint review board proposal. Long served as a
Brooklyn city councilman-at-large from 1981-1983. He is a death penalty proponent, and
is opposed to abortion and same sex marriage.
Macchiarola, Frank, PhD. Personal Interview. 11 May 2009.
Appointed by Mayor Edward I. Koch, Frank Macchiarola served as New York City
school chancellor. An active Roman Catholic layperson, Macchiarola ran unsuccessfully
for New York City comptroller, but served in many appointed positions including the
New York City Campaign Finance Board. Frank Macchiarola was a faculty member at
Baruch College, CUNY, Columbia University, Saint Francis College, and was vicepresident of the CUNY Graduate Center.
Marino, John. Personal Interview. 7 May 2009.
A former New York City teacher and East Harlem native, John Marino has been a senior
advisor to governors Mario and Andrew Cuomo, and campaign manager for three of
Governor Mario Cuomo’s elections. He also served in the administration of Governor
Hugh Carey.
McCaffrey, Walter. Personal Interview. 28 September 2011.
Walter McCaffrey, the son of Irish immigrants, served on the New York City Council for
sixteen years, and as chair of its powerful Zoning and Franchises Subcommittee of the
Land Use Committee. He was also chief of staff to Manhattan Borough President Andrew
Stein.
McLaughlin, Martin. Personal Interview. 6 May 2009.
Former Daily News reporter and George Polk Award winner Martin McLaughlin was
raised in Manhattan and attended parochial schools. He was communications director for
the Manhattan borough president’s office, and a congressional staffer in Washington.
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Later in the mid-1980s after serving as Mayor Edward Koch's press secretary during
Koch's unsuccessful New York State gubernatorial campaign, McLaughlin became a
lobbyist representing commercial interests. He remains a financial supporter of Roman
Catholic parochial schools.
McManus, James. Personal Interview. 15 July 2009.
James McManus has led the McManus Mid-Town Democratic Club since 1963. Located
in Clinton, formerly known as Hell’s Kitchen, the McManus Club has been a local and
family institution since 1892 and is one of the last Tammany-era political clubs still
functioning in New York City.
Napolitano, Andrew. Personal Interview. 2 January 2014.
Andrew Napolitano, graduate of Princeton University, author and former judge, is the
political and senior judicial analyst for the Fox News Channel. Napolitano, an active
Roman Catholic layman, is pro-life, opposes capital punishment, and believes the
government should not prohibit same sex marriage.
Ott, Edward. Personal Interview. 19 October 2009.
Edward Ott served as executive director of the New York City Central Labor Council,
representing an estimated 1.3 million union members in 400 organizations including both
private and public sector unions. After the conclusion of a forty year- long career in the
labor movement, Ott is now distinguished lecturer in labor studies at the Murphy
Institute, CUNY School of Professional Studies.
Pitta, Vincent F. Personal Interview. 19 May 2009.
Vincent Pitta, a New York City labor lawyer active in Roman Catholic organizations
including the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, grew up in a labor family. He serves
as counsel to many labor organizations, including the 25,000-member New York
Hotel/Motel Trades Council. His Father Vito Pitta, an immigrant from Sicily, was a
longshoreman who changed professions and became president of the New York
Hotel/Motel Trades Council, building it into one of the city’s most powerful entities.
Powers, Peter. Personal Interview. 21 July 2009.
Peter Powers, graduate of Bishop McLaughlin High School, Manhattan College, and
New York University Law School, was the campaign manager for Mayor Rudolph
Giuliani’s two successful mayoral campaigns. He was the city’s first deputy mayor from
1994-1996, and today heads a business consulting company. Peter Powers is a director of
the Partnership for New York City.

201

Pressman, Gabe. Personal Interview. 1 August 2011.
Gabe Pressman, the senior correspondent for WNBC-TV, has been a reporter covering
politics in New York City for more than sixty years. The winner of eight Emmy Awards,
an Edward R. Murrow Award, and Peabody Award, he has covered the leaders of the
Archdiocese of New York since Francis Cardinal Spellman.
Quinn, Peter. Personal Interview. 11 May 2011.
Peter Quinn earned a Bachelor of Arts from Manhattan College and a Master of Arts
from Fordham University. He served as chief speechwriter for Governor Hugh Carey
and Governor Mario Cuomo. Peter Quinn, author of a 1984 speech delivered by
Governor Cuomo at Notre Dame that addressed religion and politics, is a board member
of the American Irish Historical Society.
Roberts, Sam. Personal Interview. 3 June 2009.
Sam Roberts is an award winning newspaper reporter who today serves as the urban
affairs correspondent for the New York Times. A former city editor and political editor
for the New York Daily News, Sam Roberts is the co-author of a biography of Governor
Nelson Rockefeller, and editor of a book about Mayor John Lindsay's impact on the city.
Sakano, Monsignor Donald. Personal Interview. 30 August 2011.
Monsignor Donald Sakano is pastor of the Basilica of St. Patrick’s Old Cathedral located
in lower Manhattan. He served as director of the department of neighborhood
preservation, Catholic Charities. While in that post he worked to protect middle-income
housing in Manhattan at the direction of Archbishop John O’Connor. Monsignor Sakano
is president and chair of the non-profit Highbridge Community Development
Corporation, which owns and operates 2400 South Bronx housing units.
Samuels, David. Personal Interview. 16 September 2011.
David Samuels attended Harvard University and Harvard Law School. He is a former
deputy chief of the New York State Attorney General’s Charities Bureau and is an expert
on legal issues confronting charitable and religious organizations in New York State.
Schoen, Douglas. Personal Interview. 28 April 2009.
Douglas Schoen was the pollster for the campaigns of Governor Hugh Carey, mayors
Edward Koch and Michael Bloomberg, and President Bill Clinton.
Skelly, Reverend Francis. Personal Interview. 19 July 2011.
Reverend Francis Skelly, pastor of the Immaculate Conception Church in the south
Bronx, grew up in the parish in which he has served for decades. He is a founder of South
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Bronx Churches, an advocacy group whose activities have included organizing to force
the New York City Housing Authority to repair its apartment units.
Strasburg, Joseph. Personal Interview. 27 September 2011.
Joseph Strasberg is president of the Rent Stabilization Association of New York (RSA), a
landlord trade association. Previously, he was counsel to New York City Council Speaker
Peter Vallone and deputy counsel to Peter Vallone’s predecessor, Thomas Cuite.
Tierney, Robert. Personal Interview. 18 June 2009.
Robert Tierney was counsel to Mayor Edward Koch and assistant counsel to Governor
High Carey. Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed Tierney to be chairman of the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission. He has also been a visiting scholar at
New York University's Taub Urban Research Center.
Vallone, Peter Sr. Personal Interview. 1 May 2009.
Peter Vallone Sr. was the first speaker of the New York City Council, a position created
after a landmark legal case resulted in the re-organization of city government. Prior to
this, Vallone had been a councilman representing his native Astoria. He is a graduate of
Fordham University and Fordham University Law School. Active in Catholic lay
organizations, Vallone was an unsuccessful candidate for mayor in 2001.
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
1a. Is it still the case that the NYC government has input from the Archdiocese (the Power
House) regarding major appointments?
2a. Was the Biaggi withdrawal and BEAME endorsement for Mayor the seminal event indicating
the change in the decline of the ethnic and Catholic power block in city elections?
2b. Did this mean that Catholic politicians were less likely to hold power?
2c. Why do you think this is?
3a.Why did the Catholic, Irish and Italians leave the city?
3b.What was their motivation?
4a. Did this exodus affect the Church?
5a. Does the Church have a role today in city politics?
5b. If so, what?
6a. Are the new ethnic groups important to the Church?
6b. If so, how?
7a. Is the shift of power from organized labor in NYC to public sector unions reflective of:
Ethnic Shift / Changing Role of The Church?
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